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Abstract
In 1978 a group of evangelical philosophers and theologians held a meeting to decide what the
definitive statement on the doctrine of inerrancy would be. Drawing on the thought of B.B.
Warfield and others this group came up with a statement comprising of a short statement,
nineteen articles including both statements of affirmation and denial, as well as, an exposition
of these articles. Taken in its entirety, this statement is intended to be the Evangelical statement
determining all subsequent information about the doctrine of inerrancy. Leading evangelicals,
including Carl F.H. Henry signed this document in order to establish a consensus on what one
meant when using the term inerrancy.
Almost three decades later this term is still used with a sense of confusion and the doctrine is no
less controversial. In fact, it still is responsible for the division of departments in many
evangelical institutions of higher education in North America. The following thesis hopes to
help loosen this doctrine from its theological ‘stronghold’ and place it in a position where it will
be less likely to cause division amongst evangelicals.
By examining the thought of both B.B. Warfield, who helped create the doctrine, and Carl F.H.
Henry, who played a contemporary role in the formation of the Chicago Statement and who
might rightly be considered the evangelical theologian of the twentieth century, this thesis
brings to light certain presuppositions of the doctrine of inerrancy that allow it take a position
that undergirds other theological doctrines.
By identifying the nature of truth and authority as the main tenants of the inerrantist position,
the thesis examines these terms in light of the thought of both Warfield and Henry. Their
thought is found to be remarkably similar to certain principles and concerns raised by
Enlightenment philosophers and it is concluded that the understandings of truth and authority
presupposed by the doctrine of inerrancy ultimately are biased by Enlightenment philosophy
and so are an inadequate representation of the terms as used in Scripture and tradition.
The thesis suggests that an adequate understanding of truth would be primarily Christological in
nature and, therefore, a larger category than the one presupposed by the doctrine of inerrancy.
Also, an adequate understanding of authority would presuppose the contemporary work of the
Holy Spirit, which again makes for a much larger pneumatological category than the one
presupposed by the doctrine of inerrancy as it is currently defined.
Enlarging these categories in no way necessitates the denial of inerrancy altogether. Rather it
removes the doctrine of inerrancy from its theological pedestal and places it amongst other
beliefs that might support the truth and authority of Scripture but by no means establish them.
The concluding chapter ends with a statement of what this new doctrine of inerrancy might look
like.
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Introduction 
 
 
 
A great battle rages today around biblical infallibility among evangelicals.   
To ignore the battle is perilous.  To come to grips with it is necessary.  To  
fail to speak is more than cowardice; it is sinful.  There comes a time when  
Christians must not keep silent, when to do so is far worse than to speak and  
risk being misunderstood or disagreed with.1   
 
Harold Lindsell wrote these words over three decades ago.  In his controversial book, The 
Battle for the Bible, Lindsell identifies the doctrine of inerrancy as the watershed issue for 
American evangelicals in the late twentieth century.  Thirty years later, the doctrine of 
inerrancy still takes precedence in faith statements of many American evangelical institutions 
and although this ‘battle’ has died down to some extent since Lindsell’s time, it still is being 
fought, particularly amongst North American evangelicals.  To many of these evangelicals it 
is a defining doctrine and it is what differentiates them from their Christian brothers and 
sisters.   
 
So to write a PhD thesis examining some of the theological implications that are implied by 
the doctrine of inerrancy would seem to be a fruitful way to engage with some of the 
concerns of the contemporary evangelical church.  I say ‘some’ because although the 
concerns of the contemporary evangelical church are larger than just the doctrine of 
inerrancy, the doctrine of inerrancy is still a doctrine that most American  evangelicals see a 
                                                
1 Lindsell, Harold.  The Battle for the Bible.  Zondervan: Edinburgh, 1976, p. 26. 
 2 
need to confirm, but are not quite sure of what philosophical and theological presuppositions 
are involved in such a confirmation. Hence the motivation for the work that follows.  
 
Using the ‘Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy’ as the definitive statement of the 
doctrine of inerrancy, chapter one sets out to define the claims of the doctrine of inerrancy as 
established in this ‘statement.’  This is a foundational chapter in that it establishes what is 
meant by the term inerrancy when it is used in the rest of the thesis.  It addresses the 
scriptural and historical evidences that are used to support inerrancy, discusses the model of 
inspiration used by inerrantists, and then discusses the appeal to ‘original autographs’ that is 
fundamental to the inerrantist claim.  The chapter closes with an account of why inerrantists 
believe that continuing to uphold the doctrine of inerrancy is crucial to making other 
theological assertions. 
 
This leads directly into the two main parts of the thesis: Truth and Authority.  Chapters two 
and three deal specifically with the nature of truth.  We might label this the Christological 
side of the thesis.  Chapters four and five deal specifically with nature of biblical authority.  
We might label this the Pneumatological side of the thesis.  Overall, the thesis resembles the 
Irenaean conception of the two hands of God, i.e., Christology and Pneumatology, as being 
the two key ways to examine the doctrine of inerrancy.   
 
The two main dialogue partners for this thesis are B.B. Warfield and Carl F.H. Henry.  Both 
of these thinkers were very involved in their own ways in the development of the 
contemporary understanding of inerrancy.  The way in which the Chicago Statement defines 
inerrancy is remarkably similar to the way in which Warfield argues and it is obvious that he 
is a seminal thinker for the Chicago Statement.  Carl Henry is contemporary with the writing 
 3 
of the statement and possibly the evangelical theologian of the twentieth century, and so it 
would seem strange not to have his input into the debate over inerrancy.  
 
In each of the two main sections on Truth and Authority their thought is examined in light of 
the doctrine of inerrancy.  Chapter two establishes how they understand the nature of truth 
and chapter four, similarly, establishes their understanding of the nature of biblical authority.  
We find that both theologians have a strong commitment to a certain type of foundationalism 
and understand the nature of truth in a particular way.  Also, their understanding of biblical 
authority is linked heavily to the past act of inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the writing of the 
biblical texts.  Neither of them seem too concerned about the contemporary role of the Spirit 
within the life of the church and what role, if any, the Spirit has in establishing biblical 
authority for the church now.   
 
After discussing the thought of both Warfield and Henry in chapter two, chapter three lays 
out a detailed account of truth from a Scriptural perspective.  It shows that the notion of truth 
presented in Scripture is fully comprehended only Christologically.  It then reflects on the 
theological implications for this understanding of truth and asks whether the notion of truth 
in inerrancy is adequate in light of this Christological emphasis.  
 
Chapter five continues the theme of biblical authority started in chapter four and lays out 
alternative understandings of biblical authority.  This chapter is crucial to the overall thesis 
because it shows the ‘pneumatological’ nature of an alternative account of biblical authority.  
The first account of biblical authority presented in this chapter (Barthian) has little need to 
establish an account of inerrancy.  We meet the thought of Abraham Kuyper briefly in 
chapter four but in chapter five his doctrine of Scripture is more fully presented.  Kuyper’s 
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thought is perhaps the most important for our purposes because he probably would have 
considered himself an inerrantist (if one could have existed at his time) and yet his doctrine 
of Scripture is developed on a foundation independent of whether there are errors in the 
original autographs.   
 
Kuyper’s thought leads us directly into the concluding chapter of this thesis.  It is in this 
chapter where we will seek to point to a way forward for the doctrine of inerrancy which 
allows it a place amongst other church doctrines but not the primal place.  We conclude by 
stating that the doctrine of inerrancy does not adequately account for truth or authority and so 
should not be foundational to our doctrine of Scripture.  It may be seen as analogous to 
Calvin’s indicia as a doctrine that supports the faith one has in the verity of Scripture but it 
ought not be used as the foundation by which one establishes and maintains this verity.   The 
doctrine of inerrancy, as defined by the Chicago Statement, makes it necessary for one to say 
the following: “I believe that Jesus Christ rose from the dead because Scripture is true.”  This 
thesis does not seek to deny either of these claims, i.e., the truth of Scripture or the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  Rather it hopes to reverse the order of the claim being made so 
that the statement affirmed looks like this: “I believe that Scripture is true because Jesus 
Christ rose from the dead.”  When one makes this claim it is not based on an inerrant 
scriptural foundation.  Rather, it is Qeouß tó dwron, through the contemporary work of the 
Spirit of truth. 
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~1~ 
 
The Claims of Inerrancy 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As with any discussion of the doctrine of inerrancy there are inevitable disagreements on 
what exactly one means when using the term inerrant.  This may be because of the sheer 
volume of texts dealing with the subject, or it may be because scholars find that they agree 
with each other on the major premises offered but end up coming to different conclusions 
and so therefore end up in disagreement.  Because of this the task of trying to write a chapter 
on the “claims” of inerrancy seems a daunting one at first sight.   
 
However, with all of the intricate disagreements that are found among inerrantists there are 
certain foundational claims upon which all inerrantists agree.  This chapter has a twofold 
purpose.  1) to present these foundational claims as clearly and concisely as possible, being 
faithful to the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy2 where these claims are found, and 2) 
to present inerrancy in such a way as to give the reader a clear understanding of what is 
meant when the term is used in subsequent chapters.   
 
Nowhere in the following pages have I tried to argue for or against the claims of inerrancy.  I 
have only tried to present the claims that seem to be common among scholars who uphold the 
inerrancy doctrine.  As a result, there may be arguments in this chapter that seem very 
unconvincing and others that seem secure.  In some sense it is my intention for this to happen 
                                                
2 After extensive research on the subject of inerrancy I have yet to find an inerrantist who has argued against the 
Chicago Statement.  For this reason I have used the Chicago Statement as the definitive statement concerning 
inerrancy. 
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as at the end I offer no conclusion about the claims of inerrancy but only a concluding 
comment in order that the debate might remain open for the time being.   
 
It will be useful at this stage to offer some definitions given by inerrantists for the terms 
inerrancy and infallibility.  In so doing, the reader will be able to easily comprehend the 
passages in which these terms occur.  Paul D. Feinberg in his essay “The Meaning of 
Inerrancy” writes,  “Inerrancy means that when all the facts are known, the Scriptures in their 
original autographs and properly interpreted will be shown to be wholly true in everything 
that they affirm whether that has to do with doctrine or morality or with the social, physical 
or life sciences.”3 
 
The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy says that inerrancy “signifies the quality of 
being free from all falsehood or mistake.”  In so doing the term inerrant safeguards the truth 
that the Bible is “entirely true and trustworthy in all its assertions.”4  The term inerrancy is 
closely linked to notions about truth and trustworthiness so that when inerrancy is affirmed 
the Bible is affirmed as wholly true and trustworthy. 
 
The term infallible is often confused with the term inerrant and so also needs to be clearly 
defined.  J.I. Packer writes, “Infallibility is the Latin infallibilitas, signifying the quality of 
neither deceiving nor being deceived.”5  This term denotes the quality of never misleading 
and so means wholly trustworthy and reliable.  The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy 
says, “‘Infallible’ signifies the quality of neither misleading nor being misled and so 
                                                
3 Geisler, Norman L. ed.  Inerrancy.  Zondervan Publishing House: Michigan, 1979, p. 294.   
4 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, III. C.   
5 Packer, J.I.  God Has Spoken.  Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1979. p. 111. 
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safeguards in categorical terms the truth that Holy Scripture is a sure, safe and reliable rule 
and guide in all matters.”6 
 
Both doctrines lead to the same outcome.  They provide a safeguard for the truthfulness and 
trustworthiness of Scripture.  One does so by denying error to the text, the other by denying 
deception in the text.  Inerrantists claim that one cannot hold one without the other and that 
for Scripture to be entirely truthful and trustworthy it must be both inerrant and infallible.   
 
Inerrantists argue that these two doctrines are clearly supported by Scripture and Church 
history.  The first section of this chapter presents the inerrantists’ claim that both the Old and 
New Testaments support their doctrine.  Appeals are made to Christ and to the Apostles as 
sources for support of inerrancy.  Proof texts including II Timothy 3:16 are offered as 
evidence that Scripture ultimately claims inerrancy for itself.  This is a common claim among 
inerrantists and so is addressed below.   
 
The second section discusses the claim found in the Chicago Statement regarding the history 
of the Church’s doctrine of inerrancy.  Although it is readily admitted that the actual term is 
not used by the Church until the nineteenth century, appeals are made to Augustine, some 
Orthodox Fathers, Aquinas, Luther and Calvin as implicitly supporting the inerrancy 
doctrine.  It is argued that none of these theologians could have possibly imagined error in 
the text of Scripture, and so things that they have written regarding Scripture are cited for 
support.  
 
                                                
6 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, III. C.   
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If the Scriptures are inerrant then inerrantists must come to some conclusion about how the 
authors were inspired.  Inerrantists deny all forms of dictation as well as any understanding 
of Scripture that would only affirm the human authorship of the text.  So in the third section I 
have briefly discussed these denials.  Most inerrantists adopt B.B. Warfield’s understanding 
of concursus as the best way to explain the inspiration of Scripture.  Because of this 
consensus we will spend some time exploring how Warfield understands concursus to take 
place.   
 
With an understanding of concursus in place we move next to what inerrantists claim is 
inspired.  An important point often missed is that inerrantists only claim that the original 
autographs were without error.  This is primarily a theological point, and in this section we 
will discuss some of the theological concerns that inerrantists have in claiming the inerrancy 
of the original autographs.   
 
With this in mind we spend a final section discussing what is at stake with the doctrine of 
inerrancy.  Most inerrantists believe that there is a lot at stake in denying the doctrine of 
inerrancy.  In fact, some would say that the entire foundation of Christianity is disrupted and 
ultimately demolished with the denial of inerrancy.  Issues of epistemological certainty and 
biblical authority will inevitably arise in the discussion of what is at stake if one denies 
inerrancy of the original autographs.   
 
The goal of this chapter is to give a clear indication of the claims of the doctrine of inerrancy.  
It is my hope that the reader will have a better understanding of the claims of inerrancy so 
that when the term inerrancy is used later there will be a clearer idea of what is meant by that 
 9 
term.  With this in mind we turn to the first main section of this chapter: what does Scripture 
have to say?  
 
 
What does Scripture have to say?   
 
We affirm that the doctrine of inerrancy is grounded in the teaching of the Bible about inspiration.  We deny 
that Jesus’ teaching about Scripture may be dismissed by appeals to accommodation or to any natural 
limitation of His humanity.7 
 
Perhaps the main claim of inerrancy is that its understanding of Holy Scripture is supported 
by Holy Scripture itself.  When inerrancy is argued there is always a discussion about the 
ways in which both the Apostles, corporately, and Jesus Christ, particularly, support an 
inerrant Old Testament.  B.B. Warfield, who is among the most able expositors of this 
position, writes, 
 We believe this doctrine of the plenary inspiration8 of the Scriptures  
primarily because it is the doctrine which Christ and his apostles believed,  
and which they have taught us. It may sometimes seem difficult to take  
our stand frankly by the side of Christ and his apostles. It will always be  
found safe.9  
 
Along with Warfield are many other conservative scholars who would agree whole- 
heartedly with this statement.  In the following pages we shall consider the argument made 
by inerrantists about the claims of Scripture.   
 
When considering Jesus’ claims about Scripture, two main passages which are regularly cited 
by inerrantists are: John 10:34-35 and Luke 16:17.  John 10:34-35 says, “Jesus answered 
them, ‘Is it not written in your Law, “I said, you are gods?”  If he called them gods to whom 
the word of God came – and Scripture cannot be broken – do you say of him whom the 
                                                
7 Ibid, Article XV. 
8 Although Warfield used the phrase ‘plenary inspiration’ is it clear that this phrase is synonymous with the 
term ‘inerrancy.’ 
9 Craig, Samuel G. ed.  The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible.  The Presbyterian and Reformed  Publishing 
Company: Phillipsburg, 1948.  p.  128 
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Father consecrated and sent into the world, ‘You are blaspheming,’ because I said, “I am the 
Son of God?”’”10  Again Warfield comments, 
But Our Lord, determined to drive His appeal to Scripture home, sharpens  
the point to the utmost by adding with the highest emphasis: “and the 
scripture cannot be broken.”  This is the reason why it is worth while to  
appeal to what is “written in the law,” because “the scripture cannot be broken.” The 
word “broken” here is the common one for breaking the law,  
or the Sabbath, or the like (Jn. v. 18; vii. 23; Mt. v. 19), and the meaning  
 of the declaration is that it is impossible for the Scripture to be annulled,  
its authority to be withstood, or denied. The movement of thought is to the effect that, 
because it is impossible for the Scripture - the term is perfectly  
general and witnesses to the unitary character of Scripture (it is all, for the  
purpose in hand, of a piece) - to be withstood, therefore this particular Scripture 
which is cited must be taken as of irrefragable authority.11  
 
John 10:34-35 is one occasion in the New Testament where Christ characterizes an Old 
Testament passage as both the word of God and as Scripture “that cannot be broken.”  
Because of this characterization Jesus is said to be claiming for Scripture divine authority.  
Only God’s Word cannot be broken.   
 
God’s Word also cannot pass away.  Jesus says, “But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass 
away than for one dot of the law to become void”  (Luke 16:17).  Robert Lightner writes,  
 In the clearest and strongest language possible Christ said, “But it is easier  
for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one tittle of the law to fail”  
(Luke 16:17).  This comparison of Scripture with the continuance of the physical 
creation elevates the Scriptures to such an extent that they cannot  
be accounted for apart from a supernatural origin.12 
  
The two passages of Scripture quoted above are used as definitive statements from Jesus 
about the nature of Scripture.  However, most inerrantists will agree that Christ does not 
discuss the nature of Scripture very often.  Because of this an appeal is made to how Christ 
                                                
10 Scripture quotations are from the Holy Bible, English Standard Version, copyright 2001 by Crossway Bibles, 
a division of Good News Publishers.   
11The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, p. 139. 
12 Lightner, Robert, P.  A Biblical Case for Total Inerrancy: How Jesus Viewed the Old Testament.  Kregel 
Publication: Michigan, 1998,  p. 15. 
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uses the Old Testament.  By examining how Christ uses the Scriptures, inerrancy’s claim 
about Scripture seems to gain strength. 
 
The Gospels record many of Jesus’ sayings.  There is a particular interest in the “It is 
written” or “It stands written” phrases of Jesus in the New Testament.  When Jesus uses this 
phrase he is referring to a specific passage in the Hebrew Scriptures.  For the inerrantist, what 
is quoted is not primarily of interest.  What is of interest is the specific word used.  The word 
in Greek is γεγραπται (gegraptai) and is usually translated “It is written.”  It is in the perfect 
tense, passive voice and indicative mood.  Lightner writes, “Matthew here presents Christ as 
one who believed in the finality and irrevocable nature of the Old Testament revelation.”13  
John W. Wenham expounds this understanding,  
There is a grand and solid objectivity about the perfect tense, γεγραπται  
(gegraptai, “It stands written”).  “Here,” Jesus was saying, “is permanent,  
unchanging witness of the eternal God, committed to writing for our instruction.14  
 
And later he writes, 
 
Divine authority is clearly implied in the expression γεγραπται  
(gegraptai, “it is written”), already mentioned in connection with the temptations, but 
used often at other times (Matt 11:10; 21:13; 26:24, 31; Mark 9:12, 13; 11:17; 14:21, 
27; Luke 7:27; 19:46).  The inspiration and authority implied by these various phrases 
is applied not only to oracular, prophetic utterances but to all parts of Scripture 
without discrimination – to history, to laws, to psalms, to prophesies.15 
 
Christ also quotes the Old Testament and attributes certain things that are clearly not spoken 
by God in the Old Testament to Him.  One such example is Matthew 19:4-5.  In this passage 
Christ attributes to God what is actually spoken and recorded by Moses.  “Have you not read 
that he who created them from the beginning made them male and female and said, 
‘Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother and hold fast to his wife, and they 
shall become one flesh’?”  Here Christ is quoting Genesis 2:24 which was clearly a saying 
                                                
13 Ibid, 18. 
14 Inerrancy, p. 15.   
15 Ibid, 21. 
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not attributed to God, but in Christ’s statement He refers to the Creator as the one who speaks 
these things.  John Wenham writes,  
 There is a remarkable interchangeability of the terms God and scripture in  
certain New Testament passages.  We find that “scripture” is sometimes used  
where one might expect “God,” and “God” is used where one might expect 
“scripture.”16 
   
This passage and others like Romans 9:17 and Galatians 3:8 are instances where Wenham 
sees support for the inerrantists’ claim that Christ and the New Testament writers so regarded 
the Scriptures as being the very words of God that they were able to exchange “God says” 
with “Scripture says,” and vice versa with relative ease.17   
 
Matthew 19:4-5 seems to suggest that Christ traced the origin of Scripture beyond man to 
God Himself.  Robert Lightner is convinced that this is so and that because Christ used the 
Old Testament in many circumstances of His life it is evidence that He believed it to be 
trustworthy and able to be relied upon.18  Scripture was trustworthy in Christ’s mind and 
because of its trustworthiness He staked his life on it; it must be no less than His Father’s 
Word.  In a similar vein, J.I. Packer concludes, “And by His very assertions that the Old 
Testament bears authoritative divine witness to Him, our Lord bears authoritative divine 
witness to it.”19   
 
Lastly, with regard to Christ, inerrantists note that the way in which Christ quotes Scripture 
assumes an inerrant text.  One such example of this is Matthew 22:43-45: “He said to them, 
‘How is it then that David, in the Spirit, calls him Lord, saying, “The Lord said to my Lord, 
Sit at my right hand, until I put your enemies under your feet?”  If then David calls him Lord, 
how is he his son?’”  Strictly speaking, if it is not the case that David did say these things 
                                                
16 Ibid 
17 See below for a continued discussion on B.B. Warfield’s analysis of this occurrence in Scripture. 
18 Lightner, p. 53. 
19 Packer, J.I.  “Fundamentalism” and the Word of God.  William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co: Michigan, 1958, 
p. 58. 
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then Christ’s point is not made.  If the statement was inspired, as the inerrantist will argue, 
then it is fully trustworthy.  Furthermore, it must be inspired since Christ understands the 
statement to be trustworthy.  Paul D. Feinberg says, 
 First there are those instances where the whole argument rests on a  
single word… Second, there is an instance where the entire argument  
depends on the tense of a verb… Third, in Galatians 3:16, we have an  
argument where the point depends on the singular number, seed, as  
opposed to the plural, seeds… Now if the text of Scripture is not inerrant,  
it is difficult to see the point in these arguments.20   
  
But not only Christ thought this about the Old Testament.  It is common among inerrantists 
to also claim these beliefs for the New Testament writers.  Edwin A. Blum writes, 
The views of Jesus on the Old Testament are also the views of the  
Gospel writers.  These men depict Jesus and His views with obvious approval,  
and an examination of their own use of Scripture reveals the same reverence and 
submission to its authority as He showed.21 
 
Gordon Lewis argues, 
 
Because God is true and faithful, it was unthinkable to the biblical  
authors that He could breathe out (inspire) any error through them.   
They rejoiced in the faithfulness of His words (Jer 23:28), His  
commandments (Ps. 119:86), and His testimonies (Ps. 119:138).   
In their human tongues they declared His “faithful sayings”  
(2 Tim. 2:11, 13, Titus 3:8).22   
 
Because of this it is argued that with the New Testament authors there is an equation between 
the phrases “God says” and “Scripture says.”  Warfield has argued this idea extensively and 
other scholars have joined him. Henry Krabbendam writes,  
 
 Scripture passages of the Old Testament that are quoted, referred to, or  
alluded  to in the New Testament are introduced as spoken by God either  
explicitly or implicitly (see Matt. 19:4ff.; Mark 10:5ff.; Acts 13:34ff.;  
Rom. 15:9ff.; 1 Cor. 6:16; 2 Cor. 6:2; Gal 3:16; Eph. 4:8; 5:14;  
Heb. 1:5ff.; 8:8).    At times the human instrumentality is mentioned  
(see Matt. 1:22; 2:15).23 
 
                                                
20 Inerrancy,  p. 268. 
21 Ibid, 40. 
22 Ibid, 243. 
23 Ibid, 419. 
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There are also instances where words that are spoken in the Old Testament by God are 
introduced as spoken by Scripture (See Romans 9:17 and Galatians 3:18).  Warfield 
concludes on the basis of these passages that “we may perceive how close the identification 
of the two [“God says” and “Scripture says”] was in the minds of the writers of the New 
Testament.”24 
 
Warfield sees Paul’s writings as the primary support for his claim that the New Testament 
writers used the terms “God says” and “Scripture says” synonymously.  “The emphasis on 
the written Scriptures as themselves the product of a divine activity, making them as such the 
divine voice to us, is characteristic of the whole treatment of Scripture by Paul (I Cor. x. 11, 
Rom. xv. 4, iv. 23, I Cor. ix. 10, iv. 6).”25  What this implies (and this is the important thing 
for Warfield and others) is that the whole of Scripture is the creative act of God.  Because of 
this all areas of Scripture are able to be given the title “Word of God.”  Warfield writes, 
 Here we have passages in which God is the speaker and passages in which  
God is not the speaker, but is addressed or spoken of, indiscriminately  
assigned to God, because they all have it in common that they are words  
of Scripture, and as words of Scripture are words of God.26   
 
Another support of this claim is II Timothy 3:16.  Much time is spent discussing the 
implications of this verse for the doctrine of inerrancy, and it would seem that if one wanted 
a single proof text that demonstrated that the entirety of Scripture is from God this would be 
the text.  II Timothy 3:16-17 states, “All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for 
teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God 
may be competent, equipped for every good work.”27 
                                                
24 The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, p. 146.  my brackets 
25 Ibid, 318. 
26 Ibid, 147. 
27 There is an important textual variant within this verse that ought to be mentioned here.  In some of the earliest 
Latin manuscripts kai is omitted.  Therefore, the verse reads, “All God-breathed Scripture is useful…”  
Metzger claims that the kai is actually a disturbance in the verse’s construction; as a result “several versions 
and Fathers” omitted the word.  Metzger, Bruce M.  A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament.  
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The word that is translated above as “breathed out by God” has been heavily studied and its 
translation even more heavily debated.  The Greek word is θεοπνευστος (theopneustos) 
which for centuries had been translated as inspired because the Latin word, inspiratus, was 
chosen to convey the meaning of θεοπνευστος in the Latin Vulgate.  Warfield argues 
convincingly that the English word inspired, although almost a transliteration of the Latin is 
an unfortunate replacement for θεοπνευστος.  He concludes that the best English translation 
for this word is God-breathed.28   
 
The theological consequences of claiming the Scriptures to be God-breathed is very 
significant.  One recalls the significance of the creative breath of God in the Old Testament 
and the parallels are drawn automatically.  Warfield writes, 
To a Hebrew, at all events, the “breath of God” would seem self-evidently  
creative; and no locution would more readily suggest itself to him as expressive of the 
Divine act of “making” than just that by which it would be affirmed that He breathed 
things into existence.29 
 
Because the text of Scripture is God-breathed the writers of the New Testament are able to 
claim certain things.  Paul says that the Scriptures are God’s speech (Galatians 3:8, 22; 
Romans 9:17) and the entirety of Scripture is the oracle of God (Romans 3:2).  Edwin Blum 
asks, 
 Could Paul have conceived of a command of the Lord with error in it?   
Could he have said, “Christ is speaking through me” (2 Cor. 13:3) and  
thought of that speaking as erroneous or imperfect?  Certainly Christ,  
“in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:3)  
and who is truth Himself (John 14:6) could not err.30   
  
                                                                                                                                                  
UBS: New York, 1975, p. 648.  However, there does not appear to be any early Greek variants and so the 
traditional translation is used above.  For an informative discussion on this text see: Mounce, William D.  Word 
Biblical Commentary: Volume 46.  Nelson Publishers: Nashville, 2000, pp. 565-570.  
28 Space does not permit the exploring of Warfield’s argument.  To see his argument in full see The Inspiration 
and Authority of the Bible chapter 6. 
29 The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, p. 285. 
30 Inerrancy, p. 52. 
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This move from the clear assertion of the divine origin of the text to the presumption of its 
inerrancy is common among inerrantists.    
 
And these things are not just applied to the Old Testament.  On the basis of 2 Peter 3:16 we 
can assume these things about the writings of the New Testament as well.  Warfield writes,  
 We need to note in modification of the broad statement, therefore, only  
that it is apparent from 2 Pet. iii. 16 (cf. 1 Tim. 5. 18) that the NT writers  
were well aware that the category ‘Scripture,’ in the high sense, included  
also the writings they were producing, as along with the books of the OT  
constituting the complete ‘Scripture’ or authoritative Word of God.31   
 
So the inerrantist is able to claim that both the Old and New Testament Scriptures are 
breathed out by God.  I. Howard Marshall confirms this when he says,  
 Finally, we have the stage where the author of 2 Peter can place the  
writings of Paul alongside what he calls ‘the other scriptures’, and this  
implicitly affirms their status as Scripture (2 Peter 3:16).  All this suggests  
a growing realisation that the New Testament writers were composing  
works comparable in character and authority with the Old Testament Scriptures.32   
 
Because there is identification in the mind of the Apostles between their writings and the Old 
Testament, there are times when the Old Testament and New Testament are quoted in the 
same context and are seen as having the same authority.  For instance, I Timothy 5:18 says, 
“For the Scripture says, ‘You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out in grain,’ and, ‘The 
labourer deserves his wages.’”  Both these sayings are considered Scripture.  One of them 
comes from Deuteronomy 25:4 and the other is a saying of Christ.33  The significant thing is 
that Paul considers both phrases as being from Scripture.  Henry Krabbendam says that they 
are able to do this because: 1) Their authority comes from God (1 Cor. 14:37; 1 Thess. 4:2, 
                                                
31 The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, p. 232. 
32 Marshall, I. Howard.  Biblical Inspiration.  Regent College Publishing: British Columbia, 2004,        
    p.30. 
33 This phrase is a commonly identified with Christ among New Testament commentators.  The saying of Christ 
is found in Luke 10:7 and a similar reference is found in Matthew 10:10.  Scholars debate whether Paul is 
quoting Luke or whether this is a statement found in Q and known by Paul through oral tradition.  See the 
following commentators for further information:  Leaney, A.R.C.  The Epistles to Timothy, Titus and Philemon.  
SCM Press Ltd: London, 1960; Hanson, A.T.  The Pastoral Epistles.  Wm.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company: 
Grand Rapids, 1982; Houlden, J.L.  The Pastoral Epistles.  SCM Press: London, 1989; Johnson, Luke Timothy.  
The First and Second Letters to Timothy.  Doubleday: New York, 2001. 
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15) and 2) All this is possible because they are instruments of the Spirit of God (I Cor. 2:13; I 
Peter 1:13).34 
 
One is able to speak of the entirety of Scripture, both the Old and New Testaments, as being 
God-breathed because, on this interpretation, the authors regarded them as no less than this.  
We are able to recognize the Scriptures as not merely containing the words of God here and 
there but as themselves are in their entirety the Word of God written. Because of this the 
Bible has complete authority for us.  Warfield writes, 
The conception of Scripture thrown up into such clear view here supplies  
the ground of all Jesus' appeals to Scripture, and of all the appeals of the  
New Testament writers as well. Everywhere, to Him and to them alike,  
an appeal to Scripture is an appeal to an indefectible authority whose  
determination is final.35   
  
Christ who says that there is no appeal against Scripture, for “the Scripture cannot be broken” 
evidences this final determination.  This is because it is the very Word of God.  Both Jesus 
and the Apostles confirm this by their synonymous use of “Scripture says” and “God says” as 
well as their explicit admission that all of Scripture is God-breathed.  Jesus also affirms this 
when he uses the phrase “It is written.”  By using this phrase Jesus has designated Scripture 
as an authoritative divine word that, as he explicitly states, cannot be broken.   
 
Of course, if all of this is in fact the case, we would expect other people besides modern 
inerrantists to argue in the same fashion and come to some similar conclusions.  The second 
important claim of inerrantists is that theologians in the Church throughout its history support 
the doctrine.  It is to a brief section on the role of inerrancy in Church history to which we 
turn next.   
 
                                                
34  Inerrancy, p 420. 
35 The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, p. 140. 
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What does history have to say? 
 
We affirm that the doctrine of inerrancy has been integral to the Church’s faith throughout its history.  We deny 
that inerrancy is a doctrine invented by scholastic Protestantism, or is a reactionary position postulated in 
response to negative higher criticism.36 
 
Inerrantists are often criticized as holding to a doctrine that was created in response to the 
Enlightenment disregard for the authority of Scripture.  They maintain, as can be seen from 
the statement above, that this criticism could not be farther from the truth.  In fact, they claim 
that the doctrine of the complete truthfulness and trustworthiness of Scripture, i.e. inerrancy, 
can be traced historically from Christ and His apostles to Augustine and the early Church.  
Furthermore, this doctrine can be seen to be supported by theologians of the Medieval and 
Reformation periods.  Robert Preus writes, 
That the Bible is the Word of God, inerrant and of supreme divine authority,  
was a conviction held by all Christians and Christian teachers through the first  
1,700 years of church history.  Except in the case of certain free-thinking  
scholastics, such as Abelard, this fact has not really been contested by  
many scholars.37 
 
It is the inerrantists’ claim that they are, in fact, affirming what has been supported by the 
Church for almost its entire history.   
 
Preus is quick to note, however, that many of the early church fathers and medieval 
theologians did not directly address these issues but rather assumed the doctrine of biblical 
authority on the basis of what Scripture taught (see section above).  However, with this in 
mind, Preus argues that “we can clearly delineate the doctrine concerning Scripture held by 
the Christian church and its theological leaders from post-apostolic times through the 
Reformation era.”38  This can be done by looking at what is assumed in these thinkers rather 
                                                
36 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, Article XVI 
37 Inerrancy, p. 357. 
38 Ibid, 358. 
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than what is explicitly taught by them.  Furthermore, this has been done repeatedly by 
eminent scholars during the last two hundred years.39 
 
It is impossible to go through at this stage all of the Church Fathers and comment upon their 
doctrine of Scripture.  However, there are a few Church Fathers that will help substantiate the 
inerrantists’ claim.  To quote Robert Preus, 
 Irenaeus himself, in his Adversus Haereses, cites Scripture no fewer  
than 1,200 times.  As a matter of principle he states, “We must believe  
God, who has given us the right understanding, since the Holy Scriptures  
are perfect, because they are spoken by the Word of God and the Spirit of God.” 40  
 
Here we see an indication of Irenaeus’ understanding of Scripture.  There is a perfection that 
comes with Scripture precisely because it is the Word of God.  God is the author.  Irenaeus is 
not the only church Father to which the inerrantist may turn, however. 
 
Augustine and Ambrose also seem to indicate their support of this understanding of 
Scripture.  When arguing against the Manicheans they explicitly call God the author of 
Scripture.  What does this mean? 
 By the term author they meant one who produces or effects something.   
This is precisely what God did in respect to Scripture; in this sense God  
authored all the Scriptures.  And in precisely this sense the Scriptures are  
unique, differing from all other writings and possessing qualities and attributes 
(such as authority and truthfulness) which are unique by virtue of the Scripture’s 
origin and nature.41   
 
Augustine fully acknowledged difficulties in the text but refused to get around these 
difficulties by admitting error in the Scriptures.  In fact, Preus admits, 
He was far from successful in solving these problems.  But never in those  
days was a difficulty of Scripture solved by charging Scripture with error               
or untruth. 42  
 
                                                
39 See footnote 1 of chapter 12 in Inerrancy for further information about these studies. 
40 Inerrancy, p. 360. 
41 Ibid, 362. 
42 Ibid. 
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Of course, this kind of thinking is very much in line with how modern day inerrantists 
continue to argue.  J.I. Packer is fully aware of the “problems” scholars encounter with the 
text of Scripture, but he is unwilling to “solve” these “problems” by admitting error in the 
original text itself.   
 
Inerrantists claim that even though Scripture contains obscurities, this does not mean that 
there is error in Scripture.  They point to the fact that for the church Fathers everything in 
Scripture was considered inspired.  Because of this any notion of error was excluded from the 
text.  J.N.D. Kelly’s work on early Christian doctrines is often appealed to at this point.  
Kelly writes, 
 Irenaeus, for example, is not surprised at its frequent obscurity, ‘seeing it as  
spiritual in its entirety’; while Gregory of Nyssa understands St. Paul to imply  
that everything contained in Scripture is the deliverance of the Holy Spirit… 
Origen, indeed, and Gregory of Nazianzus after him, thought they could perceive the 
activity of the divine wisdom in the most trifling verbal minutiae, even in the 
solecisms, of the sacred books.  This attitude was fairly widespread, and although 
some of the fathers elaborated it more than others, their general view was that 
Scripture was not only exempt from error but contained nothing that was 
superfluous.43 
 
Of Augustine, Rodney Petersen writes, 
 
 Augustine's concern is to defend the complete reliability of Scripture,  
grounding its infallibility or inerrancy upon the fidelity of God. His  
interests are clearly pastoral; his desire is for the edification of the  
body in doing this. This moves the question of verbal discrepancies,  
differences in the narrative, and other problems into the realm of  
interpretation, away from questioning the truth of the Bible, as was  
the case with the Manichaeans.44  
 
                                                
43 Kelly, J.N.D.  Early Christian Doctrines.  Harper &Brothers Publishers: New York, 1958.  p. 61. 
Kelly’s claim might be a little sweeping.  One is surprised to see Origen’s work included in the list of the early 
theologians to support inerrancy.    
44Petersen, Rodney L.  ‘To Behold and Inhabit the Blessed Country: Inspiration, Scripture, and Infallibility- An 
Introductory Guide to Augustine Studies, 1945-1980’ in Moo, Douglas. Ed.  Biblical Authority and 
Conservative Perspectives.  Kregel Publications: Michigan, 1997,  p. 97.  
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This, of course, is what many inerrantists claim of their own work.  When one challenges 
inerrancy, they primarily challenge the fidelity of God.  The inerrantist is convinced that he 
or she is supported by the early church Fathers when making this claim.   
 
We move from the early church to the medieval theologians.  Between these time periods 
inerrantists find explicit support harder to come by.  Furthermore, “One may range through 
thousands of pages of scholastic theology before finding any explicit or direct word 
concerning the divine origin, authority, or truthfulness of scripture.”45  With this in mind, 
inerrantists will often point to general attitudes toward Scripture rather than specific treatises 
on the matter.   
 
For example, one might appeal to the modus theologiae est certior certitudine experientiae 
(the method of theology is more certain than a certitude drawn from experience) of 
Alexander of Hales as pointing to an implicit understanding that Scripture offers a 
knowledge that is absolute or perhaps, a divine certainty.  Or maybe, as Robert Preus does, 
one might look to what he calls the “scripture principle” in Anselm, and in so doing, see the 
relationship between faith and understanding as ultimately being founded on the divine 
revelation in Scripture.46 
 
Lastly come the writings of Thomas Aquinas.47  Here, Preus claims that Aquinas has a more 
explicit view of Scripture than his predecessors.  This view is found in his prolegomena on 
                                                
45 Inerrancy, p. 366. 
46 Ibid, 367. 
47 It must be stated here that many medieval works are largely overlooked by Preus and other inerrantists.  
Theolgians like Boethius and Gregory the Great, Maximus the Confessor, Bede, and John of Damascus are 
often not considered.  Also, Lombard’s Sentences and Bonaventure’s commentary on them are left out of the 
discussion.  Duns Scotus, John Wycliff, Thomas a Kempis, John Hus and Meister Eckhard are all medieval 
scholars which seem to be disregarded.  This raises the obvious question of why more attention is not paid to 
these theologians.   
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the nature of sacra doctrina.  In Aquinas there is a notion that man needed revelation from 
God apart from reason because the truth about God from the latter would be mixed with 
error.  This implies that the former would not be.  Preus quotes Aquinas saying, 
It was necessary for man’s salvation that there be a certain doctrine  
according to divine revelation, truths which exceed human reason.   
Even regarding those truths which human reason can investigate it was  
necessary that man be taught by divine revelation.  For the truth about  
God which is learned through reason would be known only by a few after  
a long time and with an admixture of errors; but the salvation of man depends 
upon his knowledge of this truth which is in God.  Therefore, in order that  
salvation might the easier be brought to man and be more certain it was  
necessary that men be instructed concerning divine matters through divine 
revelation.48   
 
Inerrantists largely appeal to the statement of Thomas Aquinas for support amongst the 
medieval theologians.49 This is largely to do with his understanding of the need for divine 
revelation and the fact that if this revelation was not divine, man could not depend on it as a 
source for the truth concerning salvation.  This is remarkably similar to the inerrantists’ 
concern regarding Scripture.   
 
Aquinas also writes, “It is heretical to say that any falsehood whatsoever is contained either 
in the gospels or in any canonical Scripture.”50  This quote, in the mind of the inerrantist, 
stops any debate against their claim that Aquinas supported the full inerrancy of Scripture.  
With his detailed doctrine of divine revelation added to this brief quote about the nature of 
Scripture, Aquinas is a continued source of confirmation for the inerrancy position.   
 
With the admission that there is no dogmatic doctrine of Scripture within the above-
mentioned medieval theologians, we move to the next major point within Church history: the 
                                                
48 Ibid, 368. 
49 Although this statement is often appealed to for support the question is raised about whether Aquinas’ use of 
the term ‘doctrine’ in this statement ought to be identified with the term Scripture.  This implicit identification 
is made often by inerrantists. 
50 Quoted by Preus in Inerrancy, p. 370. 
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Reformation.  Within the last century, the debate over whether John Calvin and Martin 
Luther supported the complete inerrancy of Scripture has been a very hot topic.  Both the 
supporters and non-supporters of inerrancy seem to have a desire to prove their respective 
positions as having the support of Calvin and Luther.   
 
Inerrantists clearly regard the theology of Calvin and Luther as supporting their 
understanding of Scripture.  John D Woodbridge writes,  
For Luther, no inconsistency existed between affirming that the Bible  
communicates the good news of salvation and holding the belief that  
the Bible is completely infallible. Nor did he distinguish between the Bible's  
infallibility for matters of faith and practice and its supposed capacity to err in 
historical, geographical, and scientific matters.51  
 
Similarly, he cites Paul Althaus, a distinguished Lutheran scholar, as giving support to this 
reading of Luther.  Althaus writes concerning Luther’s statements about biblical infallibility, 
 We may trust unconditionally only in the Word of God and not on the  
teaching of the fathers; for the teachers of the church can err and have erred.  
Scripture never errs. Therefore it alone has unconditional authority.52  
 
Eugene F. Klug makes this point concerning Althaus’ work on Luther: 
 
 But even the redoubtable Paul Althaus, whose preeminence in Luther  
studies is generally acknowledged, is frank to admit that this is correct.  
“Although Luther criticized the Bible in specific details,” says Althaus,  
the Reformer was nevertheless committed to viewing Scripture “as inspired  
in its entire content by the Holy Spirit,” for which reason “it is therefore  
the Word of God”, or “the book written by the Holy Spirit.”53 
 
Eugene Klug makes us aware of the fact that theologically Althaus does not agree with 
Luther at this point.  Nevertheless, he concedes that for Luther it was the “text itself that was 
inspired and, therefore, was the Word of God in its very ontological being by virtue of this 
inspiration.”54  
 
                                                
51 Biblical Authority and Conservative Perspectives, p. 24. 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid, 92. 
54 Ibid, 133. 
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Along with Luther is the appeal to John Calvin.  Calvin’s writings are extensive and he is 
sometimes just as difficult to pin down as Luther is.  Because of this there have been dozens 
of articles published debating whether Calvin was an inerrantist.55  Below, we will rehearse 
the standard inerrantist argument affirming Calvin’s support of inerrancy. 
 
The first and most obvious place to turn in Calvin’s writing is his Commentary on 2 
Timothy.  Inerrantists are quick to quote his statement regarding chapter three verse sixteen 
of Paul’s second letter to Timothy.  Calvin writes, 
This is a principle which distinguishes our religion from all others, that  
we know that God hath spoken to us, and are fully convinced that the prophets 
 did not speak at their own suggestion, but that, being organs of the Holy  
Spirit, they only uttered what they had been commissioned from heaven to  
declare.56  
 
The Commentaries are not the only place where one can turn to understand Calvin’s doctrine 
of Scripture.  The Institutes are another spring from which information may be gathered.  
Fundamental to any understanding of Calvin’s doctrine of Scripture is his statement 
concerning its origin, nature and authority.  Calvin writes, 
 Before I go any further, it is worth-while to say something about the  
authority of Scripture, not only to prepare our hearts to reverence it, but  
to banish all doubt.  When that which is set forth is acknowledged to be the  
Word of God, there is no one so deplorably insolent – unless  
devoid also both of common sense and of humanity itself – as to dare impugn  
                                                
55 Entering this argument is not relevant to my thesis, but in an attempt to represent the claims of inerrancy it is 
necessary to present this particular aspect of the inerrantists’ historical claim.  I recognize that what is presented 
above is a one-sided reading of Calvin and have listed texts below which explore a variety of different 
understandings of Calvin’s doctrine of Scripture.  For texts published on the debate see: Rogers, Jack B. and 
McKim, Donald K.  The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach.  Harper & Row 
Publishers: New York, 1979;  Moo, Douglas ed.  Biblical Authority and Conservative Perspectives.  Kregel 
Publications: Grand Rapids, 1997;  Reid, John K.S.  The Authority of Scripture.  Methuen & Co.: London, 
1957;  Palmer, Ian S.  ‘The Authority and Doctrine of Scripture in the thought of John Calvin,’ The Evangelical 
Quarterly.  Volume XLIX, 1977;  Prust, Richard C.  ‘Was Calvin a Biblical Literalist,’ Scottish Journal of 
Theology.  Volume XX, 1967; Thompson, Mark D.  ‘Reformation Perspectives on Scripture: The Written Word 
of God,’ The Reformed Theological Review.  Volume LVII, December, 1998, No. 3; Niclole, Roger.  ‘John 
Calvin and Inerrancy,’ Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society.  Volume XXV, December 1982, No. 4;  
McNeill, John T.  ‘The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin,’ Church History.  June 28, 1959.     
56 Calvin, John.  Calvin’s Commentaries (Complete).  Electronic text downloaded from the Christian Clasics 
Ethereal Library: <http://ccel.wheaton.edu>.  Formatted and hypertexed by OakTree Software, Inc. Version 1.5.  
Part of the Accordance Bible suite for Mac. 
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the credibility of Him who speaks.  Now daily oracles are not sent from heaven, for it 
pleased the Lord to hallow his truth to everlasting remembrance in the Scriptures 
alone [cf. John 5:39].  Hence the Scriptures obtain full authority among believers only 
when men regard them as having sprung from heaven, as if there the living words of 
God were heard.57   
 
Commenting on this passage Thompson writes, 
  
 However, there can be little doubt the point he is making here in the  
Institutes is that the written words of Scripture are to be treated with  
precisely the same respect as words from the mouth of God himself.   
It is Scripture which ‘is acknowledged to be the Word of God’.58 
 
It is clear to Thompson that for Calvin the term “Scriptures” and the phrase “Word of God” 
are interchangeable.  He sees this pattern being consistent throughout Calvin’s works.   
 
Even though this identification of “Scriptures” and “Word of God” can be seen in the Bible 
itself, in Augustine and now in Calvin there are many scholars who would adamantly oppose 
reading Calvin as an inerrantist.  What about the places where it seems at first sight Calvin 
has admitted error?  J.I. Packer writes, “The handful of passages in his commentaries which 
have on occasion been taken as affirming or implying that he thought particular biblical 
writers had gone astray prove on inspection to fall into the following categories.”59 And here 
he lists four particular categories.   
 
The first category deals with God’s accommodation.  Some of Calvin’s writings that are seen 
as affirmations of error in the Bible are  
reminders of points where God has accommodated Himself to  
rough-and-ready forms of human speech, and tell us only that in  
such cases God is evidently not concerned to speak with a kind or  
degree of accuracy which goes beyond what these forms of speech  
                                                
57 McNeill, John T. ed.  Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 1.  The Westminster Press: 
Philadelphia, 1960, p. 74. 
58 Thompson, Mark D.  ‘Reformation Perspectives on Scripture: The Written Word of God.”  The Reformed 
Theological Review.  Vol. 57, December, 1998, No. 3,  p. 116. 
59 Montgomery, John Warwick. Ed.  God’s Inerrant Word: An International Symposium on the Trustworthiness 
of Scripture.  Bethany Fellowship, Inc.: Minnesota, 1974, p.105. 
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would naturally convey.60   
 
A particular instance may possibly be found in Calvin’s commentary on the Genesis 1 
passage.  Here Calvin warns that we must not expect to learn astronomy from this text.  An 
important note to make at this point is that a misunderstanding often occurs when one speaks 
of accommodation.  Some scholars use accommodation as if to say that because God 
accommodated himself there must be error in the revelation.  However, there is no necessary 
connection between accommodation and error, and we must not be too quick to make this 
connection.61  Because of this, even though Calvin sees God as accommodating Himself to 
his creation there is no need for Calvin to admit to error in that revelation.   
 
The second category refers to texts that have received error through transmission.  Examples 
of this in Calvin are his comments on Matthew 27:9 and also Acts 7:14-16.   Calvin tells us 
that “by mistake” Jeremiah’s name has “crept in” in Matthew 27:9.  The word he uses here is 
obrepserit which Packer says is his “regular word for unauthentic textual intrusions.”62  Also, 
Acts 7: 14-16 has a similar copyist error when it mentions seventy-five people in contrast to 
Genesis 46:27 which only mentions seventy.  Warfield writes, “His assurance that it cannot 
be the Biblical writer who stumbles leads him similarly to attribute what seems to him a 
manifest error to the copyists.”63  
 
Other comments that might be seen as supporting a non-inerrantist view in Calvin are 
passages that deal with cases where apostolic writers quote Old Testament texts loosely.  
Packer suggests,  
                                                
60 Ibid, 106. 
61 John Gerstner labels this the “accommodation non sequitur.”  He says that it does not follow that because 
God accommodates himself to human language he must accommodate himself to human error.  For further 
explication of accommodation see section below on the “Model of Inspiration” in inerrancy. 
62 God’s Inerrant Word,  p.106. 
63 Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge.  The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield.  Volume V: Calvin and Calvinism.  
10 vols.  Baker Books: Michigan, 2003 p. 59. 
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 Calvin’s point in this group of comments is invariable that the apostles  
quote paraphrastically precisely in order to bring out the true sense and  
application – a contention strikingly supported by the modern discovery  
that this was standard practice among the rabbis at that time.64   
 
Finally, there is a selection of comments made by Calvin which deal with what might be 
called the formal inaccuracy of the text by suggesting that in these cases no assertion was 
intended and therefore no error can fairly be said to have been made.  An example of this 
class of passage might be Calvin’s denial that the evangelists meant at any point to write 
narratives which were chronologically ordered, leading to the claim that since they did not 
intend to connect everything chronologically, but on occasion preferred to follow a topical or 
theological principle of arrangement, they therefore cannot be held to contradict each other 
when they narrate the same events in a different sequence.   
 
All of the statements that fall into the four above-mentioned categories are statements that 
may be seen as allowing for error in the Biblical text.  Packer insists that these statements are 
not Calvin’s way of showing error in Scripture.  He cites Rupert Davies’ conclusion about 
questionable passages in Calvin’s writings, “The most they can possibly prove is that Homer 
may have nodded – in other words, that in the course of thirty years of theological writing so 
prolific as to fill fifty-nine large volumes of the Corpus Reformatorum Calvin may on three 
or four occasions have broached a suggestion about a text which did not fit his doctrine of 
Scripture quite as well as he thought it did.”65 
 
In the same vein, Packer concludes that the few passages in Calvin that seem contrary to 
inerrancy should not be assumed to be significant for Calvin’s doctrine of the Bible.  He 
writes,  
                                                
64God’s Inerrant Word, p. 106. 
65 Ibid, 107. 
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At most, they merely show even Calvin could on occasion fail to  
be quite consistent with himself.  And even this may be thought to  
concede too much.  It might be rash to affirm that Calvin’s handling  
of all four groups of texts which we mentioned was right in every  
particular, but it is not at all hard to maintain that it does involve not  
the least inconsistency with his doctrine of inspiration.66 
 
And it is to the doctrine of inspiration which we now turn.  If it is the case, as inerrantists 
claim, that the doctrine of inerrancy was implicitly held by Jesus Christ and the Apostles as 
well as the early, medieval and reformation Church than the question of how this inerrant text 
was brought about immediately comes to mind.  Inerrantists are constantly critiqued as 
having a dictation model of inspiration and so we turn now to the claim of inerrantists 
regarding inspiration and their refutation of the “inspiration-by-dictation” label. 
 
Model of Inspiration 
 
We affirm that inspiration was the work in which God by His Spirit, through human writers, 
gave us His Word.  The origin of Scripture is divine.  The mode of divine inspiration remains 
largely a mystery to us.  We deny that inspiration can be reduced to human insight or to 
heightened states of consciousness of any kind.   
 
We affirm that God in His work of inspiration utilized the distinctive personalities and 
literary styles of the writers whom He had chosen and prepared.  We deny that God, in 
causing these writers to use the very words that He chose, overrode their personalities. 
 
We affirm that inspiration, though not conferring omniscience, guaranteed true and 
trustworthy utterance on all matters of which the Biblical authors were moved to speak and 
write.  We deny that the finitude or falseness of these writers, by necessity or otherwise, 
introduced distortion or falsehood into God’s Word.67 
 
 
There are many different understandings of inspiration that one meets when researching the 
topic.  When speaking about the doctrine of inspiration one generally finds three models 
identified.  The first model concerns the particular author of the given biblical text.  This 
model relates inspiration to the author in such a way that it is said that the author is inspired.  
The second relates inspiration to the biblical text.  This model of inspiration generally 
                                                
66 Ibid. 
67 Articles VII – IX of the Chicago Statement. 
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downplays any role of the human writer of the biblical text and sees the final product being 
that which ought to be labelled as inspired.  Paul Achtemeier writes, 
To say that the Bible is “inspired” means at least that in some special way the  
literature in that book owes its origin to God himself, and to the events behind  
which he has stood, which are reported in its pages, and that therefore the Bible 
occupies a central and irreplaceable position within the Christian faith.68   
 
The final model sees inspiration neither in terms of the author nor of the text but of the 
reader.  The reader is said to be inspired because of the experience of coming into contact 
with the biblical text. 
 
The inerrancy understanding of inspiration is found somewhere in between the first two 
models mentioned above but cannot be completely identified with either of them.  The reason 
for this is that, according to inerrancy, inspiration has to do with the transmission of 
knowledge from God to writing.  Because of this, there is a tension between the divine and 
human in the inspiration and we shall explore this tension below.  But first it seems 
appropriate to mention what the inerrancy doctrine of inspiration is not.  1)  The inerrancy 
doctrine of inspiration is not inspiration by dictation.  Gordon Lewis writes, 
 The supernatural aspect of inspiration is not dictation apart from human  
means but the extraordinary use of human means such as research (Luke 1:1-4), 
memory (of events in Christ’s life), and judgment (1 Cor. 7:25), so that what was 
written conformed to God’s mind on the subject and did not teach error of fact, 
doctrine, or judgment. 69  
 
2) The inerrancy doctrine of inspiration is not deistic.  B.B. Warfield writes that it is common 
in theories about the origin and nature of the Scriptures to exclude the divine factor 
altogether and make them purely human in both origin and character.  He attributes this to 
                                                
68 Achtemeier, Paul J.  The Inspiration of Scripture: Problems and Proposals.  The Westminster Press: 
Philadelphia, 1980, p. 14. 
69 Inerrancy, p. 256. 
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the influence of Hegelianism and Deism.70  But this understanding of inspiration (or lack of 
it) has no room in the inerrancy doctrine.   
 
Henry Krabbendam writes, 
 
Although Warfield rejects the dictation theory, he is just as critical of the  
opposite extreme, which in his opinion is the more common error, namely  
the exclusion of the divine factor from the origin and nature of Scripture.   
While Scripture is fully man’s word, it is not a purely human book.71   
 
He continues to remark that the concept, in which the Bible is regarded as both a human 
product in every part and every word and a divine product to the smallest detail, was called 
by Warfield concursus.72  It is Warfield’s doctrine of concursus that the majority of 
inerrantists hold.  For example, Gordon Lewis writes, 
 More often, however, there seems to have been concursive inspiration,  
in which the prophet or apostle actively wrote and the Holy Spirit moved  
along with the speaking and writing in such a manner that the thing spoken  
or written was also the Word of God. 73   
 
And similarly, J.I. Packer remarks, 
  
 We are to think of the Spirit’s inspiring activity, and, for that matter, of all  
His regular operations in and upon human personality, as (to use an old but  
valuable technical term) concursive; that is, as exercised in, through and by  
means of the writers’ own activity, in such a way that their thinking and writing was 
both free and spontaneous on their part and divinely elicited and controlled, and what 
they wrote was not only their own work but also God’s work.74  
 
Concursus is a term so widely used by inerrantists that Warfield’s name is rarely mentioned 
as the person who coined the term with respect to inspiration.  It has been accepted as the 
term which most adequately portrays the way in which the divine and human co-existed in 
the production of the Scriptures.   
                                                
70 Warfield, Benjamin B.  Selected Shorter Writings: Volume 2.  Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing 
Company: New Jersey, 2001, p 544.   
71 Inerrancy,  p. 427. 
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Warfield defines concursus as follows: 
 
 By “concursive operation” may be meant that form of revelation  
illustrated in an inspired psalm or epistle or history, in which no human  
activity - not even the control of the will is superseded, but the Holy Spirit  
works in, with and through them all in such a manner as to communicate to  
the product qualities distinctly superhuman.75  
 
He also writes, 
 
 When we consider the promises of supernatural guidance which Christ made  
to his apostles (Matt. x. 19, 20; Mark xiii. 11; Luke xxi. 14; John xiv and xvi),  
in connection with their claim to speak with divine authority even when writing (1 
Cor. xiv. 37; 2 Thess. iii. 6) and their conjunction of their writings with the Old 
Testament Scriptures as equally divine with them, we cannot fail to perceive that the 
apostles claim to be attended in their work of giving law to God’s Church by 
prevailing superintending grace from the Holy Spirit.  This is what is called 
inspiration.  It does not set aside the human authorship of the books.  But it puts 
behind the human also a divine authorship.  It ascribes to the authors such an 
attending influence of the Spirit in the process of writing, that the words they set 
down become also the words of God…76 
 
According to Warfield the doctrine of concursus is the only model which conceives of the 
Bible as a divine-human book, in which every word is at once divine and human.   The 
philosophical basis he finds for this doctrine is the Christian idea of God as immanent as well 
as transcendent in His modes of activity.  The tension between the divine and human in the 
writing of the Scriptures is mirrored in the inherent tension found in the Church’s 
understanding of the immanent and economic Trinity. 
 
Of course, this is not the only divine-human parallel that can be made within the Christian 
story.  Some inerrantists see a parallel with the incarnation.  Just as Christ is both fully man 
and fully God but without sin, so in a similar fashion the Scriptures are viewed as being both 
divine and human but without error.  J.I. Packer writes, 
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 The mystery of the Word incarnate is at this point parallel to that of  
the Word written.  And as we must see Jesus in His human, historical  
context, and study His recorded words as the sayings of a first century  
Jew, if we would fully grasp their message to us as words of God, so it  
is in interpreting all the words of the Bible.77   
 
Warfield warns, however, that this parallel should not be taken too far.  The primary reason 
for his unease is that there is no hypostatic union between the divine and human in Scripture 
only in Christ.  So he dismisses this mode of thinking and sees the distinction between the 
immanent and economic Trinity as being more helpful in our understanding of how God acts 
in producing the text without overwhelming the human writers’ own personalities.   He 
writes, 
 The fundamental principle of this conception is that the whole of  
Scripture is the product of divine activities which enter it, however, not  
by superseding the activities of the human authors, but confluently with  
them; so that the Scriptures are the joint product of divine and human activities, both 
of which penetrate them at every point, working harmoniously together to the 
production of a writing which is not divine here and human there, but at once divine 
and human in every part, every word and every particular.78   
 
Fundamental to this understanding of inspiration is the deeply rooted understanding of divine 
providence and predestination that it entails.  Gordon Lewis writes, 
 However, in God’s eternal plans, He could guide in all such particular factors.   
The writing of Scripture was no last-minute emergency operation in which God had 
to use whatever He could find to work with.  He who knew all things from the 
beginning graciously planned to communicate through the oral and written work of 
the prophets and the apostles.  Jeremiah was set apart from before his birth (Jer 1:5), 
as was Paul (Gal. 1:15).79   
 
God is seen to have providentially, before the foundations of the earth were created, prepared 
the writing of his revelation.  Scripture indicates that God in His providence was from the 
beginning preparing the human vehicles of inspiration for their specific predestined tasks.     
 
In a very revealing passage Warfield writes, 
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 But what if this personality has itself been formed by God into precisely  
the personality it is, for the express purpose of communicating to the world  
given through it just the coloring which it gives it? What if the colors of the  
stained-glass window have been designed by the architect for the express  
purpose of giving to the light that floods the cathedral precisely the tone and  
quality it receives from them?80  
 
According to Warfield even the personalities of the Biblical authors can be seen as prepared 
in eternity past for their role in revealing God to His creation.  Undoubtedly, many 
inerrantists would not follow Warfield to this extent; however, there is no doubt that some 
type of Reformed doctrine of predestination is vital to the inerrantists’ claim concerning the 
inspiration of Scripture.  To summarize this idea Warfield writes, “If God wished to give His 
people a series of letters like Paul's, He prepared a Paul to write them, and the Paul He 
brought to the task was a Paul who spontaneously would write just such letters.”81  
 
With this understanding comes an implicit pneumatology.  How did God prepare such a 
Paul?  He did so by His Spirit.  The Spirit’s work is seen to make all of this possible.  
The Spirit is not to be conceived as standing outside of the human powers  
employed for the effect in view, ready to supplement any inadequacies they may 
show and to supply any defects they may manifest, but as working confluently in with 
and by them, elevating them, directing them, controlling them, energizing them, 
so that, as His instruments, they rise above themselves and under His inspiration do 
His work and reach His aim.82 
  
I. Howard Marshall writes, “At the same time, however, on the divine level we can assert that 
the Spirit, who moved on the face of the waters at Creation (Gen 1:2), was active in the 
whole process so that the Bible can be regarded as both the words of men and the Word of 
God.”83 
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In a very real way the Spirit makes the authors who they are.  He gives them their identity 
and guides them in their writing of the text.  The humanness of the authors is not an 
embarrassment to God, any more than the distinctively human qualities of Jesus are.  God 
has prepared these authors to do the task set before them and with the aid of the Spirit they 
are able to achieve this task.  Warfield writes, 
 God is Himself the author of the instruments He employs for the  
communication of His messages to men and has framed them into  
precisely the instruments He desired for the exact communication of  
His message. There is just ground for the expectation that He will use  
all the instruments He employs according to their natures.84  
 
There is a particular understanding of predestination and providence in this line of thinking.  
And yet there is still the desire within inerrancy to affirm the humanness of the Biblical text.  
This is seen as an affirmation of what the Biblical text requires of any doctrine of inspiration.  
Edwin Blum says, “The New Testament conception of ‘inspiration’ stresses divine 
origination but at the same time clearly involves human personality (see Rom 10:20; 1 Cor. 
2:13; 14:37; 2 Peter 1:20-21).”85 
 
For the inerrantist it is a non sequitur to speak of the Bible as being a human document and 
therefore fallible.  Through the concursive action of the Holy Spirit and by the divine 
providence of the Father there is a document created that is both the Word of God and the 
word of man.  In other words, what we find in Scripture is God’s word written in the 
language of man.  There is a tension in our understanding of Scripture as both divine and 
human and this is recognized by inerrantists.  But this tension is not greater than that which is 
found in the doctrine of the Incarnation.   
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It would be a great mistake to assume that the Scriptures cannot be both divine and human at 
the same time.  “We may be equally sure that the relation of the divine and human in 
inspiration and in the Bible are not properly conceived when they are thought of, as elements 
in the Bible, as lying over against each other, dividing the Bible between them; or, as factors 
in inspiration, as striving against and excluding each other, so that where one enters the other 
is pushed out.”86  To do so would be a Platonic dichotomy not accepted by the Biblical 
witness or the doctrine of Inerrancy.   
 
As we will find in the next section all of this inspiration does not strictly apply to the text that 
we call the Bible today.  This divine inspiration was only given once.  The errorless text that 
is the result of the Spirit’s guidance and the Father’s providence and the product of this 
inspiration may some day be reconstructed by textual criticism, but it does not exist in any 
one copy of the Scriptures available today.  So we move to the claim by inerrancy that it is 
only the ‘original autographs’ which were kept inerrant by the hand of God.  
 
 
 
Only the Autographs… 
 
We affirm that inspiration, strictly speaking, applies only to the autographic text87 of 
Scripture, which in the providence of God can be ascertained from available manuscripts 
with great accuracy.  We further affirm that copies and translations of Scripture are the 
Word of God to the extent that they faithfully represent the original.  We deny that any 
essential element of the Christian faith is affected by the absence of the autographs.  We 
further deny that this absence renders the assertion of Biblical inerrancy invalid or 
irrelevant.88   
 
  
                                                
86 Selected Shorter Writings, 545. 
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So much misunderstanding often comes when one hears the Bible described as inerrant.  
Often, clear textual mistakes are pointed to in order to show that the Bible is not inerrant.  
There is need to clearly explain which text is actually being claimed to be inerrant by the 
doctrine of inerrancy.  The fact that inerrantists only believe that the original autographs of 
Scripture are inerrant is sometimes missed and often overlooked by their critics.  At other 
times one’s pragmatic way of thinking arises as one questions whether there is any value in 
affirming inerrancy to something that does not exist anyway.  The claim about the original 
autographs may, on the surface, be the hardest to accept, but inerrantists are vigilant to argue 
their case for three main reasons.   
 
The three main reasons why one should and can only claim inerrancy for the original 
autographs are:  1) The truthfulness of God supports the inerrancy of the original autographs. 
2) Man is sinful by nature and only God can reveal God.  3) God does not require the 
continued transmission of an errorless text to achieve His purposes.  These three reasons 
seem to be the assumptions behind the inerrancy claim that only the original autographs were 
written without error.  We shall now discuss each of these briefly.   
 
As we have seen previously there is an equation between the words of Scripture and the 
words of God so that the terms “Scripture says” and “God says” are synonymous.  With that 
premise granted and the premise that God cannot lie, the conclusion necessarily follows that 
neither can Scripture.  So to question the inerrancy of Scripture is to question the very 
truthfulness of God.  Greg Bahnsen writes, 
  
The direct response to this perspective is that restricting inerrancy to the  
autographa enables us to consistently confess the truthfulness of God –  
and that is quite important indeed!  Inability to do so would be quite  
theologically damaging.  Only with an inerrant autograph can we avoid  
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attributing error to the God of truth.89   
 
This is perhaps the thing that inerrantists worry about most.  If some type of original 
autograph cannot be claimed to be without error a priori, then the very nature of God is 
challenged.  Bahnsen continues, 
The nature of God (who is truth Himself) and the nature of the biblical  
books (as the very words of God) require that we view the original manuscripts, 
produced under the superintendence of the Holy Spirit of truth, as wholly true and 
without error.90   
 
If it is the case that what ‘Scripture says,’ ‘God says’ then one must necessarily claim that 
when God originally ‘spoke’ Scripture into existence by the inspiration of the Biblical writers 
he did so without error.  This is the heart of the inerrancy claim concerning the original 
autographs.   
 
Along with the concern for keeping the truthfulness of God intact is also a realisation of 
humankind’s condition.  The second reason for holding that the original autographs are 
inerrant is tied to the doctrine of man’s total depravity.  Warfield writes, 
 Christians need not be worried about the fact that the autographa  
are lost… On the other hand they must be deeply concerned to  
maintain that an infallible revelation has actually entered into history. 91  
 
Christians ought to be deeply concerned about this because only God can reveal God 
according to Warfield.  Along with this comes an epistemological concern.  For if the 
original manuscripts were liable to error then, as Bahnsen concludes, “We could not possibly 
know the extent of the error in them.”92  Further he writes, 
 
 The importance of original inerrancy is not that God cannot accomplish  
His purpose except through a completely errorless text, but that without  
it we cannot consistently confess His veracity, be fully assured of the  
scriptural promise of salvation, or maintain the epistemological authority  
                                                
 89 Inerrancy, p. 179. 
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92 Inerrancy, p. 183. 
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and theological axiom of sola Scriptura (since errors in the original unlike  
those in transmission, would not be correctable in principle).93   
 
There is an epistemological slippery-slope created if one admits to error in the original 
autographs.  There is then no way of distinguishing between that which is an error and that 
which is truthful because there is no ruler by which to measure these things.  But if the 
original autographs are inerrant then that ruler once existed and so one’s hope is not 
grounded in sinful man’s ability to distinguish truth from falsity on his own but rather on the 
truthfulness of God once given by the apostles in Holy Writ.   
 
But errors have crept in by the transmission of these texts through history.  This is no 
embarrassment for inerrantists who are often first to admit these errors.  But these errors can 
be attributed to the sinful nature of man.  This leads us to the final point that God does not 
require the continued transmission of an errorless text to achieve his purposes.  Warfield 
writes, “God’s creation of man holy did not involve his keeping him holy:94 and no more 
does his giving the Scriptures errorless to man involve ‘an inerrant transmission’ as a 
corollary.”95 
 
The argument is often made that since God has not insisted on keeping the transmission of 
Scripture inerrant then it must not have been his intention to give mankind an errorless text in 
the first place.  Inerrantists regard this line of thinking as absurd.  “The argument is as absurd 
as it would be for one who had destroyed half the pages of his Bible to light his cigar with, to 
contend that it was not God’s intention to give man a perfect Bible, or he would have 
restrained him from mutilating it in this manner…”96  Warfield again writes, “God’s desire is 
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that the human race shall always have the benefit of this errorless revelation.  It is man’s fault 
if he loses it.”97 
 
Greg Bahnsen summarizes this point well.  He says, 
We can admit, with Davis, that God did not keep the copyists from error  
and that nevertheless the church has grown and survived with an errant text,  
but to infer from these facts that an inerrant autograph was not vital to God  
or necessary for us would be to commit the fallacy of hasty generalization.   
The importance of original inerrancy is that it enables us to confess consistently the 
truthfulness of God Himself.  We thereby can avoid saying that the one who calls 
Himself “the Truth” made errors and was false in His statements.98  
 
Not unlike the whole of the doctrine of inerrancy, the plea for an inerrant original autograph 
is grounded in a serious theological concern.  Scripture equates what it says with the words 
of God and, as Bahnsen remarks, if God calls himself “the Truth” then his Word must be 
without error.  So to affirm that this Word was originally inspired without error is also to 
affirm the truthfulness and trustworthiness of God.  This leads us into our concluding section 
regarding what inerrantists feel is at stake if one rejects the doctrine of inerrancy.   
 
Why Does Any of This Matter? 
 
Recognition of the total truth and trustworthiness of Holy Scripture is essential to a full 
grasp and adequate confession of its authority... We are persuaded that to deny it is to set 
aside the witness of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit and to refuse that submission to the 
claims of God’s own Word that marks true Christian faith.99   
 
  
To answer the question of why any of this matters we must address what inerrantists believe 
to be at stake if the doctrine of inerrancy is not affirmed in its entirety.  Three of the main 
issues at stake are: 1) The authority of the Bible is questioned, 2) submission to Christ is 
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disregarded and 3) epistemological certainty in theology is lost.100  All three of these issues 
are severely impaired if the doctrine of inerrancy is not upheld.   
 
The first of these is the issue most cited by inerrantists when discussing what is lost when 
inerrancy is not affirmed.  Greg Bahnsen writes, “If the Bible is not wholly true, then our 
assurance of salvation has no dependable and divine warrant; it rests rather on the minimal 
and fallible authority of men.”101  Similarly, J.I. Packer says, “The value of these terms is that 
they conserve the principle of biblical authority; for statements that are not absolutely true 
and reliable cannot be absolutely authoritative.”102  
 
To deny inerrancy is to deny biblical authority.  Paul Achtemeier recognizes this when he 
writes, 
 It is equally clear that for the conservative understanding, inerrancy is the  
total basis for the authority of Scripture.  To deny inerrancy for this way of  
understanding the Bible is to deny any authority of any kind to the Bible.103   
 
One reason that inerrantists maintain this position is that if the Bible is not completely 
inerrant then man has to rely on his own understanding and reason to judge what is true and 
what is false in Scripture.  If the Bible is not inerrant we have no foundation upon which to 
lay our knowledge of God since anything that is said about God in the text of the Bible could 
potentially be in error.  Bahnsen writes, 
 
 And the minute that we say that, we have in principle lost our ultimate  
foundation of theological knowledge.  Our personal assurance of salvation,  
as objectively grounded in the Scriptures, is swept away – for God’s  
well-meant promises of such might still be in error. 104  
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Warfield confirms this when he claims this of the Christian heart. 
 
 …that without such an “external authority” as a thoroughly trustworthy  
Bible, the soul is left without sure ground for a proper knowledge of itself,  
its condition, and its need, or for a proper knowledge of God's provisions of  
mercy for it and his promises of grace to it, - without sure ground, in a word,  
for its faith and hope.105  
 
Tied closely with the need to keep the authority of Scripture intact is also the need to ensure 
the certainty of the Church’s theological knowledge.  Without a text given by God that is 
completely without error, we have no certainty that what we read in the Old and New 
Testaments is actually a true representation of the God whom they reveal.  Robert Lightner 
comments, 
 …it must be said that unless the Biblical record about Him is infallible we  
have no sure way of knowing whether or not we are believing right things  
about Him. If God’s revelation in the Bible may not be trusted entirely how  
are we to know when it is to be trusted. [sic, ?] If the fountain is corrupt and  
contaminated so is all the water which flows from it.106  
 
What actually happens is an elevation of one’s reason to an improper position of authority.  
C.F.W. Walther understood that if one finds error in the Scriptures, he establishes his reason 
above God’s Word.  Walther declared in 1858, 
 He who imagines that he finds in the Holy Scripture even only one error,  
believes not in Scripture, but in himself; for even if he accepted everything  
else as truth, he would believe it not because Scripture says so, but because  
it agrees with his reason or with his heart.107 
 
Finally, if one denies inerrancy he has disregarded the teaching of Christ and the apostles.  
One can no longer claim them as doctrinal guides.  Warfield writes, 
 If criticism has made such discoveries as to necessitate the abandonment  
of the doctrine of plenary inspiration, it is not enough to say that we are  
compelled to abandon only a “particular theory of inspiration,” though that  
is true enough. We must go on to say that that “particular theory of inspiration” is the 
theory of the apostles and of the Lord, and that in abandoning it we are abandoning 
them as our doctrinal teachers and guides, as our “exegetes”…108 
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J.I. Packer comments about this matter when he says, “We believe in these things, not 
because we can prove them ‘scientifically,’ but because we are assured of them by Christ and 
His apostles, whom we regard as teachers worthy of our trust.”109  And similarly, “Anything 
short of unconditional submission to Scripture, therefore, is a kind of impenitence; any view 
that subjects the written Word of God to the opinions and pronouncements of men involves 
unbelief and disloyalty towards Christ.”110   
 
Ultimately, one holds to the doctrine of inerrancy because this is what was taught by Christ 
and the apostles and in so doing he has placed his trust in Christ, the Divine Teacher.  
Because of this there is no doubt about the authority of the Bible.  It was given by the 
concursive operation of the Spirit to mankind in order to be a trustworthy source of the 
knowledge of God.  And as a result man does not have to rely on his own understanding.  He 
does not have to determine by his own fallible reason which parts of the Bible are true and 
trustworthy and which parts are not.  Inerrancy allows man to affirm the truth and 
trustworthiness of all parts of the Bible without question.   
 
However, this does not mean that the doctrine of inerrancy has all of the questions posed to it 
answered, nor does it claim to be able to answer all of these questions.  Packer writes, 
 Therefore, just as we should not hesitate to commit ourselves to faith in  
the Trinity although we do not know how one God can be three Persons,  
nor to faith in the incarnation, although we do not know how the divine  
and human natures combined in the Person of Christ, so we should not  
hesitate to commit ourselves to faith in Scripture as the infallible Word   
of the infallible God, even though we cannot solve all the puzzles, nor  
reconcile all the apparent contradictions with which in our present state  
of knowledge it confronts us.  On all these articles of faith we have God’s  
positive assurance; and that should be enough.111   
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The inerrantist stands firm in the faith that he is upholding a doctrine that was taught by 
Christ and his apostles and affirmed by the Church for the first seventeen hundred years of 
her history.  That somehow, whether we use the term concursus or not, God inspired the 
authors of Holy Writ in such a way that their personalities were not diminished and yet what 
they said in Scripture, God said as well.  This resulted in the writing of a completely truthful 
and trustworthy text in order to faithfully reveal the God who claimed to be its author.   
 
Concluding Comment 
 
As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter it was not my intent to argue for or against the 
doctrine of inerrancy.  What I hope to have accomplished is to outline the main claims that 
all inerrantists, by virtue of being inerrantists, would agree with.  Inerrantists do not always 
agree on the minor points in their doctrines and have different ways of expressing these 
points, but there are some main points or claims that establish the inerrantist position and 
these have been discussed above.  
 
With the main claims of inerrancy laid out, the hope is that when one encounters the term in 
future chapters there will be a clear understanding of what is meant.  Now that the reader has 
been grounded in his understanding of the claims of inerrancy we are able to move into 
discussing Christology and the notion of truth maintained by the doctrine of inerrancy.  I 
agree entirely with Paul Feinberg when he writes about the word inerrancy, “People surely 
accept or reject the word without agreeing or even knowing what someone else means by 
it.”112 
  
We know have a clear understanding of the claims of inerrancy.  With these claims in mind 
we are now in a position to examine more carefully the notion of truth presupposed by the 
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inerrancy claims.  Chapter two examines a number of different philosophical and theological 
shifts that occur in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries our of which the doctrine of 
inerrancy developed and then examines the thought of both Warfield and Henry in order to 
see whether their understanding of truth has been influenced by the particular way of 
thinking about truth after the philosophical shifts of these centuries.  
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~2~ 
Inerrancy’s Historical Influences 
 
In this chapter we will explore some of the historical conditions that would seem to have 
allowed the doctrine of inerrancy to take root and grow into the doctrine as it was presented 
in the previous chapter.  The first section of this chapter deals with three different theses, all 
within the scope of what might be described as theological shifts during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  In the space available it will not be possible to build our own thesis 
concerning the history of ideas on the basis of primary evidence, so what we shall do is 
outline some theses that have recently been advanced, and test them against the primary 
sources.  The first thesis explores the relationship between theology and history and how this 
relationship degenerated during this time.  The second examines the way in which the 
presuppositions about theological language changed from being analogical to univocal, and 
finally, the third thesis explores the change in attitude during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries to the ontology of the Bible.  We will offer a brief conclusion at the end of this 
section of the chapter stating how these historical shifts in thinking helped to make a fertile 
bed for inerrancy to take root and grow into the doctrine it has become today.   
 
The second half of this chapter will deal with the philosophical shifts during the same time 
period, which also would seem to have affected the way in which the doctrine of inerrancy 
developed.  We will look particularly at the relevant aspects of John Locke and Thomas 
Reid’s philosophy before turning to two twentieth century proponents of inerrancy, B.B. 
Warfield and Carl F.H. Henry, we shall examine each of their positions on inerrancy to see if 
it can be seen to be influenced by the philosophies of either Locke or Reid.  The goal of the 
chapter is to show that there are certain theological and philosophical shifts that occur during 
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which were necessary precursors for the doctrine of 
inerrancy to be developed as it has been in the twentieth century (see chapter 1 for more 
details).  We turn now to examine three important theological shifts that help this 
development. 
 
 
Separation between theology and history 
 
Murray Rae contends that there is a “disengagement” between truth and history that has its 
roots in seventeenth century thinking and that as a result “theology and history have been 
torn apart.”113 This divorce between history and theology has caused there to be a suspicion 
about the truth claims of the biblical text in particular.  The presupposition which drives this 
suspicion, Rae claims, is that history ought to be safegaurded against certain theological 
claims.”114  In other words, the truth of historical claims cannot be understood by utilizing 
“theological categories in our accounts of what has taken place.”115 
 
The separation between theology and history is one of the theological shifts during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Rae sees the roots of this separation philosophically, 
starting with, Rene Descartes (1596-1650).  The theological forerunner of this position, 
according to Rae, is Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) followed by Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) 
and G.E. Lessing (1729-81).  The writings and thought of these three seminal thinkers lay an 
important foundation for the proceeding skepticism about the historical claims in the Bible 
that affects many theologians even today.   
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According to Rae, Spinoza “represents a fateful turn for Christian theology for it is under his 
influence that there arose in biblical interpretation a separation between history and faith.”116  
The biblical critic, Reimarus, makes a similar split and argues that we cannot know anything 
about the historical Jesus from the writings of the apostles because they deliberately 
fabricated their accounts of the resurrection in order to maintain the vision that Jesus had for 
himself.117  Finally, Lessing concludes that it is the very nature of historical claims that they 
can never be definitive of claims concerning ultimate or absolute truth.  So it is with these 
three thinkers that we start our examination of the theological “shifts” that allow the doctrine 
of inerrancy to take root and flourish.   
 
Spinoza’s chapter ‘Of the interpretation of Scripture’ in the Theological-Political Treatise is 
where Rae points his readers and also where we shall go in order to see where the shift 
mentioned above begins.  Spinoza’s motive for developing his hermeneutic is because “we 
see that nearly all men parade their own ideas as God’s Word, their chief aim being to 
compel others to think as they do, while using religion as a pretext.”118  So, he continues, “In 
order to escape from this scene of confusion, to free our minds from the prejudices of 
theologians and to avoid the hasty acceptance of human fabrications as divine teachings, we 
must discuss the true method of Scriptural interpretation and examine it in depth; for unless 
we understand this we cannot know with any certainty what the Bible or the Holy Spirit 
intends to teach.”119 
 
According to Spinoza, the primary way that one goes about achieving this certainty is by 
accepting that “all knowledge of Scripture must be sought by Scripture alone.”  Prima facie 
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this sounds like a reasonable way to proceed but we shall soon find that what Spinoza means 
by this leads him to make conclusions that separate faith and history.  He writes,  
 Now here I term a pronouncement obscure or clear according to the degree  
of difficulty with which the meaning can be elicited from the context, and not 
according to the degree of difficulty with which its truth can be perceived by  
reason.  For the point at issue is merely the meaning of the texts, not their  
truth.  I would go further: in seeking the meaning of Scripture we should take  
every precaution against the undue influence, not only of our own prejudices,  
but of our faculty of reason insofar as that is based on the principles of natural  
cognition.120  [my italics] 
 
What he means by interpreting Scripture using Scripture alone is precisely this:  we must 
only look for the true meaning of Scripture not whether historical accounts or any other 
affirmations in Scripture are true facts.  We must only judge Scripture on Scripture’s terms.  
He uses two sayings of Moses to illustrate his point.   
 The sayings of Moses, “God is fire,” and “God is jealous,” are perfectly  
clear as long as we attend only to the meaning of the words; and so, in spite of  
their obscurity form the perspective of truth and reason, I classify these  
sayings as clear.  Indeed, even though their literal meaning is opposed to the  
natural light of reason, this literal meaning must nevertheless be retained  
unless it is in clear opposition to the basic principles derived from the study of  
Scripture…Therefore, the question as to whether Moses did or did not believe  
that God is fire must in no wise be decided by the rationality or irrationality of  
the belief, but solely from other pronouncements of Moses.121 
 
Historical study of the text, for Spinoza, can provide us with what the author intended to 
convey.  It can tell us the meaning of the text.  Whether or not it does tell us the factuality of 
the history is of no consequence to Spinoza.  Rae concludes, “The reference of the texts to 
that which has taken place apart from them fades into obscurity.”122  This is because the 
historical “facts” are unimportant to Spinoza.  What is important is the virtues that Scripture 
teaches.  Rae writes, “It is quite possible under Spinoza’s scheme that the historical 
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narratives be judged false, but this is no threat to faith which is concerned principally with 
right conduct.”123 
 
This commitment to retrieving the eternal moral truths of Scripture is evident in Spinoza’s 
writings.  And even though Spinoza understands his method to be “historical,” it is only in 
the sense that he is hoping to understand the history the Bible presents in and of itself.  
Furthermore, what he is primarily interested in are these universal truths which the Bible 
clearly conveys.  He writes,  “In just the same way we must first seek from our study of 
Scripture that which is most universal and forms the basis and foundation of all Scripture; in 
short, that which is commended in Scripture by all the prophets as doctrine eternal and most 
profitable for all mankind.  For example, that God exists, one alone and omnipotent, who 
alone should be worshipped, who cares for all, who loves above all others those who worship 
him and love their neighbours as themselves.”124 
 
What we can know and what it is important to know are these universal moral truths.  Once 
we have extrapolated these from the biblical text then the important work is done, all other 
work is founded on curiosity.  Spinoza concludes, “With the help of such a historical study of 
Scripture as is available to us, we can readily grasp the meanings of its moral doctrines and 
be certain of their true sense…Therefore we have no reason to be unduly anxious concerning 
the other contents of Scripture; for since for the most part they are beyond the grasp of reason 
and intellect, they belong to the sphere of the curious rather than the profitable.”125 
 
Rae’s thesis is that Spinoza opens the door in biblical studies for the continued separation of 
faith and history.  As the quote above indicates, and as Rae concludes, “It is the abstract and 
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universal ideas of the Bible that are to be reckoned with and not the history to which its 
narratives bear witness.  The implication eventually to be drawn, not by Spinoza himself, but 
by those who followed him, was that the historical narratives of the Bible should properly be 
regarded as mythical.”126  Samuel Reimarus, a biblical critic and one who lived after 
Spinoza, followed in this line of thinking.  As Rae puts it, he dealt “a blow to the confidence 
that Christian truth was founded upon the solid rock of historical occurrence.”127  It is to his 
writings that we turn to next. 
 
Reimarus’ contemporary G.E. Lessing only published the writings that deal this ‘blow’ after 
Reimarus’ death.  It is in these writings where we find Reimarus seriously questioning the 
truth of the Bible’s historical claims.  Reimarus followed Spinoza’s thought by reducing 
Christian truth to something ahistorical.  The truth of the Christian claims about Jesus Christ 
are fabrication by the Apostles, according to Reimarus.  What is important is the simple 
Gospel that Jesus proclaimed.  The gospel does not proclaim the truth of a divine saviour 
becoming incarnate.  Rather it is reduced to the simple message of repentance and talk about 
the immanence of the kingdom of God.128 
 
Reimarus writes, “The person who reads and reflects upon all Jesus’ words will find their 
content applies collectively to these two things: either he describes the kingdom of heaven 
and commands his disciples to proclaim it, or he shows how men must undergo a sincere 
repentance and not cling to the sanctimonious nature of the Pharisees.”129  The call to 
virtuous living by way of repentance and preparation for the immanent return of the kingdom 
is what the life and teaching of Jesus can be reduced to.  In fact it was the goal of Jesus’ 
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teaching to bring about these things.  Reimarus is clear that “these are not great mysteries or 
tenets of faith that he explains, proves, and preaches; they are nothing other than moral 
teachings and duties intended to improve man inwardly and with all his heart…”130 
 
According to Reimarus, Jesus Christ was not God incarnate but a pious teacher who by being 
given the title “son of God” was especially loved by God.  “He [Jesus] urged nothing more 
than purely moral duties, a true love of God and of one’s neighbor…”131 Addressing the 
meaning of the title “son of God” Reimarus concludes, “This meaning is so obvious that any 
other interpretation is unscriptural, new, and unprecedented if it makes the Son of God a 
person whom God begot out of God’s being in eternity, and who in turn with the Father who 
begot him produces yet a third divine person.  The Old Testament, the Jews, the evangelists, 
do not know such a Son of God, and Jesus himself does not present himself as such; it is, 
rather, the apostles who first sought something greater in this term.”132 
 
In fact, it is the Apostles who bear the brunt of Reimarus’ criticism.  They were responsible 
for fabricating much of the history upon which orthodox Christianity relies so heavily, i.e., 
the resurrection.  According to Reimarus, Jesus was a pious man, beloved of God, and at 
whose death God expressed his anger.  In fact Jesus believed that God would appoint him as 
the Messiah over his temporal kingdom but this plan was frustrated.  The disciples believed 
that Jesus would take on this role, as well, and when he was crucified had to fabricate the 
resurrection story in order to, in Rae’s words, “keep the dream alive.”133 
 I do not pretend to assert that the thoughts of the Antiochians, while listening 
to the speech of Paul, were the same as my own, but as in these days we must  
often be Antiochians, and must listen to Paul’s evidence of the resurrection  
and the Christian religion, I candidly declare that however honestly I go to  
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work, I cannot draw any other inference from it; and everyone who has so far  
advanced in thinking as to be able to resolve a wild discourse into common- 
sense conclusions, and thus test it, will agree with me, that no other deduction  
can be wrung from the speech of Paul.  Thus it is quite clear that the old  
Scripture evidence of the resurrection of Jesus never can stand proof before  
the judgment seat of sound reason, and only contains a miserable and palpable  
petitonem principii per circulum.134 
 
According to Remairus, the Apostles adopted a new system which included a “spiritual 
suffering Savior” who would resurrect and ascend to heaven and only then would he return to 
be the Messiah and king of Israel.135 
 
What it is important to realize is that Reimarus was very skeptical about the historical claims 
of the New Testament, especially the claim concerning the resurrection.  Also, he reduced the 
message of the Gospel down to living virtuously and waiting for the kingdom of God.  He 
believed that the message of Jesus conveyed this and that Jesus himself was a faithful teacher 
of this message but nothing more.  Any claims about Jesus being God and resurrecting from 
the dead were later fabrications of his followers.  Rae concludes, “His messianic delusions 
notwithstanding, Jesus’ ethical teaching provided worthy guidance, it was supposed, for a life 
well-pleasing to God.  The echo of Spinoza resounds clearly here; what Christian faith is 
finally concerned with in the biblical material is not the dubious historical claims but the 
teaching about virtue.”136 
 
The final key figure to push this shift in thinking forward, according to Rae’s thesis, is G.E. 
Lessing.  Lessing helped to publish Reimarus’ Fragments and no doubt was influenced by 
them.  He shares the same skepticism about basing universal truths on historical accounts, but 
whereas Reimarus thought that there was a deliberate deception on the part of the Biblical 
writers to create history, Lessing believed that it was actually the nature of the historical 
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claims that they could never be strong enough to be the foundation upon which universal 
truth could be established.  Because of the distance between the readers of the Bible today 
and the writers of the biblical narratives there is no way to obtain epistemic certainty about 
what the writers have written.  Rae writes, “First, the passing of time and the mediation of 
testimony itself erodes the epistemic value of historical testimony to the point that, in respect 
of the biblical narratives, we who stand so many centuries after the events are bound to 
remain agnostic about the veracity of the biblical testimony.”137 
 
‘On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power’ is undoubtedly one of Lessing’s most influential 
writings.  It is in this work where he lays out what would become a decisive blow against the 
claim that Christian truth is ultimately mediated through history.  According to Lessing the 
historical claims of Christianity are incidental and so do not belong to the essence of 
Christianity.138  This marks the final break between faith and history that is characteristic of 
the thought of this time.   
 
Lessing begins his work saying,  
 If I had lived at the time of Christ, the prophecies fulfilled in his person  
would certainly have made me pay great attention to him.  And if I had  
actually seen him perform miracles, and if I had no cause to doubt that these  
were genuine miracles, then I would certainly have gained so much  
confidence in one who worked miracles and whose coming had been predicted  
so long before, that I would willingly have subordinated my understanding to  
his and believed him in all matters in which equally indubitable experiences  
did not contradict him.139   
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Already we are beginning to see the uncertainty regarding historical claims that occurs in 
Lessing’s mind.  The problem that Lessing raises is whether the claims of historians are as 
certain as his experience.  He writes, “Or is what I read in reliable historians invariably just 
as certain as what I experience myself?  I am not aware that anyone has ever made such a 
claim.”140  His answer is no.  Yet, this is what is being asked of him by Christianity.  One 
must believe the historical claims of the Bible as firmly as one believes demonstrated truths.   
 
It is important to note that Lessing does not doubt the historical claims made in the Bible.  
Rather he questions whether historical claims qua historical claims can ever have the same 
reliability as demonstrative claims.  He writes,  
 Firstly, who will deny – and I do not do so – that the reports of these  
miracles and prophecies are as reliable as historical truths can be? – But then,  
if they are only as reliable as this, why are they suddenly made infinitely more  
reliable in practice?...If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing  
can be demonstrated by means of historical truths.  That is, contingent truths  
of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.141 
 
And now the break between history and faith is complete.  Historical truths can never be the 
foundation upon which faith is built.  For Lessing, only reason can be this foundation.  He 
cites the example of the history of Alexander the Great and says, “Who, as a result of this 
belief, would permanently disavow all knowledge that conflicted with this belief?  I certainly 
would not.”  Lessing has no reason to disbelieve the history of Alexander but maintains that 
it is possible that that entire history is based on the writings of the poet Choerilus who 
travelled with him.  He goes on to relate this to the historical claims of Christianity.   
 Consequently, if I have no historical objection to the fact that Christ raised  
someone from the dead, must I therefore regard it as true that God has a Son  
who is of the same essence as himself?  What connection is there between my  
ability to raise any substantial objection to the evidence for the former, and my  
obligation to believe something which my reason refuses to accept?142 
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The same holds for the resurrection and the fact that both Christ himself and his disciples 
believed him to be the Son of God.  Lessing can make no historical objection to these claims.  
However, what he refuses to do is go from that historical conclusion to certain metaphysical 
and moral beliefs, for this would be switching to a different category of truth claims.  Lessing 
concludes, 
 But to make the leap from this historical truth into a quite different class  
of truths, and to require me to revise all my metaphysical and moral concepts  
accordingly; to expect me to change all my basic ideas on the nature of the  
deity because I cannot offer any credible evidence against the resurrection of  
Christ -  if this is not a ‘transition to another category’, I do not know what  
Aristotle meant by that phrase.143 
 
It is not as though Lessing is unwilling to change his metaphysical and moral beliefs.  He is 
not against this per se.  What he is against is changing them on the basis of historical claims.  
Historical truths do not have the power to do this.  The only truths which do would appear to 
be ones based on reason.   
 
Rae’s thesis about the split between faith and history would seem to be correct.  From 
Spinoza to Lessing there is undoubtedly a suspicion about the historical testimony of the 
Bible.  “The result of Reimarus’ skepticism about the reliability of the Gospels as historical 
witness combined with Lessing’s conviction that the passing of time is corrosive of any 
certainty we may aspire to concerning the events of history, has convinced many people that 
the truth of Christian faith ought to be established on grounds other than that of historical 
testimony.”  But this shift in thinking is only one of a number of ‘shifts’ taking place during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that allowed the doctrine of inerrancy to flourish.144   
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From Analogy to Univocity 
 
Another thesis explores the shift from analogy to univocity in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  We turn to William Placher’s work now to explore this thesis.  According to 
Placher, a key change in the understanding of how we are to speak of God is developed in 
large degree in the seventeenth century.  Beginning in the fifteenth century, through the 
writings of Cajetan and later with Suarez, the Thomistic assumption about God’s 
transcendence is disregarded.  
 
According to Placher, what was assumed by Aquinas and other Medieval theologians was 
that God’s being was primarily a mystery and any talk of who God is could only be done 
analogously.  However, beginning with Cajetan there is a univocal shift that happens to the 
understanding of analogous language.145  It is this shift that starts what Placher terms the 
domestication of God’s transcendence.  In the seventeenth century there were many factors 
that were “pressing for a more univocal language and tighter argumentation in theology” and 
Placher’s thesis represents one of these.146   
 
This shift does not just happen among Roman Catholic theologians, according to Placher.  It 
also has its Lutheran and Reformed representatives.  For the purposes of this chapter we will 
have to limit our treatment of Placher’s thesis to the main Reformed representative that he 
cites, Francis Turretin.  According to Placher, Turretin’s understanding of analogy closely 
resembles Suarez’s and it is largely through Turrentin’s thought that the shift from analogy to 
univocity finds its beginning amongst Reformed Protestants.  “Thus the ‘shift to univocity’ – 
the growing confidence that our language about God makes roughly the same sort of sense as 
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our language about creatures – was nearly as common among both Lutheran and Reformed 
theologians as among Catholics in the seventeenth century.”147   
 
In a similar manner Rogers and McKim argue that Turretin believed the language in the 
Bible was supernaturally dictated by God.  “Calvin viewed the language and thought forms 
of the biblical writers as human products that God had graciously condescended to use.  
Turretin, in contrast, treated the language and thought forms of the Bible as supernatural 
entities dictated by God.”148  Turretin writes, “Nor can we readily believe that God, who 
dictated and inspired each and every word to these inspired (theopneustois) men, would not 
take care of their entire preservation.”149  
Turretin did believe that the words of Scripture had been dictated by God to the writers of the 
texts.  However, it is important to see what he understood to be the function of theological 
language.  According to Placher, Turretin opens the door for the acceptance of the univocity 
of language in his discussion of the attributes of God.  In so doing he begins the shift in 
Reformed Protestantism from understanding language about God as primarily analogous to 
being primarily univocal.  However, Turretin does not explicitly develop a theory of 
language that is univocal.  The important point that Placher establishes is that by using the 
language of “analogies of similarity” Turretin begins to sound very similar to Suarez, who 
Placher claims, plays a crucial role in establishing this shift in thinking.     
 
Turretin’s thought is decisively different than John Calvin when it comes to his 
understanding of analogy.  Although Calvin does not explicitly develop his understanding of 
analogy, perhaps because this was a common assumption of the theologians of his time, a 
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place in his thought where we can glean some information is when he talks about the 
sacraments.  Calvin writes,  
 For this reason Augustine calls a sacrament “a visible word;” because it  
represents the promises of God portrayed as in a picture, and places before our 
eyes an image of them, in which every lineament is strikingly expressed.   
Other similtudes may also be adduced for the better elucidation of the nature  
of sacraments; as if we call them pillars of our faith: for as an edifice rests on  
its foundation, and yet from the addition of pillars placed under it receives an  
increase of stability; so faith rests on the word of God as its foundation, but  
when the sacraments are added to it as pillars, they bring with them an  
accession of strength.  Or if we call them mirrors, in which we may  
contemplate the riches of grace which God imparts to us: for in the  
sacraments, as we have already observed, he manifests himself to us as far as  
our dulness is capable of knowing him, and testifies his benevolence and love  
towards us more expressly than he does by his word.150 
 
Calvin is clear that the sacraments only mirror the divine reality of God’s grace toward us 
and they seem to do this “more expressly” than the Scriptures in his mind.   
 
Calvin’s understanding of the working of the Holy Spirit is central to his theology of the 
sacraments.   Without the Spirit, both word and sacrament would only strike at our ears and 
eyes but would not penetrate either the heart or the mind.  “He illuminates our minds by the 
light of his Holy Spirit, and opens an entrance to our hearts for the word and sacraments; 
which otherwise would only strike the ears and present themselves to the eyes, without 
producing the least effect upon the mind”151 (my italics).   This understanding would seem 
contrary to the thought produced by Turretin and much of the Reformed tradition that follows 
him.  Without the Spirit neither word nor sacrament can produce an effect on the mind.  But 
when the shift from analogy to univocity occurs then the need for the Spirit to cause this 
effect on the mind seems to diminish.    
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In fact, even Calvin was concerned about the need to maintain a doctrine of analogy, albeit 
indirectly.   In his critique of Lombard’s understanding of the sacraments this becomes 
apparent.  According to Calvin Lombard’s error was to posit that the sacraments themselves 
where the causes of righteousness and salvation.  In other words they were univocally tied to 
the righteousness of God himself, i.e., Jesus Christ.  But according to Calvin, the sacraments 
have no power in se.  God must act in order for them to have power.  If the there were some 
kind of univocal assumption about the sacraments then they would have power in se.152  It 
could be argued that because Calvin recognizes the importance of analogy he cannot take the 
steps needed in order for him and Lombard to agree about the sacraments.  Unfortunately, the 
scope and purpose of this chapter will not allow me to explore this any further.   
 
Turrentin’s understanding of univocity begins with his conception of the divine attributes.  
According to Turretin, the distinction between divine commiunicable and incommunicable 
attributes is the most frequent distinction made of the divine attributes but a distinction that is 
not “equally received by all.”  The analogous, or communicable attributes, “God produces in 
creatures (especially in rational creatures) effects analogous to his own properties, such as 
goodness, justice, wisdom, etc.”153  He admits that  
the communicable attributes are not predicated of God and creatures  
univocally because there is not the same relation as in things simply univocal  
agreeing in name and definition.  Nor are they predicated equivocally because  
there is not a totally diverse relation, as in things merely equivocal agreeing  
only in name.  They are predicated analogically, by analogy both of similitude  
and of attribution.154 
 
This statement is what causes Placher’s conclusion that Turretin comes very close to a 
univocal understanding of language.  Even though he denies that communicable attributes are 
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univocal, Placher argues that by introducing an understanding of analogy of similarity, 
univocity is able to slip in through the back door as it were.   
 
And at this point, Turretin started to sound like Suarez.  Communicable  
attributes are predicated of God and creatures neither univocally nor  
equivocally, he explained, but analogically in two senses: analogy of  
attribution and analogy of similarity.  God is “good,” for instance, in that God  
causes goodness in creatures (attribution) but also that goodness in God has  
“A certain similarity” to goodness in creatures (similarity).  Turretin has thus  
arrived by a different route at exactly what Suarez called analogy of internal  
attribution – A causes a property in B and also itself possesses the property it  
causes.155 
 
Placher’s case would seem to be validated by Turretin’s own definition of what it means to 
talk about analogy of similarity.  He defines this category as “When one name is so attributed 
to more than one thing that it may be said of one primarily and principally or by priority, but 
of the others secondarily and by posteriority on account of dependence on the first.”156  
Nevertheless, to talk about God’s goodness and creaturely goodness is to mean the same 
thing, even if the goodness in God is original and independent.   
 
Now it would seem a reasonable conclusion to draw that if language is univocal then it would 
be extremely important to maintain the perfection of the particular words in the Bible.  This 
is indeed what Turretin does.  In fact, according to Turretin, written revelation is the “most 
perfect mode of revelation.”157  This written revelation, the Bible, is dictated by God and so 
is authentic and divine.  As a result it is the only authority and foundation for faith. 
 
There would therefore seem to be a connection between holding a univocal theory of 
language and the particular doctrine of Scripture that Turretin espouses.  Accordingly, the 
Bible becomes a kind of scientific textbook whose words univocally describe who God is.  
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This means that the very words themselves must be affirmed in no way to fall into error 
because they perfectly speak concerning the things of God.  Turretin goes to some length in 
the Institutes ‘proving’ that Scripture does not fall into contradiction.  “The contradictions 
(antilogia) found in Scripture are apparent, not real;” he writes, “they are to be understood 
only with respect to us who cannot comprehend and perceive the agreement everywhere, but 
not in the thing itself.”158   
 
Not only was it important for Turretin to prove that no contradictions existed in Scripture, he 
also predicated the entire authority of Scripture on its divine and inerrant properties.  He 
writes, “Rather the question is whether in writing they were so acted upon and inspired by 
the Holy Spirit (both as to the things themselves and as to the words) as to be kept free from 
all error and that their writings are truly authentic and divine.  Our adversaries deny this; we 
affirm it.”159 He goes on to write, “The prophets did not fall into mistakes in those things 
which they wrote as inspired men (theopnuestos) and as prophets, not even in the smallest 
particulars; otherwise faith in the whole of Scripture would be rendered doubtful.”160  And 
further, “For since nothing false can be the object of faith, how could the Scriptures be held 
as authentic and reckoned divine if liable to contradiction and corruptions?”161  “Nor can we 
readily believe that God, who dictated and inspired each and every word to these inspired 
(theopneustois) men, would not take care of their entire preservation.”162 
 
It is important to understand that Turretin is arguing against his understanding of Roman 
Catholic doctrine that would place the Church as that which establishes the authority of the 
Bible.  Instead of relying on the Church to affirm the Bible’s authority, Turretin points his 
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readers to the text itself.  For Turretin the Bible proves its own authority by it very nature as a 
dictated text given inerrantly by God to the human writers.  These human writers were 
assisted by the Holy Spirit in such a way that they were able to write down this inerrant word 
without erring themselves.  The Church is not the foundation which provides authority to the 
text of Scripture.  Rather, its authority is directly from God and proved by its own ‘marks’, 
i.e., inerrancy. 
 
It would appear that the claim concerning inerrancy is the result of a denial to attribute 
authority to the Roman Catholic Church.  If one is not to believe that the Bible is 
authoritative because of the testimony of the Church then what other grounds might there be 
for making the same affirmation.  Because Scripture is the sole foundation for faith, 
according to Turretin, it is also the sole foundation for its own authority.  It is able to prove 
itself.   
 
But is there a connection between Turretin’s understanding of the analogy of similitude of 
the divine attributes and his doctrine of Scripture?  Ultimately, both areas of doctrine are 
dealing with the use of language and so it would seem at least plausible that there might be a 
connection.  If it does exist, though, it would seem to be only implicit.  As one author has 
written, “It is a semantical theory that is the basis for the traditional way of giving priority to 
revelation while at the same time appropriating insights from other intellectual sources about 
the nature of God.”163 
 
Placher makes a strong case that through Suarez’s misinterpretation of Aquinas’s 
understanding of analogy, there is a shift from the analogous nature of theological language 
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to a univocal nature of theological language.  This happens by defining analogy differently 
than Aquinas did.  By splitting types of analogy into appropriation and similitude, Placher 
claims, Turretin makes the same mistake as Suarez.  Furthermore, by using the category of 
similitude Turretin allows for language to speak about the divine reality in a way that 
Aquinas would not have accepted.   
 
But how does this affect revelation, particularly with regard to the dictated words of the 
Bible?  As we have seen, Turretin held to a dictation theory of biblical inspiration and so if 
the shift to univocity is made then what is being dictated is language that fully unveils the 
mystery of who God is.  There is no distance between the language to describe who God is in 
the Bible and the reality of who God is in se.  This move is something that Aquinas would 
never have affirmed.  The created reality of language can never describe the reality of God in 
se.  Placher writes,  
 But it is not that God is wise like Einstein and good like Gandhi, only more so.  
While the predicates we apply to God are somehow connected to the way we  
use the same words of other things, we cannot understand what the connection  
is.  To use Aquinas’s terms….there is some connection between the “thing  
signified” in our experience and the “thing signified” in God.  If we  
understood God, we would realize the appropriateness of using a term like  
“wise” of God.  Indeed, “wise” would then seem most appropriately used of  
God, with every human application but a pale reflection.  But, situated as we  
are, we cannot understand the “mode of signifying” that any term has as  
applied to God, and hence we simply cannot imagine how such terms would  
turn out to be appropriate.164 
 
This may be one of the factors why it was so important for Turretin to affirm the total 
inerrancy of Scripture.  The Bible becomes a scientific textbook which one can turn to in 
order to have the mystery of God unveiled through language.  Hans Frei writes concerning 
the trends at this time in history, “Furthermore, is the appeal to the “mystery” of revelation 
anything other than an admission that the idea itself is unintelligible, a token of that 
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unwarranted intrusion of imagination or, worse yet, sheer ignorant superstition into matters 
religious which the new intellectual rigor must repel?”165  There is a tendency in this way of 
thinking toward rationalism, which during Turretin’s time would have been strong.  Faith can 
become merely assent to propositions found in the Bible.  These propositions are given so 
much importance because they are the most perfect way, according to Turretin, for God to 
reveal Himself.  If language is, in fact, univocal then this is undoubtedly the case.  Univocity 
and the doctrine of Scripture are not explicitly connected in Turretin’s thought, and it would 
be unfair to his theology to label him a rationalist.  However, rationalism is a temptation 
when assumptions about the univocal nature of theological language are made.   
 
Space will not allow us to fully examine the connection, if any, between Turretin’s 
understanding of language and his doctrine of Scripture.  However, it would seem that 
Placher’s claim that the tendency toward univocity was in Turretin’s thought is valid.  There 
is no doubt that Turretin’s thought influenced later developers of Inerrancy at Princeton.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that his doctrine of Scripture and his tendency toward univocity 
would have an impact on those theologians indebted to his work.   
 
But the shift to univocity is not the only other theological change happening during this time.  
Another change, and the final one that we will be examining has to do specifically with 
hermeneutics and how the Bible was seen.  By the late eighteenth century the Bible was 
beginning to be seen as “just another book” which could be read and interpreted like any 
other historical text or great work of literature.  It is this assumption which we will examine 
next.   
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Just Another Book 
 
According to Hans Frei, Schleiermacher “thought all of hermeneutics as a fully coherent and 
articulated theory of interpretation, equally applicable to every discourse.”166  There is a 
hermeneutical shift and change in attitude regarding reading the text of the Bible that takes 
place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and it is fully realized with 
Schleiermacher in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Schleiermacher 
develops a theory of hermeneutics that is not just interested in the question of how we are to 
understand a text, but, rather, how understanding happens.  This is perhaps why his thought 
is considered by some to be a watershed in the history of Biblical Studies.167  In seeking to 
develop the process of understanding itself (to better understand understanding) 
Schleiermacher broadens the scope of the hermeneutical art so that it is able to be applied 
universally to all language. 
 
Because of Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutic the Bible becomes just another book to 
be understood and interpreted like any other piece of literature of its kind.  Part of the reason 
for this might have been linked to Schleiermacher’s denial of verbal inspiration.  According 
to Schleiermacher, the Bible is not verbally inspired.  He rejected the traditional view of 
Biblical inspiration in place of a more universal inspiration in which the Scripture 
participated.  He writes, “These books only share in it; and inspiration in this narrower sense, 
conditioned as it is by the purity and completeness of the apostolic grasp of Christianity, 
covers the whole of the official apostolic activity thence derived.  If we consider the 
inspiration of Scripture in this context as a special portion of the official life of the Apostles 
which in general was guided by inspiration, we shall hardly need to raise all those difficult 
questions about the extent of inspiration which so long have been answered solely in a 
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manner that removed the whole subject from the domain of experiential insight.”168  
Therefore, the writers of the Bible were not inspired to write the words of Scripture but rather 
were ‘moved’ prior to the exercise of their writing.  “Accordingly, their inspiration was a 
prior condition in which scripture participated.  More important, that ‘condition’ was 
universal, to the extent that any book or person might serve as point of contact with the 
infinite.”169 
 
Regardless of what the motivating factor was for Schleiermacher to treat the Bible like any 
other book, his theory of hermeneutics set this way of thinking in stone.  Whereas there was a 
time when it was thought that the Bible needed special tools of interpretation in order for it to 
be understood, Schleiermacher believed that the art of interpretation was universal and so 
there could be no special pleading when one comes to interpret the text of the Bible.  As one 
author has commented, “What Spinoza and Reimarus had taught before him, Schleiermacher 
received into the dogmatics of liberal Protestantism: the Bible must be treated like all other 
books.”170 
 
Schleiermacher places hermeneutics within the field of epistemology.  Hermeneutics 
becomes concerned with the problem of human understanding as such.  “What he has in 
mind is no longer the pedagogical function of interpretation as an aid to the other’s (the 
student’s) understanding; for him interpretation and understanding are closely interwoven, 
like the outer and the inner word, and every problem of interpretation is, in fact, a problem of 
understanding.”171  Thiselton writes,  
 This stands in contrast to both the pre-modern and post-modern models.   
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In the former, it is perhaps too readily assumed that the interpreter, or  
community of interpretation, already in principle “knows” what the text is all  
about; hermeneutics tends in practice to furnish explanations for the different  
routes whereby other interpreters or communities have reached different  
conclusions.  In the ancient world and in Patristic thought hermeneutics  
encouraged reflection on interpretation within a framework of trust which  
might include innocence and obedience, but also, on occasion, credulity and  
self-deception.  The Reformation marked a transition towards a hermeneutic  
of enquiry, which increasingly raised questions about the nature of knowledge  
and understanding itself.  Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics become, after Kant,  
transcendental: he enquires into the linguistic and inter-subjective conditions  
which make understanding possible.172 
 
Because of this desire to broaden the role of hermeneutics so that it looks at the nature of 
understanding itself, Schleiermacher develops a hermeneutic that is equally applicable to 
interpreting any text.173  No longer is a text allowed to dictate how it should be understood.  
Because hermeneutics is a universal category all texts174 must be held to the same standard, 
and this includes the Biblical text.  Schleiermacher remarks, “If, then, hermeneutics is 
important for Christian theology in the same way as it is for classical studies, then neither 
theological nor classical hermeneutics represents the essence of the matter.  Rather, 
hermeneutics itself is something greater out of which these two types flow.”175  He writes 
further,  
Hermeneutics does not apply exclusively to classical studies, nor is it   
merely a part of this restricted philological organon; rather, it is to be applied  
to the works of every author.  Therefore its principles must be sufficiently  
general, and they are not to be derived solely from the nature of classical  
literature.176 
 
It is important to remember that what we know of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is largely 
dependent upon handwritten manuscripts.  He wrote no systematic treatise on the topic and 
so at times it is difficult to decipher just exactly what he means.  For instance, in manuscript 
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two which dates between 1809-10, Schleiermacher begins his writing on whether the 
Scriptures should be considered with a special hermeneutic.  He writes,  
 Are the books of Holy Scripture as such in a different category than secular  
books?  One knows that they are holy only by virtue of having understood  
them.  Either the first readers believed that the books were holy and that they  
themselves were holy, or they considered the books to be altogether human  
works and so could understand them only in the usual way.  The customary  
belief that the Holy Spirit is not to be subjected to the rules of interpretation is  
simply erroneous.  The catholic doctrine of inspired interpretation.  But why  
do they grant it only to the clergy?  Certainly, one cannot understand the Holy  
Spirit without the Holy Spirit.  But this is a completely different question, and  
it, too, depends on being interpreted correctly.  Do the Holy Scriptures, by  
virtue of their special nature, also require a special hermeneutics?  Yes.  But a  
special hermeneutics can be understood only in terms of general hermeneutics;  
otherwise, the result is still aggregate.177 
 
Schleiermacher is addressing a particular way of doing hermeneutics where the Bible is seen 
to need a special hermeneutic.  He takes particular issue with the thought of F.A. Wolf and 
Friedrich Ast.  From this passage alone one might conclude that he agrees with the current 
thought of his time, but that would be a mistake.  He wants to give some credence to the idea 
of a “special hermeneutic” but is insistent that this hermeneutic be based upon the universal 
hermeneutic that he is developing.178 
 
Over ten years later in a manuscript titled, Hermeneutics: The Compendium of 1819 and the 
Marginal Notes of 1828, Schleiermacher addresses this idea of a special hermeneutic for 
Scripture.  In the very first line he writes, “At present there is no general hermeneutics as the 
art of understanding but only a variety of specialized hermeneutics.”179  He is again referring 
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to the work of Wolf and Ast.180  Later in this manuscript, Schleiermacher clarifies what he 
means when he says that Scripture needs a special hermeneutic.  He writes, 
 Incidentally, the question arises whether on account of the Holy Spirit the  
Scriptures must be treated in a special way.  This question cannot be answered  
by a dogmatic decision about inspiration, because such a decision itself  
depends upon interpretation.  1. We must not make a distinction between what  
the apostles spoke and what they wrote, for the church had to be built on their  
speeches.  2.  But for this reason we must not suppose that their writings were  
addressed to all of Christendom, for in fact each text was addressed to specific  
people, and their writing could not be properly understood in the future unless  
these first readers could understand them…Our interpretation must take this  
into account, and we must assume that even if the authors had been merely  
passive tools of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit could have spoken through  
them only as they themselves would have spoken.181 
 
Again, it seems that Schleiermacher’s view of inspiration both influences and is influenced 
by his hermeneutics.  In a footnote on this particular topic he address the issue of a special 
hermeneutic but only briefly,  
 Whether the view that everything in the Scriptures was inspired means that  
everything must relate to the whole church?  No.  This view would necessarily  
entail that the original recipients would interpret them incorrectly, so that it  
would have been better if the Holy Spirit had not produced the Scriptures as  
occasional writings.  Therefore, grammatical and psychological interpretation  
always proceed in accordance with the general rules.  To what extent a  
specialized hermeneutics is still required cannot be discussed until later.182  
 
He finally does talk about a specialized hermeneutic for the Bible but it would appear that 
what he means by this is simply that we must take into account the different linguistic 
influences that might be on the writers of Scripture.  At one point he writes that “each 
language could have its own special hermeneutics” and it would appear that when he 
mentions a “special hermeneutics” for Scripture he mainly means taking into account the 
influence of other languages on the original Greek of the New Testament.183  He reiterates 
the fact that “in general a special hermeneutics is only an abbreviated procedure which must 
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be governed by the general rules.”184  So it would seem that even if there are times when 
Schleiermacher considers a special hermeneutic for Scripture it is in no way the same kind of 
hermeneutic that would have been advocated by his predecessors.  He most certainly desires 
all hermeneutics to be driven by the general hermeneutic that he develops and which has 
influenced in some way all of the hermeneutics is done since his time.185   
 
The scope of this chapter will no allow us to specifically explore Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutical method.  Others have done this much more exhaustively than could ever be 
achieved here.186  The point of this section was to show that with Schleiermacher the attitude 
toward Scripture has fully changed.  Biblical studies after Schleiermacher had to deal with 
this change.  Scripture could no longer be interpreted and understood using different methods 
than one would use to understand Homer or Thucydides.  From Schleiermacher onwards 
Scripture was seen as being just like any other book and should be interpreted and 
understood accordingly.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion- Part One 
 
So how do any of these theological shifts affect the development of the doctrine of 
inerrancy?  The first thing that needs to be admitted is that the doctrine of inerrancy was not 
developed in a bubble.  Like any doctrine, its development was at the very least influenced 
by the specific concerns and challenges of its day.  This influence may be seen to be negative 
or positive.  Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the influence was there.   
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One might conclude that the doctrine of inerrancy was a reactionary doctrine.  For instance, 
if Rae’s thesis is correct and there was a separation between faith and history, then one way 
to counter this separation is making the connection between the historical claims in Scripture 
and their divine inspiration.  If the historical claims have been divinely dictated and could be 
proved to be inerrant then there would not be reason to make the separation between faith 
and history that was popular at the time.  To put that another way: if the Bible is inerrant then 
the historical claims must be taken to be factually true.  Therefore, if inerrancy is assumed 
then one is able to guard against the separation between faith and history.  This is not to say 
that there is any explicit connection between any of the three theses mentioned above and the 
doctrine of inerrancy.  Nevertheless the doctrine of inerrancy that is being examined in this 
thesis could not have avoided being influenced by the theological shifts happening around its 
development.   
 
A strictly univocal understanding of the language of the Bible would make the truth of the 
individual words very important.187  If, as Turretin believed, verbal revelation is the most 
perfect revelation that God can offer, then the need to guard against imperfection of these 
words would seem imperative.  The doctrine of inerrancy is a way of maintaining this.  
Perhaps, it is possible that a doctrine of inerrancy would have been developed even if the 
shift from analogy to univocity had not occurred, but the emphasis of the doctrine may have 
been different.  The need to protect the individual words from error would seem a very 
valuable enterprise if the univocal nature of language is assumed.   
 
                                                
187 This is not to say that if one holds to an analogical understanding of Scriptural language the words are 
unimportant.  They are important, as well, but for different reasons. 
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Finally, if the Bible is “just another book” then it should be held to the same standards of 
examination as my sixth grade history text.  So just as my sixth grade history textbook would 
be taken out of print if it erred in its retailing of the American Civil War or some other 
important historical event so the Bible too ought to be examined in a similar manner and 
should not be regarded as worthy of reading if it too errs in an important aspect of the history 
it retells.  The doctrine of inerrancy regards this kind of error as impossible but if the 
assumption about the Bible being “just another book” is not held then perhaps the need for 
inerrancy becomes less important. 
 
It would seem a reasonable conclusion to make then, that at the very least the doctrine of 
inerrancy is in part a response to the different theological shifts that occurred in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Had these shifts not taken place then one wonders 
whether the need for the doctrine of inerrancy would have still been perceived to be as 
necessary.  The theological shifts are only part of the historical story of this time.  There were 
also philosophical shifts happening concurrently which undoubtedly spurred on the need for 
the doctrine of inerrancy to develop.  We shall examine two of these shifts below.  
 
 
 
 
Philosophical shifts in Britain during 17th & 18th Centuries 
 
There were many philosophers during this time that played a crucial role in the formation of 
philosophical schools.  Unfortunately the scope and pursuit of this chapter will not allow 
many of these thinkers to be examined.  Our focus will be on two British philosophers.  
Names such as Hobbes, Berkley and Hume played a crucial role in the building of British 
thought in the eighteenth century, particularly in their response to John Locke.  The 
Cambridge Platonists, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton and Samuel Clarke are also names that if 
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one were reading a history of the British enlightenment one would expect to encounter.  With 
this said, I am not attempting here to write such a history in the pages that follow.  What I 
have had to do is pick two of the most influential thinkers within Britain during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and focus on their thought.  I have done this because I 
am of the opinion that of all the philosophical figures in Britain at this time the following two 
thinkers were most influential in the modern doctrine of inerrancy that would flourish in 
North America in the late nineteenth century up until the present day.  These two thinkers are 
John Locke and Thomas Reid.  John Locke is famous for the epistemology that he developed 
based on experience and Thomas Reid is most notable for the philosophy of common sense 
which he developed.  It seems to me that both of these thinkers contributed to American 
theology in general and its epistemological presuppositions concerning truth in particular.  I 
shall attempt to establish a case for this in the latter half of this chapter but before I can do 
this we must lay the foundations by discussing the particulars of the philosophies of Locke 
and Reid.   
 
John Locke’s magnum opus, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, is generally seen 
as a monumental work which represents the beginning of the modern science of psychology, 
the separation of philosophy and science into two disciplines and possibly the precursor to 
Kant’s ‘critical’ philosophy.188  In this work, Locke changed the central question of 
philosophy from one of metaphysics and ontology to epistemology.  Locke sought to explore 
human understanding and questioned the rationalists’ belief in innate ideas as the primary 
source of knowledge in favour of experience.  Locke rejected Descartes’ innate ideas and 
instead advocated a tabula rasa, or blank slate, as the best understanding of our minds at 
                                                
188 Lowe. E.J. ‘Locke’ in A Companion to the Philosophers. Edited by Robert L. Arrington.  Blackwell 
Publishers: Oxford, 1999, p. 374. 
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birth.  According to Locke, only once our minds have been written upon by the pen of 
experience are we then able to know anything.   
 
Like Descartes, Locke believed that knowledge demanded certainty.  When certainty is not 
obtained we are left with either belief or opinion.  Because of this Locke was pessimistic 
about the amount of knowledge that the human mind could obtain.  The scope of our 
knowledge is very narrow.  Locke writes, 
 Our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not  
 happy enough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion  
 to consider, most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay, act  
 upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth…189  
 
The foundation of this certitude is reason.  Only that which has been proven by reason can be 
accounted as knowledge.   
 
Truth, for Locke, is the correct joining of signs.  If the sign and the thing signified are joined 
together correctly this is truth.  “The joining or separating of signs here meant is what by 
another name we call proposition.  So that truth properly belongs only to propositions; 
whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal, as there are two sorts of signs commonly 
made use of, viz. ideas and words.” 190  Locke further elaborates on his understanding of the 
above-mentioned propositions, 
 We must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable  
 of making: - First, mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings are  
 without the use of words put together, or separated, by the mind perceiving  
 or judging of their agreement or disagreement.  Secondly, verbal propositions,  
 which are words, the signs of our ideas, put together or separated in  
 affirmative or negative sentences.191 
 
                                                
189 Locke, John.  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  Collins: London, 1975, p. 404. 
190 Ibid, p. 354. 
191 Ibid, p. 355. 
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So, for Locke, truth can take the form of either mental or verbal propositions.  He admits that 
it is very hard to create mental propositions apart from words but nevertheless believes that 
one must maintain the distinction.192 
 
The ideas in our minds that are either expressed by mental or verbal propositions are created 
by our encounter with the external world.  It is through our experiences that the ideas are 
formed in our minds.  Therefore, it is through our experiences that the truth is ultimately 
known.   
 Locke therefore took the empirical analysis and inductive reasoning of  
 the physicist as the model for his philosophical arguments; and he took  
 the criterion of genuine knowledge, where matters of fact are concerned,  
 to be that which he supposed the empirical scientist employs as he goes  
 about his business; namely, the accordance of theories or ideas with  
 observable data.193 
 
This ‘criterion of genuine knowledge’ is an interesting concept and ought to be explored 
further.  Locke contended that as humans we have four different types of knowledge of 
which we can be certain.  First we have knowledge of self evident propositions, i.e., 1+1=2. 
Second, we have knowledge of propositions about the contents of our own minds.  An 
example of this would be that you have a headache or you have the feeling of being about to 
sneeze.  Locke says that of this type of knowledge we have no reason to doubt. Third, we 
have knowledge of “other things,” of the world around us.  Finally, certainty is also obtained 
with demonstrative knowledge, i.e., knowledge that can be deduced from propositions of the 
above three sorts of knowledge. 194  
 
                                                
192 This is perhaps because for Locke, ideas are primary and of most importance.  We only know what we know 
based upon our ideas of external things.  Locke does not doubt that the external world around us is accurately 
reflected by the ideas in our minds but this separation of ideas and the reality outside of our minds has led some 
modern philosophers to question his epistemology.  Richard Schacht writes, “To be sure, it might still be true 
that there are objects which exist independently of us, and which produce the ideas we have; but Locke has not 
shown that this is so, and therefore cannot be said to know that this is so.”  Quote taken from: Schacht, Richard.  
Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant.  Routledge Publishers: London, 1993, p. 133.   
193 Schacht, p. 103. 
194 Plantinga, Alvin.  Warranted Christian Belief.  Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000, pgs. 75-77. 
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This knowledge that we are able to obtain with certainty only forms a very small part of our 
understanding and beliefs, but, according to Locke, it is the core of those beliefs and plays a 
crucial part in the development of our understanding.  Furthermore, it is opinion that provides 
the majority of what we believe not knowledge, and it is our opinions that must be guided by 
reason.  Alvin Plantinga remarks, “Locke’s crucial claim is that we must be guided, in the 
formation of opinion, by reason.”  He goes on to say that for Locke reason is “the power 
whereby we can discern broadly logical relations among propositions (IV, xviii, 3), which, of 
course, are the candidates for our assent, the things we believe.”195 
 
By using our reason we are able to discern the probability of certain beliefs that we hold 
based on the knowledge that we currently have.  We might say something like, “I believe x is 
probably true because of the certainty of y that I currently have.”  So our beliefs, which form 
a large part of our understanding, are founded upon propositions which we know to be true.  
Plantinga writes, 
 I should proportion degree of assent to the evidence; that is, I should  
 believe a proposition p with a firmness that is proportional to the degree  
 to which p is probable with respect to what is certain for me.  This is what  
 it is to regulate or govern opinion according to reason.196 
 
But how does Locke deal with revelation?  Are we to believe that God has revealed certain 
truths to us in the Bible, for instance?  It is certainly the case that many of the ‘facts’ in the 
Bible do not fall under the four types of knowledge mentioned above; so it must be said, 
according to Locke’s philosophy, that we believe some of the claims made in the Bible are 
true not that we know for certain that they are.  
 
                                                
195 Ibid. p. 77. 
196 Ibid, p. 79. 
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Locke does not have a problem with revealed truth.  In fact, he believes that God does reveal 
truths to us.  Locke writes, “Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be 
made of it.”197  The crucial thing for our purpose is the question of how do we know which 
things have truly been revealed by God and which things have not.  Locke makes reason the 
basis of this knowledge.   He writes, 
 So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and  
 leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation.  Only we must be sure  
 that it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right:…198 
 
and 
 
 I do not mean that we must consult reason, and examine whether a  
 proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles,  
 and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but consult it we must, and  
 by it examine whether it be a revelation from God or no: and if reason  
 finds it to be revealed from God, reason then declares for it as much as  
 for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates.199 
 
Plantinga concludes: “God can certainly reveal truths to us.  We are not obliged to accept as 
revealed, however, anything that would go contrary to what we would otherwise know, even 
with respect to the lowest level of knowledge.”200  According to Locke, we know very little 
with certainty.  Our beliefs and opinions form a large part of our overall understanding and 
we must regulate these beliefs and opinions by our reason.  We do this by believing only 
what can be founded on the certain knowledge that we do have, to believe anything else 
would be unreasonable.   “So we are to follow reason, in the formation of religious opinion, 
but so doing does not preclude accepting certain propositions as specially revealed by God, 
and accepting them on that basis.”201 
 
                                                
197 Quoted in Warranted Christian Belief, p. 80. 
198 Locke, p. 414. 
199 Ibid, p. 432. 
200 Plantinga, p. 81. 
201 Ibid. 
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The path has now been laid to develop an understanding of philosophical foundationalism 
which is based on Locke’s epistemology.  The importance of seeing this connection is 
because, as Plantinga has said, “Locke’s views here, particularly with respect to religion, 
have achieved the status of orthodoxy, and most discussions of the rational justification of 
religious belief have been and still are conducted in the unthinking acceptance of that 
framework.”202 
 
Epistemological foundationalism is a particular philosophy that bases the belief of one 
proposition on the evidential basis of others.  “According to the foundationalist, in an 
acceptable, properly formed noetic structure, every proposition is either in the foundations or 
believed on the evidential basis of other propositions.”203  Locke is seen as the father of 
modern foundationalism because he advocated the idea that all humans have four different 
types of basic knowledge which are certain (see above).  These four types of knowledge 
ought to form the foundation for all of our other beliefs and opinions.  Following Locke, the 
foundationalist holds that only propositions that are properly basic for me are the ones that 
are certain for me.     
 
With this said, there is no necessary reason why a foundationalist would have to agree with 
Locke about his four types of knowledge.  Plantinga defines classical foundationalism as 
follows: “A belief is acceptable for a person if (and only if) it is either properly basic (i.e., 
self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for that person), or believed on the 
evidential basis of propositions that are acceptable and that support it deductively, 
inductively, or abductively.”204  The important thing to note is that there is always some type 
                                                
202 Ibid, p. 85. 
203 Ibid, p. 83. 
204 Ibid, p. 84. 
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of knowledge that is basic, which everyone possesses with certainty.  Once this foundation is 
laid then the rest of one’s epistemological house can be constructed.205     
 
To summarize Locke’s philosophy we must first recognize his empiricism.  He rejected the 
rationalism of Descartes and instead developed a notion of the mind as a tabula rasa.  
Written on this tabula rasa are all our ideas created by our experience of the world around 
us.  The knowledge that is created based on these experiences can be divided into four parts, 
each of which is able to provide us with certainty.  However, this knowledge is very narrow 
and does not account for a large part of our understanding.  Our understanding is largely 
indebted to beliefs and opinions.  For these beliefs and opinions to be verified as true they 
must be tested against our basic knowledge that we hold to be certain.  If our beliefs are not 
found to be somehow linked to this basic knowledge then they ought to be deemed false and 
disregarded.  Locke does believe that God reveals truths to us but the only way that we can 
be certain which truths are de facto is to use the light of reason and assign to them a certain 
probability based on the basic truths that we hold to be certain.   
 
Thomas Reid (1710 -1796) rejected Locke’s empiricism for a phrase that was soon to sum up 
all of Reid’s philosophy: common sense.  Reid’s retelling of the history of philosophy that 
took place between Locke and himself, would look something like the following:206 The two 
                                                
205 For a detailed account of Locke’s epistemology and to some extent a new reading of that epistemology see:  
Wolterstorff, Nicholas.  John Locke and the Ethics of Belief.  Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996.   
Wolterstorff argues that Locke’s primary concern was to answer the question, “How should we form our beliefs 
on fundamental matters of religion and morality so as to live together in social harmony, when we can no longer 
appeal to a shared and unified tradition?”  He goes on to say that the epistemological question was indeed 
important for Locke but that it was a question which was “a step on the path toward answering that other 
question which Locke regarded as much more important.”  See preface and chapters three and four of John 
Locke and the Ethics of Belief for further development of this argument. 
206 I have sketched this picture of Reid’s understanding of his philosophical predecessors largely from the essay 
written by William Rowe in A companion to the Philosophers.  Edited by Robert L. Arrington.  Blackwell 
Publishers: Oxford, 1999, pp. 469-70.  However, this picture is consistent with Reid’s own writings.  See, for 
instance, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man by Thomas Reid, Essay II: ‘Of the Powers We Have by 
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major philosophical thinkers to take up Locke’s philosophical notions were George Berkeley 
and David Hume.  Berkeley argued that the ideas in the mind were not really reflections of 
the external world but rather that the objects in the external world were a collection of ideas.  
He used Locke’s philosophy but advanced it logically to the next level. Locke believed that 
our ideas really do correspond to the external world; Berkeley felt otherwise.  David Hume 
took Berkeley’s philosophy even further and did away with the external world altogether. 
“Bishop Berkeley had gone so far in the same track as to reject that material world as 
fictitious; but it was left to Mr. Hume to complete the system,” Reid writes.207  For Hume, 
“minds themselves are nothing more than a series of ideas connected by certain relations 
among themselves.”208 This, of course, led to a scepticism that is usually attributed to Hume 
about the existence of the external world.   
 
Reid believed that if we follow the path of Locke (as he felt Berkeley and Hume did) then we 
would end up losing a belief in the material world altogether. He writes, “The theory of 
ideas, like the Trojan horse, had a specious appearance both of innocence and beauty; but if 
those philosophers had known that it carried in its belly death and destruction to all science 
and common sense, they would not have broken down their walls to give it admittance.”209  
This ‘theory of ideas’ advocated by Locke, Berkeley and Hume “cuts us off from direct 
perception of the external world – either because there is no external world to be perceived or 
because our own perception of it is indirect – not strictly perception at all, but inference 
based on what we do perceive, namely, ideas.”210  
                                                                                                                                                  
Means of Our External Senses’ for a more detailed account of Reid’s understanding of the philosophers 
mentioned here and his refutation of their ideas.   
207 Reid, Thomas.  Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. in ‘Reid’s Works: Volume I’ Edited by Sir 
William Hamilton.  Maclachlan and Stewart: Edinburgh, 1863, p. 356.       
208 Rowe, William L. ‘Reid’ in A Companion to the Philosophers. Edited by Robert L. Arrington.  Blackwell 
Publishers: Oxford, 1999, p. 470. 
209 Reid, Thomas.  An Inquiry into the Human Mind.  The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1970, p. 87. 
210 Sosa, Ernest and Van Cleve, James.  ‘Thomas Reid’ in The Blackwell Guide to the Modern Philosophers: 
From Descartes to Nietzsche.  Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 2001, p. 180. 
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 It was Reid’s contention that Hume’s philosophy was ‘a system of  
 scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather than  
 its contrary’.  In fact, it constituted, in Reid’s opinion, the reduction ad  
 absurdum of scepticism.  At the same time it was the result of a consistent 
 development of the implications of certain principles, or a certain principle,  
 which had been shared by writers such as Locke and Berkeley, and even by  
 Descartes, who were not so consistent or rigorous as Hume in drawing the  
 appropriate conclusions from their premises.  Hence it was necessary to  
 examine the starting-point of the process of reasoning which had led in the  
 end to a contradiction of the beliefs upon which all men of common sense  
 must act in common life.  The root of the whole trouble Reid finds in what he  
 calls ‘the theory of ideas’.211   
 
As a result, Reid rejected the philosophical notions developed in the ‘theory of ideas’ and 
instead advocated an understanding of common sense that he believed was innate for 
mankind.  The principles of common sense are innate first principles “which produce 
irresistible belief when we are involved in the conduct of practical affairs.”212  Reid writes, 
“First, I hold it to be certain, and even demonstrable , that all knowledge got by reasoning 
must be built upon first principles.”213  And later he concludes, “Thus I conceive, that first 
principles, which are really the dictates of common sense, and directly opposed to absurdities 
in opinion, will always, from the constitution of human nature, support themselves, and gain 
rather than lose ground among mankind.”214 
 
These principles of common sense were a way of understanding the world that did not lead 
either to Materialism or Idealism, but rather took what Reid felt to be the best from both 
systems of thought.   
 Reid adopted a symmetry thesis as an epistemological methodology.   
 Our knowledge of the internal world of mental operations and our  
 knowledge of the external world of physical processes are treated  
 symmetrically.  Both are taken for granted as a starting point for  
 philosophical reflection… If you assume only knowledge of the  
 internal world, as advocates of the ideal theory did, then you will  
                                                
211 Copleston, Volume V. p. 365. 
212 Lehrer, Keith.  Thomas Reid.  Routledge Press: London, 1991,  p. 30. 
213 Reid, Thomas.  Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.  Derek R. Brookes ed.  Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, p. 454.  
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 find that you are unable to reduce the material world to the mental  
 world and deny the existence of everything but mental states.  On the  
 other hand, if you assume only knowledge of the external world, as  
 advocates of materialism are wont to do, then you will find that you are  
 unable to reduce the mental world to the material world and deny the  
 existence of the mental world altogether.  In one case you become an 
 eliminative idealist and the other an eliminative materialist.  One is as  
 absurd as the other, and the antidote to absurdity is the even-handed  
 symmetry of accepting our common sense knowledge of both the internal  
 world and the external world as a starting point.215   
 
Reid felt that by establishing an understanding of common sense that could be appealed to 
epistemologically then he would keep himself and others from falling into either the 
absurdity of Materialism or Idealism.  Reid, therefore, starts with common sense knowledge 
of the external world of objects and the internal world of the mind and sets out to prove an 
account of human understanding that can be demonstrated by observation and experience.  
Reid writes, 
 The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting  
with common prudence in the conduct of life, makes him capable of  
discovering what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident,  
and which he distinctly apprehends.  All knowledge, and all science, must  
be built upon principles that are self-evident; and of such principles every  
man who has common sense is a competent judge, when he conceives them  
distinctly.  Hence it is, that disputes very often terminate in an appeal to  
common sense… Men rarely ask what common sense is; because every  
man believe himself possessed of it, and would take it for an imputation  
upon his understanding to be thought unacquainted with it.216   
 
In order for one not to fall into scepticism, Reid believed that he must appeal not to ideas in 
the mind but to the external world in which all men of common sense believe.217  This leads 
some Reid scholars to conclude that “Reid is thus a realist in perception.  The objective 
world is evidence for itself, irresistible, a matter of common sense.”218   
 
                                                
215 Lehrer, Keith.  Thomas Reid.  Routledge Press: London, 1991,  p. 21. 
216 Works of Thomas Reid, p. 422-23. 
217 See Essay II of Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man to see how Reid appeals to common sense 
to argue against Locke, Berkley and Hume.   
218 Helm, Paul.  in Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance.  Edited by Joseph Houston.  Dunedin 
Academic Press: Edinburgh, 2004, p. 119. 
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Paul Helm argues that Reid rejected the foundationalism of Locke but did not reject 
foundationalism altogether.   
 Reid certainly attacked versions of foundationalism associated with  
 the Way of Ideas.  But to recognise this is not to say that he repudiated  
 all versions of foundationalism in a principled fashion.  There is, after all,  
 a contingent connection with the Way of Ideas and foundationalism as  
 such…. His attack on the Way of Ideas was thus not an attack on its  
 foundationalism, but on its allegedly sceptical consequences.219   
 
And further, 
 
 He was, in other words, a foundationalist of universal certitude, not a  
 foundationalist of self-evidence, and a foundationalist whose  
 foundations consisted not just of one foundation-stone, but of several  
 stones, the several deliverances of common sense.220  
 
So for Reid, the truth is known and must be established on the innate first principles of 
common sense.  This is evident by the way he challenges the philosophy of the Way of Ideas 
(or Theory of Ideas).  In refuting the Way of Ideas Reid constantly appeals to the ‘light of 
common sense’ or ‘the common sense of mankind.’221  If what we think is true cannot be 
seen to be rooted in common sense then it must be rejected as absurd.    
 
It would appear, then, that one of the main philosophical principles to be developed within 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is foundationalism.  Whether this be the internal 
foundations developed by Descartes ‘clear and distinct’ ideas or Reid’s common sense 
principles, or external foundations dependent upon Locke’s evidentialism, the is period in 
history seems to offer a foundationalism of one type or another as the only way to establish 
the truth.222  Further, the claim that inerrancy presupposes this kind of epistemology would 
thus only be substantial if it in fact presupposes one of the types of foundationalism 
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presented above.  In what follows we will seek to validate or invalidate this claim by looking 
at the primary modern defenders of inerrancy: B.B. Warfield and Carl F.H. Henry.    
 
 
B.B. Warfield and the Apologetic Need for Biblical Inerrancy 
 
The claim that B.B. Warfield was heavily influenced by Reid’s ‘Common Sense’ realism is 
not as controversial as it might first appear.  In fact, Warfield’s own supporters are happy to 
admit that like most men of their time, Warfield was to a certain extent a product of his own 
cultural philosophical inheritance.  John Gerstner writes, “It is clear that Warfield belongs to 
the Scottish Realistic philosophical approach of Old Princeton and not to the Dutch 
presuppositionalism of his great and much-admired contemporary, Abraham Kuyper.”223  
Mark Noll also sees this influence and perhaps gives the influence more weight when he 
remarks,  
 Rather, he gave himself wholeheartedly to Princeton’s deeply ingrained  
 commitment to theology as a scientific task (with “science” defined in  
 conventional Enlightenment terms).  In so doing, he thus shared fully in  
 Princeton’s equally long-standing confidence in a philosophy of common- 
 sense realism.  That philosophy owed something to its formal statement by  
 the cautious savants of the Scottish Enlightenment like Thomas Reid and  
 Dugald Stewart.224 
 
The point of contention, then, is not whether Warfield was influenced by Common Sense 
Philosophy but, rather, how much it can be said that Common Sense Philosophy influenced 
Warfield’s understanding of truth and how truth is obtained.  Those who are sympathetic to 
Warfield’s understanding of inerrancy are prepared to say that the influence is not significant 
and that Warfield’s understanding of truth is no different from his Reformed predecessors.  
                                                
223 ‘Warfield’s Case for Biblical Inerrancy’ by John H. Gerstner in God’s Inerrant Word: An International 
Symposium on the Trustworthiness of Scripture.  Edited by John Warwick Montgomery.  Bethany Fellowship: 
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propose that in the main thy did not.” p. 136. 
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Those who find Warfield’s method unhelpful are more than willing to connect him with 
“Enlightenment” presuppositions (i.e., Common Sense Philosophy) and disregard his 
particular doctrine of Scripture.  And then there are those who find themselves somewhere in 
the middle of these positions who are unhappy with Warfield’s method but like where the 
method leaves them theologically.225  That is to say they appreciate Warfield’s “high” regard 
for Scripture (i.e., its inerrancy) but are suspicious of the evidentialism that leads him to 
postulate this of Scripture.  It is the source of this anxiety that will occupy the rest of our 
examination of Warfield.  The source of this anxiety is Warfield’s evidentialist 
presupposition which leads him to elevate Apologetics to the first task of theology.226   
 
For Warfield Apologetics is the first theological discipline because we must first prove that 
there is a God to know before we can say anything about him.227  He writes, 
 But certainly, before we draw it from the Scriptures, we must assure  
 ourselves that there is a knowledge of God in the Scriptures.   
 And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a  
 knowledge of God in the world.  And, before we do that, we must  
 assure ourselves that a knowledge of God is possible for man.  And,  
 before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a God to know.   
 Thus, we inevitably work back to first principles.  And, in working thus  
 back to first principles, we exhibit the indispensability of an “Apologetical  
 Theology,” which of necessity holds the place of the first among the five  
 essential theological disciplines.228 
 
For Warfield, faith in God was not something determined apart from evidence.229  Faith 
ought to always be grounded in or founded upon evidence.   
                                                
225 In John Gerstner’s article quoted above he writes, “For example, Klaas Runia, in his Karl Barth’s Doctrine 
of Holy Scripture, manifestly prefers Warfield’s doctrine of Scripture to Barth’s but equally favours Barth’s 
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John D.  Biblical Authority: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal.  Zondervan Publishing House: Grand 
Rapids, 1982, p. 137.   
227 Rae’s argument that was presented in the first section of this chapter might be seen to be part of the reason 
by Warfield needed to place so much theological weight with evidentialism.     
228 Meeter, John E.  Benjamin B. Warfield: Selected Shorter Writings, Volume Two.  P&R Publishing Co: New 
Jersey, 1973, p. 98. 
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 For ourselves, we confess we can conceive of no act of faith of any kind  
 which is not grounded in evidence: faith is a specific form of persuasion  
 or conviction, and all persuasion or conviction is grounded in evidence.   
 And it does not seem obvious on the face of it that the evidence adapted to  
 ground the conviction that the Christian religion is true, and the evidence  
 adapted to ground the conviction that I am myself in Christ Jesus, need be 
 the same: so that the resulting acts of faith must necessarily occur together  
or even coalesce.230 
 
It seems then that the conclusion to be drawn from this is that our beliefs are always founded 
upon some basic evidence, or first principle.  Here we see the link between Warfield’s 
thought and the foundationalism that grew out of the philosophical shifts in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  Warfield believed that Christianity could be proved true with 
evidence.231  In fact, as we have seen, it is the nature of faith that it is necessarily, according 
to Warfield, grounded in some type of evidence.  “But we are arguing that faith is, in all its 
exercises alike, a form of conviction, and is, therefore, necessarily grounded in evidence.”232 
 
In arguing this way Warfield believed he was representing a long Augustinian tradition 
regarding faith and reason.  In his interpretation of Augustine’s thought, Warfield writes,  
 He [Augustine] found no obstacle in the attainment of certitude: but nothing 
 but apodeictic certitude satisfied him.  He entertained no doubt, for example,  
 that seven and three make ten; what he demanded was the same kind and  
 degree of certainty he had here, for everything else.  In other words, he  
 would not commit himself to any truth for which he did not have ready at  
 hand complete demonstration.233  
 
This tradition he finds ultimately fulfilled in Descartes’ cogito.  When Descartes claimed 
cogito ergo sum, he, according to Warfield, was upholding Augustine’s particular 
                                                                                                                                                  
229 Here we see a major difference between the method of Warfield and the method of Barth.  We might say that 
Warfield advocates a theology ‘from below’ whereas Barth would insist on doing theology ‘from above’.    
230 Selected Shorter Writings, Volume Two.  p. 113. 
231 Although he did not believe that evidence could make a Christian.  No matter how much evidence is given, 
someone is able to become a Christian only by the work of the Spirit.  “It certainly is not in the power of all the 
demonstrations in the world to make a Christian.  Paul may plant and Apollos water; it is God alone who give 
the increase.  But it does not seem to follow that Paul would as well, therefore, not plant, and Apollos as well 
not water.  Faith is the gift of God; but it does not in the least follow that the faith that God gives is an irrational 
faith, that is, a faith without ground in right reason.”  Selected Shorter Writings, Volume Two, p. 98. 
232 Ibid, p. 100. 
233 Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge.  The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield: Volume IV, Studies in Tertullian and 
Augustine.  Baker Books: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2003, p. 137. 
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epistemology.  “When he [Augustine] urged men to cease seeking truth without them, and to 
turn within, since the home of truth is inside man, he already placed them upon the firm 
footing which Descartes sought with this cogito ergo sum.”234   
 
In Warfield faith and reason are never separated.  Christianity is a reasonable faith and the 
faith that is produced in man by the Spirit is grounded in reason.  Furthermore, this faith is 
always grounded in right reason.  Even though it is through the Spirit that faith is actualized, 
the seeds of this faith can always be seen to be connected to or planted in the garden of 
evidence.  The faith that grows out in this garden is always surrounded by this evidence.  The 
appeal for the Christian believer as to their believing what is true is an appeal to evidence 
available to all men at all times.235  How do we know that Christianity is true?  We are able 
to appeal to the same evidence available to all men to give merit to our belief.     
 The Holy Spirit does not work with a blind, an ungrounded faith in  
 the heart.  What is supplied by his creative energy in working faith is  
 not a ready-made faith, rooted in nothing and clinging without reason  
 to its object; nor yet new grounds of belief in the object presented; but  
 just a new ability of the heart of respond to the ground of faith, sufficient  
 in themselves, already present to the understanding.236 
 
Warfield was concerned that if the faith of the Christian could not be grounded in reasonable 
evidence then there was no way to confirm that, in fact, the Holy Spirit was working within a 
particular person.  Warfield felt that Kuyper’s questioning of the validity of Apologetics led 
to subjectivism.  If the only way in which we can know whether or not the Holy Spirit has 
brought about belief in someone is by their own sensus divinitatis, then truth was ultimately 
determined by the subject.   
 It is not true that the Christian view of the world is subjective merely,  
 and is incapable of validation in the forum of pure reason. It is not true  
                                                
234 Ibid, p. 135. 
235 Warfield’s method is a deliberate rejection of the presuppositionalism advocated by Kuyper and his 
followers.  Warfield is critical of the claim of Kuyper that once the Almighty has implanted faith in the heart of 
the believer there will be no need to ground that faith in reason.   
236 Selected Shorter Writings, Volume II, p. 99. 
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 that the arguments adduced for the support of the foundations of the  
 Christian religion lack objective validity.237   
 
It seems as though Warfield wanted to maintain the internalism that he believed, rightly or 
wrongly, Augustine and Descartes advocated, but with that said he certainly rejected all 
forms of idealism.  The true world really exists outside of the mind and our Christian faith 
corresponds to and is validated by a correct understanding of this external world. 
 
The question that seems to follow from this is one to do with pneumatology.238  What is the 
role of the Spirit in all of this?  Does Warfield place any emphasis on the testimonium 
internum Spiritus Sancti?  Warfield seems to see the Spirit’s role as one of confirmation.  
The internal testimony of the Spirit cannot be used as demonstration for the truths of the 
Christian faith.  Rather the Spirit provides a confirmation of this faith.  As one author has put 
it, “The internal testimony seals to the heart what the external miracles provide for the 
mind.”239  Warfield remarks, “The action of the Holy Spirit in giving faith is not apart from 
evidence, but along with evidence; and in the first instance consists in preparing the soul for 
the reception of the evidence.”240 
 
He writes further, “This is not to argue that it is by apologetics that men are made Christians, 
but that apologetics supplies to Christian men the systematically organized basis on which 
the faith of Christians must rest.”241  So Apologetics as a discipline organises all of the 
evidence and when faith needs assurance it is to this evidence that it must look.  Christians, 
according to Warfield, are able to make a case for the truth of Christianity that is solely based 
on common evidence available to everyone.     
                                                
237 Ibid, p. 103. 
238 For more on pneumatology see chapter 4 and chapter 6 of this thesis. 
239 ‘Warfield’s Case for Biblical Inerrancy,’ p. 129.   
240 Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge.  The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield: Volume IX, Studies in Theology.  
Baker Books: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2003, p. 15. 
241 Ibid, p. 16. 
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The role that evidence plays in the overall conception of faith is where the anxiety of many 
theologians seems to lie.  John Woodbridge writes,  
 It is true, however, that the Old Princetonians (influenced by Common  
 Sense Realism) may have overestimated mankind’s ability to understand  
 an apologetic case for Christianity based on external evidences, and this  
 despite their Reformed anthropology.242 
 
It appears that Warfield’s emphasis on the human ability to ground faith in reason and his 
exaltation of Christian Apologetics as the Queen of the theological sciences has made some 
question his method.  Rogers and McKim remark, 
 Properly, theology was “the science of God” which dealt with “a body  
 of objective facts” and had as its subject matter the “knowledge of God.”   
 If this was so, argued Warfield, then apologetics “must begin by  
 establishing the reality of objective facts of the data upon which it is based.”243 
 
Rogers and McKim conclude that for Warfield philosophy came before theology and that for 
God to give faith by the Spirit the requirements of human reason had first to be met.244  
Rogers and McKim go on to say that according to Warfield the Holy Spirit did not create 
faith in man, reason does this.  The Holy Spirit makes that faith which is produced by reason 
into a ‘saving faith’.245  Warfield writes in a review of Herman Bavinck’s De Zekerheid des 
Geloofs, 246 
 The truth therefore is that rational argumentation does, entirely apart  
 from that specific operation of the Holy Ghost which produces saving  
 faith, ground a genuine exercise of faith.  This operation of the Spirit is  
 not necessary then to produce faith, but only to give to a faith which  
 naturally grows out of the proper grounds of faith, that peculiar quality  
 which makes it saving faith.247 
 
                                                
242 Biblical Authority: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal. p. 136. 
243 Rogers, Jack B. and McKim, Donald K.  The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical 
Approach.  Harper & Row Publishers: London, 1979, p. 328. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid, p. 331. 
246 Dr. Bavinck’s work sets out to describe the nature of Christian certainty.  Warfield critiques Bavinck because 
Bavinck argues that Christians cannot obtain certainty from Apologetics or experiments.  Warfield says that for 
Bavinck certainty is a fruit of faith itself and nothing more.   
247 Selected Shorter Writings, Volume II. p. 115.  
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So there appears to be in Warfield a dichotomy between secular and sacred faith, if we may 
use these terms.  A ‘secular’ faith is produced by natural revelation (i.e., Apologetics, reason, 
scientific experimentation, etc.) and once this ‘faith’ is established in the mind of man, the 
Holy Spirit works by His internal testimony to nurture this faith into a ‘sacred’ faith or saving 
faith.248  
 
John Gerstner makes the connection between Warfield’s understanding of reason and faith 
and his doctrine of Scripture.  Gerstner writes, “Precisely because of this primacy of reason 
to faith, Scripture must first be authenticated to provide a rational basis for its acceptance.”249  
This raises the question of whether Warfield’s doctrine of inerrancy is his means of 
authenticating Scripture, i.e., providing a rational basis for its acceptance.  Only by looking at 
the way in which Warfield develops this doctrine will we be able to come to some 
conclusions regarding this question.  Henry Krabbendam writes, “In the final analysis, 
Warfield holds to his view of Scripture – its plenary, verbal, inspiration; its truth; its 
authority; its infallibility/inerrancy -  because it is based on the “exegetical fact,” “the 
common place of exegetical science,” of the witness of Scripture, of the Lord Jesus Christ, 
and of the apostles.”250 
 
For Warfield the evidence for the inspiration of Scripture lies with the claims made within 
the Bible itself.251  However, he does not fall into a circular argument because the writers of 
the Bible are able to be accredited by evidences other than Scripture references.  “…we 
                                                
248 It would be quite easy here to see Warfield as a precursor of our postmodern times and to see this distinction 
between the different types of faith as in line with the postmodern critique of objective knowledge.  However, 
this would be a mistake.  It seems fairly evident that for Warfield ‘sacred’ faith is synonymous with objective 
knowledge producing belief in God. 
249 God’s Inerrant Word. p. 123. 
250 Inerrancy. p. 429. 
251 It is interesting to note just how much it would seem that Warfield’s argument relies on the ‘Bible as just 
another book’ condition. 
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believe the writers of the Bible, because they have been shown, independently of an assumed 
inspired Bible, to be accredited messengers of the God who cannot lie or err.”252  Stephen 
Evans also claims that Warfield grounded the authority of Scripture in the historical 
evidences of Jesus to avoid a circular argument.  Warfield thought we could gain some 
reasonable knowledge about the historical Jesus without assuming the inspired character of 
the Gospels.253 
 
Warfield’s reliance on historical evidence might be a reaction to the anxiety over historical 
‘facts’ that we covered in the first half of this chapter.  Warfield would have been very aware 
of the challenges that Spinoza and Lessing brought to theology especially in the with regard 
to the truthfulness of historical claims.  It is by no means a stretch of the imagination to think 
that Warfield would have stressed a need to hold on to historical evidence precisely because 
of the split between faith and history that Rae’s thesis explores.   
 
It is with Warfield’s reliance on historical claims that we see how important Apologetics is 
for Warfield’s understanding of the inspiration of Scripture.  Warfield writes, 
 First, there is the exegetical evidence that the doctrine [plenary inspiration] 
 held and taught by the Church is the doctrine held and taught by the Biblical  
 writers themselves.  And secondly, there is a whole mass of evidence –  
 internal and external, objective and subjective, historical and philosophical,  
 human  and divine – which goes to show that the Bible writers are trustworthy  
 as doctrinal guides.  If they are trustworthy teachers of doctrine and if they  
 held and taught this doctrine, then this doctrine is true, and is to be accepted  
 and acted upon as true by us all.254 
 
By placing Apologetics in such an important role for faith, Warfield is consistent with his 
Common Sense heritage.  The inerrancy of Scripture then becomes that ‘evidence’ of 
                                                
252 God’s Inerrant Word. p 131. 
253 Evans, C. Stephan.  The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith.  Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996, p. 29. 
254 ‘The Real Problem of Inspiration’ by B.B. Warfield in The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible. Edited by 
Samuel G. Craig.  P&R Publishing Company: New Jersey, 1948, p. 174. 
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Scripture, which is available to all men for examination, and the authority of Scripture can be 
upheld by this particular evidence.   
 
 
 
 
Carl F.H. Henry and the Rational Need for Biblical Inerrancy 
 
 
Carl F.H. Henry (1913-2003) was arguably one of the twentieth century’s leading evangelical 
theologians.  His six-volume magnum opus, God, Revelation and Authority continues to 
challenge evangelical and non-evangelical thinkers alike.  For the purposes of this chapter we 
will be examining Henry’s main epistemological presuppositions and how these specifically 
impact his doctrine of the inerrancy and authority of Scripture.  And although Henry takes a 
noticeably Warfieldian line when it comes to the doctrine of inerrancy, he does use a slightly 
different method than the strict apologetic approach that Warfield assumed (see above).   
 
In our discussion above concerning Warfield’s epistemology we found that he placed a lot of 
emphasis on evidentialism and that he advocated a foundational understanding of 
epistemology based on these ‘evidences.’  We noted that this was very consistent with the 
particular foundationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy.  With 
Henry the connection to this philosophy is far less apparent.  Henry was very aware of the 
critique of this philosophy offered by his contemporaries and believed that Cartesian 
rationalism and scientific empiricism were very different epistemological ‘pictures’ to the 
one painted by Christian revelation.  “The axioms of the Christian system of truth are not 
presuppositions shared in common with secular thought,” Henry writes, “Christian doctrines 
are not derived from experimental observation or from rationalism, but from God in his 
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revelation.”255  If and when these axioms resemble certain “Enlightenment” presuppositions, 
Henry will argue that they are given as a precedent in the written revelation of God.  In the 
pages that follow we will be discussing the axioms and presuppositions that Henry uses to 
develop his particular doctrine of the authority and inerrancy of Scripture.  Henry’s main 
presuppositions that interest us here are: 1) the objective nature of revelation, and 2) the 
scientific nature of theology.  With these presuppositions firmly in place we will be able to 
paint an adequate picture of his notion of truth and determine whether there are any 
similarities with the philosophies examined previously in this chapter. 
 
 
 
Henry and the Objective Nature of Revelation 
 
Very early on in volume one of his work Henry writes, “Religion now has become 
“everyone’s own kettle of fish” – a matter of personal preference rather than a truth-
commitment universally valid for one and all.”256  Henry’s concern is to re-establish the 
historical Christian commitment to objective general and special revelation.  For Henry, all 
knowledge revealed by God is accessible to men because all revelation is objective.  Man has 
been created with the capacity to recognize this revelation.  “…Christianity contends that 
revelational truth is intelligible, expressible in valid propositions, and universally 
communicable.”257 
 
God primarily communicates this objective revelation through propositions.  These 
propositions are the autographic text of Scripture, which is labelled by Henry as special 
revelation.  By identifying Scripture with the objective propositional revelation of God, 
Henry establishes a way in which all men may know this objective revelation equally.  By 
                                                
255 Henry, Carl F.H.  God, Revelation and Authority, Volume 1.  Crossway Books: Wheaton, 1999, p. 223. 
256 Ibid, p. 13. 
257 Ibid, p. 229. 
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reading the Scriptures all men have equal access to the truth of God.  In a sense the 
Scriptures act as a kind of revelational textbook and source for objective truth.  This special 
revelation (i.e., the Bible) takes precedent in Henry’s thinking because it takes the truth 
revealed generally to mankind through creation and converts it into objective propositions, 
which are epistemologically verifiable. 
 
 Man’s ability to comprehend both special and general revelation is provided in Henry’s 
thought by the creation of the imago Dei universally in man. The imago Dei is man’s 
rationality.  “The possibility of man’s knowledge of divine revelation rests in the created 
capacity of the human mind to know the truth of God, and the capacity of thought and speech 
that anticipates intelligible knowledge and fellowship.”258  It is important to note here that 
this rationality/imago Dei was not fully affected by the fall.  Henry argues that the fall 
primarily affected man’s volition and not his rationality.  “The fall conditions man’s will 
more pervasively than his reason.”259  He seems to rationalize this belief by stating that if 
man’s rationality were deeply effected by the fall then we would have to be sceptics because 
we could have no assurance that what we can know objectively is not marred by our fallen 
humanity.  And if our cognitive abilities were thus affected then God could not objectively 
reveal himself to us and therefore we could not have any relationship with him or knowledge 
of him.   The very fact that our belief in God is ‘reasonable’ confirms that the fall has not 
fully affected our ability to know God in this way.  “The functions of reason – whether 
concepts, forms of implication, deduction and induction, judgments and conclusions, and 
whatever else – are not simply a pragmatic evolutionary development but fulfil a divine 
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259 Ibid, p. 226. 
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intention and purpose for man in relation to the whole realm of knowledge.”260  Clearly this 
intention was not thwarted by the fall.   
 
Because revelational truth is objective and able to be understood rationally, Christian truth-
claims can be examined by anyone of normal cognitive aptitude.  “But the nature of truth is 
such that the Christian revelation is formally intelligible to all men; it convincingly overlaps 
ineradicable elements of everyman’s experience, and offers a more consistent, more 
comprehensive and more satisfactory explanation of the meaning and worth of life than do 
other views.”261  Christian revelation is subject to all of the rational tests that other truth-
claims are subjected to.  In fact, Henry argues that rational tests will show the Christian 
revelation to be logically and psychologically superior to all other worldviews.  
 
The reason why Christian truth is accessible to all men is both because mankind has an innate 
ability to comprehend this truth (i.e., the imago Dei) and because this truth is given in 
propositional form.  The scriptural revelation is intelligible and propositional.  This allows 
Henry to understand the revelational truth found in Scripture to be verifiable in the same way 
as truths found in science.  He writes, “The truth-content of theology can be investigated – as 
can that of astronomy and botany and geology – quite apart from the moral character of the 
technical scholar and his interest or disinterest in a new way of life.”262  And further, 
“Theological truth does not differ from other truth in respect to intelligibility; therefore, truth 
must be rationally cognized if it is to be meaningfully grasped and communicated.”263  This 
leads us to another one of Henry’s important presuppositions that is vital to his overall 
understanding of Christian revelation: his identification of theology and science. 
                                                
260 Ibid, p. 227. 
261 Ibid, p. 238. 
262 Ibid, p. 229. 
263 Ibid, p. 228. 
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Henry and the Scientific Quest of Theology 
 
We have established thus far Henry’s belief in objective revelation given primarily in the 
autographic propositions of Scripture.  We turn now to his belief in the need for this 
revelation to be ‘scientifically’ verifiable.   A second presupposition in Henry’s theology is 
his understanding of theology as a scientific enterprise.  He writes, “Indeed, Christianity is a 
genuine science in the deepest sense because it presumes to account in an intelligible and 
orderly way for whatever is legitimate in every sphere of life and learning.”264   
 
One of the reasons Henry gives for maintaining theology as a verifiable, intelligible science 
is apologetic in nature.  “How else,” he writes, “except by persuasive rational evidence that 
unmasks the inconsistencies of other views and exhibits the rational consistency of Christian 
claims shall we make it apparent to the non-believer that his alternative, however fantastic 
are its promises, lacks the intellectual compulsion of the Christian view?”265  The revelation 
offered by God in Scripture is a logically consistent revelation of God, which is, in Henry’s 
mind, verifiable by reason.   
 
Because of his insistence that theology offers rationally verifiable truths, Henry sees the need 
to develop a methodology that will help explicate these truths.  In a very telling statement 
Henry concludes, “If the theology of revelation holds more than an antiquarian interest, 
Christians must indicate their conviction that Christianity is distinguished above all by its 
objective truth, and must adduce the method of knowing and the manner of verification by 
which every man can become personally persuaded.” And further “What’s more, if the 
                                                
264 Ibid, p. 203. 
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question of method and verifiability is left unanswered, even the Christian himself can have 
no rational certainty in his commitment to God.”266 
 
For Henry, the question of verifiability is connected with the scientific aspect of theology.  
Like all scientific truth, theological truth must be verifiable if it is to be believed, and like all 
scientific truth, theological truth must maintain logical consistency.  In fact any theological 
truth that is contrary to the law of non-contradiction must be denied as truth.267  “Christianity 
is open to falsification by the same laws of logic that determine validity and invalidity 
throughout the whole range of human knowledge.”268  And, “the meaning and truth of any 
claim must meet the test of rational intelligibility, noncontradiction and consistency or it can 
only remain suspect.”269 The science of Christian theology must have some rationally 
verifiable foundation to rest upon in order to demonstrate its universal truth for all of 
mankind.270     According to Henry the verification principle is the inerrant Word of God.  
“The means of verifying the truth about God, the inspired Scriptures, is accessible to all.”271     
 
The inerrant scriptures are the means by which anyone can access the objective truth about 
God and verify for himself in a rational and intelligible way the claims made by them.   
Henry remarks, “Evangelical Christianity insists that scriptural revelation is intelligible and 
propositional, and it therefore cannot dispense with any interest in harmonizing precepts and 
phenomena.  Whatever is logically contradictory and incapable of reconciliation simply 
                                                
266 Ibid, p. 214. 
267 This is one of many reasons that Henry is critical of Barthian theology.  He says that dialectical theology 
forfeits the logical consistency of revelation and leads ultimately to scepticism.   
268 Ibid, p. 265. 
269 Henry, Carl F.H.  God, Revelation and Authority: Volume IV.  Crossway Books: Illinois, 1999, p. 49. 
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cannot be accepted as truth.”272   As the inerrant revelation of God, the Bible is the only 
“objectively authoritative norm” for believers and non-believers alike to judge truth from 
falsity.   Because the truth of God is communicated in this way, i.e., in an objective 
propositional form, one’s personal faith is not required to understand it.273  Hence, Henry’s 
belief that theology is like all other sciences in its ability to communicate objective truths to 
anyone.   
 
The inerrancy of the scriptures provide an objective epistemic authority for themselves which 
allows them to be rationally verified and demonstrably true.  In a summarizing statement 
Henry concludes,  
 Divine revelation is the source of all truth, the truth of Christianity  
included; reason is the instrument for recognizing it; Scripture is its  
verifying principle; logical consistency is a negative test for truth and  
coherence a subordinate test.  The task of Christian theology is to exhibit  
the content of biblical revelation as an orderly whole.274   
 
 
Henry’s Concept of Truth 
 
At the beginning of God, Revelation and Authority: Volume I, Henry writes, “The 
fundamental issue remains the issue of truth, the truth of theological assertions.  No work on 
theology will be worth its weight if that fundamental issue is obscured.”275  He continues to 
say that contemporary Western thought has a growing distrust about ‘final’ truth.276 So what 
is this ‘final’ truth of which Henry speaks?  This final truth is an objective, unchanging truth 
revealed to us by God.  “There is only one kind of truth.  Religious truth is as much truth as 
                                                
272 God, Revelation and Authority: Volume IV, p. 174. 
273 This is yet another area where Henry finds Barthian theology difficult.  Contrary to Barth, evangelicals 
typically hold that the authority and sense of Scripture objectively precedes the reader’s faith.  Henry argues 
that by claiming that faith needs to be present in order to understand the Bible, Barth makes the authority and 
meaning of the Bible dependent upon the belief of a particular individual.  “But unless Scripture has objective 
epistemic authority as a verbally inspired record, its validity as revelational truth remains obscure and its 
internal personal authority is grounded solely in individual decision.”  God, Revelation and Authority: Volume 
IV, p. 267. 
274 God, Revelation and Authority: Volume I, p. 215. (his italics) 
275 Ibid, p. 14. 
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any other truth.  Instead of being devised for tasks other than to express literal truths about 
God, human language has from the beginning had this very purpose in view, namely, 
enabling man to enjoy and to communicate the unchanging truth about his Maker and 
Lord.”277  It is the revelation of God as his written word upon which all other truths are 
deduced.278  
 
Henry seems to synonymously relate Truth with propositions.  For instance, he writes, “All 
God’s revelation is intelligible revelation; his special scriptural revelation is communicated 
in truths and words.”279 Also, “If divine revelation is intelligible, as biblical Christianity 
insists, then God’s communication of truth and provision or information is its vital centre.  In 
that event, the revelational significance of concepts and words, and of propositional truth, is 
indispensably important.”280  In Scripture we have objective information about God and his 
purposes.   
 
To know this truth one must exercise his powers of reason.  Henry advocates an Augustinian 
notion of truth in some respects when he states that truth is located within the intellect.  This 
truth is not one kind of truth among many kinds of truth.  Henry is adamant that there is only 
one kind of truth.  “There is but one system of truth, and that system involves the right axiom 
and its theorems and premises derived with complete logical consistency.”281  So for 
something to be true it must be consistent with certain logical axioms.  In fact, as far as 
revelation is concerned, Henry concludes that whatever violates the law of contradiction 
cannot be regarded as revelation. 
 
                                                
277 God, Revelation and Authority: Volume IV, p. 128. 
278 God, Revelation and Authority: Volume I, p. 219. 
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Henry’s identification of truth with objective propositions revealed by God is consistent with 
his understanding of the nature of revelation and the scientific goal of theology.  By 
identifying propositional truth with revealed truth Henry is able to verify the truth of 
scripture in a ‘scientific’ way.  In volume IV of his work he talks about the “persuasive 
evidence” for the authority of the Bible as divinely inspired Scripture.282   This divinely 
inspired propositional truth can be proved to be authoritative because it does not err; it is 
inerrant.  According to Henry, the link between authority and inerrancy is maintained in 
classical orthodoxy.  “The classical view of inspiration refuses to ground the authority of 
Scripture in the common life of the community of faith; it correlates that authority instead 
with a divinely imparted property of the scriptural texts” (my italics).283   
 
The link here between Henry’s understanding of truth and the doctrine of inerrancy is now 
apparent.  Inerrancy is that divinely imparted property of Scripture that allows one to verify 
the authority of the divinely inspired text.  Without retaining the doctrine of inerrancy one is 
unable to prove the authority of Scripture.  Henry asks, “Can we associate divine authority 
with anything less than verbal inerrancy?”284  Again, he asks, “But error is what is wrong, 
inaccurate, incorrect, mistaken. If we declared the category of inerrancy to be irrelevant for 
Scripture, can we any longer contend for the truth of Scripture?”285  Henry’s concerns 
regarding inerrancy and authority are consistent with the understanding of truth, which he 
advocates.  He concludes, “Only logical imprecision can begin with errancy and conclude 
with divine authority.  What is errant cannot be divinely authoritative nor can God have 
inspired it.”286 
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There is in Henry, a univocal understanding of propositional truth and revelation that is not 
dissimilar to Placher’s thesis concerning the univocal language of revelation.  Because 
propositional truth is univocal with revelation when one says that the proposition has erred 
one must necessarily conclude that the revelation has done the same.  We saw at the 
beginning of this chapter that Placher’s thesis concerning the univocity of language about 
God has resulted in a modern shift in an understanding about revelation.  Henry’s 
understanding of revelation might be understood to be influenced by this shift.   There is no 
doubt from the quotes of Henry above that he believed propositions and revelation to be 
univocal.  It would appear that he is another thinker who is partially representative of the 
shift that Placher’s thesis explains.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter was to address a number of different theological and philosophical 
shifts that occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that became the fertile 
soil through which the doctrine of inerrancy could spring to life.    In the previous pages of 
this chapter we have addressed some of the different shifts and concluded that the 
philosophical shift resulted in an epistemological foundationalism.  We then looked at both 
Warfield and Henry to see if their thought could be seen to be influence by this shift to 
foundationalism.  We concluded that B.B. Warfield presupposed a certain foundationalism, 
which regarded evidence as the primary means of discovering what is true.  Because of his 
‘Common Sense’ heritage, Warfield elevated the role of Apologetics to the first task of 
theology.  By doing this he believed he could prove the truthfulness of Christianity.  The 
evidence for the authority of Scripture was linked to the apologetic task for which the 
doctrine of inerrancy became vital.   
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We then turned to Carl F.H. Henry and discovered a different sort of foundationalism, which 
relied on reason and the principle of verifiability to determine truth.  Henry’s emphasis on the 
rational demonstrability of the truth of Christianity allowed him to connect the authority of 
Scripture with its inerrancy.  His particular understanding of truth supported this connection. 
In both cases we conclude that the understanding of truth promoted by the two theologians 
resemble certain Enlightenment concerns to do with epistemological certainty and 
objectivity.  Although it would be an overstatement to identify Warfield and Henry as wholly 
influenced by the theological and philosophical shifts of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, it is evident that their particular concerns cannot be seen apart from this context.   
 
In the next chapter we propose to examine a number of contemporary ways of talking about 
‘truth’, e.g., correspondence or coherence.  Once the preliminary work has been done on 
contemporary notions of truth we will look to see if these notions are consistent with the 
scriptural portrayal of truth. By looking at how both the Old Testament and New Testament 
use the term truth we will be able come to some conclusions about whether Warfield and 
Henry’s use of truth is consistent with the biblical picture.   
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~3~ 
 
Biblical Notions of Truth: Towards a  
Christological Understanding 
 
 
 
 
 
Pilate therefore entered again into the Praetorium, and summoned Jesus, and said to Him, 
“Are You the King of the Jews?”  Jesus answered, “Are you saying this on your own 
initiative, or did others tell you about Me?”  Pilate answered, “I am not a Jew, am I? Your 
own nation and the chief priests delivered You up to me; what have You done?”  Jesus 
answered, “My kingdom is not of this world. If My kingdom were of this world, then My 
servants would be fighting, that I might not be delivered up to the Jews; but as it is, My 
kingdom is not of this realm.”  Pilate therefore said to Him, “So You are a king?” Jesus 
answered,  “You say correctly that I am a king. For this I have been born, and for this I have 
come into the world, to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears My 
voice.”  Pilate said to Him, “What is truth?” And when he had said this, he went out again 
to the Jews, and said to them, “I find no guilt in Him.” 
 
 
 
The question, which was raised by Pilate in the quote from the Gospel of John above, is a 
question that has vexed both philosophers and theologians throughout human history.  
Aristotle defined truth in the following manner:  “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is 
not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; 
so that he who says of anything that is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is 
false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.”287  The nineteenth century 
philosopher, William James, develops an understanding of the nature of truth equated with its 
use.  He writes, 
 True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate  
and verify.  False ideas are those that we can not.  This is the practical  
difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning  
of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.  This thesis is what I have to  
defend.  The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it.   
Truth happens to an idea.  It becomes true, is made true by events.  Its  
verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying  
                                                
287 Aristotle.  ‘Metaphysics.’ 1011a 25.  in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
Volume II.  Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1995.  
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itself, its veri-fication.  Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.288 
  
 
This chapter proposes to outline two of the main philosophical positions on the nature of 
truth, i.e., correspondence, coherence, verification/pragmatism and identity theory, in order 
to establish some of the options that theology has for understanding this nature.289  We will 
then examine the way in which Scripture defines and uses the term ‘truth’ in order to see if it 
resembles any of the philosophical options presented in section one.290 After discussing the 
way in which Scripture seems to understand ‘truth’ we will turn to the claim of Jesus himself 
that he is the truth to see if there is a theological definition of truth which bears upon the 
philosophical options presented in the first section of this chapter.  Finally, this will allow us 
to re-consider the implications of our findings in relation to the doctrine of inerrancy.  
 
Section One: Philosophical Theories of Truth 
 
 
The Nature of Truth: Correspondence Theory 
 
The correspondence theory of truth is often linked to Aristotle’s definition quoted above.291  
It is the theory that ‘X is true, if and only if, X corresponds to reality or facts.’  
Correspondence theories argue for the adequacy of things in reality to the intellect 
(adaequatio rei et intellectus).  Aristotle provides the foundational definition for 
correspondence theorists.   
 
                                                
288 James, William.  ‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth.’ in Lynch, Michael P. ed. The Nature of Truth.  The 
MIT Press: Cambridge, 2001, p. 213. 
289 I am here presupposing that truth can be properly said to have a nature and will not be presenting truth 
theories, such as deflationism, which would deny such claims.   
290 Presenting the main philosophical definitions of truth is a useful device for entering in on a consideration the 
biblical notion of truth presented in the following section of this chapter.  In my reading on inerrancy the overall 
tendency is for theologians and philosophers alike to focus their discussion the main theories of truth presented 
below. 
291 It is interesting to note that Aristotle’s definition does not guarantee the separate existence of the thing 
referenced.  This issue becomes evident when raised by Aquinas in his Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate and 
is addressed.  For a discussion of this see: Engel, Pascal.  Truth.  Acumen Publishers: England, 2002, p. 16; 
also, Weingartner, Paul.  Basic Questions on Truth.  Kluwer Academic Publishers: London, 2000, pp. 108-09. 
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However, within the correspondence theory are terms that need to be carefully defined and 
understood.  Correspondence theorists tend to be realists.292  Realism is the philosophical 
position that the world exists outside of the mind.  The correspondence theory is sometimes 
labelled a realist conception of truth because it holds that truth is uncovered when our 
thoughts correspond to a reality independent of those thoughts.293  Engel writes, 
 Our thoughts are true in virtue of something that is distinct from them,  
and independent from our thinking and knowing of them.  In this sense,  
the truth of a statement is also supposed to transcend our possible  
knowledge of it, or its verification.294   
 
In this understanding of truth propositions play a key role.  A proposition is a statement or 
assertion that can be deemed true or false.  Propositions are the ‘truth-bearers’ for the 
correspondence theory.  In other words, propositions have the property of truth; so we say 
that the proposition is true because it conveys or bears the truth of the reality which makes 
the truth.295   That which makes truth (truth-maker) is the reality that exists independent of 
the self.296  There is an intuition that truth relies not on us but on a reality independent of 
us.297 
 
What we have in the end is an objective reality outside of the mind that exists independently 
of the mind.  Something is true when is corresponds with this reality.  So, the proposition: 
“St. Mary’s is located on South Street in St. Andrews” is a true proposition because it 
                                                
292 I say “tend to be” here because as Michael Lynch has pointed out it is possible to pry realism and 
correspondence apart.  He writes, “Strictly speaking, one could believe that objects are partly or wholly 
constrained by their relations to concepts and still hold a correspondence or realist account of truth.”  See 
Lynch, Michael P. ed. The Nature of Truth.  The MIT Press: Cambridge, 2001, p. 11. 
293 Engel, Pascal.  Truth.  Acumen Publishers: England, 2002, p. 14. 
294 Ibid, 15. 
295 There are different types of truth-bearers of which propositions are one.  Other examples include ideas and 
mental representations (Descartes) or things located in space and time like utterances (Hobbes).  I chose to use 
the example of propositions above primarily to make an implicit connection with my previous chapter. 
296 Michael Lynch rightly argues that correspondence theorists must make explicit their metaphysical 
assumptions like that of ‘truth-bearers,’ but also ‘truth-makers’ and the way in which these two things relate or 
correspond. See: Lynch, Michael P. ed. The Nature of Truth.  The MIT Press: Cambridge, 2001, p. 9. 
297 Ibid. 
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corresponds to the reality, or fact, that St. Mary’s is located where the proposition claims it to 
be.    
 
In general then, correspondence theorists are those who can be classified as philosophical 
realists who regard truth as primarily conveyed in propositions.  For these propositions to be 
considered true they must accurately reflect, portray, correspond to the reality of which they 
speak.298  Many evangelical correspondence theorists also make an historical appeal arguing 
that the correspondence theory of truth has a rich philosophical history which should not just 
be disregarded as other theories of truth are developed. 
 
Correspondence theory may be the most influential theory of truth amongst evangelicals.  
Kevin Vanhoozer admits that it may be the intuitive meaning of truth.  However, as his 
article on Truth in the Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible explains, there 
are problems with this theory of truth.299  He points to the coherence theory as being perhaps 
the “chief rival” for a theological interpretation of Scripture.   It is to this theory that we now 
turn. 
 
The Nature of Truth: Coherence Theory 
 
As we saw above, the correspondence theory makes a clear distinction between subject and 
object.  The coherence theory, on the other, does not make such a distinction. The coherence 
theory is rooted in Hegelian Idealism, which does not place an emphasis on distinguishing 
                                                
298 Because of space limitations I am having to be particularly brief in my examination of the different truth 
theories.  I will be only painting a general picture of the different theories and not looking at the philosophical 
intricacies, which make the truth theories complex.  For instance, some correspondence theorists would be 
unhappy with my ‘realist’ generalization.  Some would consider themselves critical realists or moderate realists 
or immanent realists, etc.  Compare, for instance, Terence Horgan’s ‘Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical 
Realism: Truth as Indirect” and William P. Alston’s ‘A Realist Conception of Truth’ in The Nature of Truth 
edited by Michael P. Lynch. 
299 Vanhoozer advocates what he calls a “chastened” correspondence view of truth that he believes helps solve 
some of the problems with the traditional correspondence theory presented above.  For further information see 
his article on Truth in the Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible.  Edited by Kevin Vanhoozer, 
Baker: Michigan, 2005, pp. 818-22. 
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ideas and the objects of ideas.300  In general the coherence theorists’ metaphysic ends up 
being monistic.301  We see this in the philosophy of Brand Blanshard, an American 
philosopher who helped develop the theory of coherence, when he writes, “To think of a 
thing is to get that thing itself in some degree within the mind.”302   
 
Pascal Engel defines the coherence theory in the following way: “X is true if and only if it 
appropriately belongs to a coherent set of propositions, beliefs and statements.”303  However 
this definition might contextualize the theory too much.  According to Blanshard there is an 
Absolute in which all truth coheres, so for something to be true it must be seen as coherent 
overall with the Oneness of the universe.  Blanshard is quick to realize that there is an 
amount of scepticism inherent within this view because we do not know what the Oneness of 
the world is.  He writes,  
The admission is that the theory does involve a degree of scepticism  
regarding our present knowledge and probably all future knowledge.   
In all likelihood there will never be a proposition of which we can say, 
‘This that I am asserting, with precisely the meaning I now attach to it, 
is absolutely true’.304   
 
Nevertheless for a thing to be ultimately true it will find coherence within this metaphysical 
unity.  Because of this we can only know truth imperfectly and contextually.  For Blanshard, 
we must see truth in degrees.  Because of our finiteness we are not fully able to understand 
how truth coheres as a whole but we are able to see a degree of truth as is coheres with our 
experience.  “Truth is the approximation of thought to reality… The degree of truth of a 
particular proposition is to be judged in the first instance by its coherence with experience as 
                                                
300 As Lynch writes the coherence theory became prominent at the end of the nineteenth century under the 
thought of H.H. Joachim and F.H. Bradley who were neo-Hegelian absolute idealists.  See The Nature of Truth, 
p. 99. 
301 Again I say in general because there are philosophers who are coherentists but do not fit this mould.  For 
instance, Linda Martin Alcoff would not consider herself an idealist but remains a coherentist.   
302 Brand Blanshard ‘Coherence as the Nature of Truth’ in The Nature of Truth. 
303 Truth. p. 26. 
304 The Nature of Truth, 112. 
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a whole, ultimately by its coherence with that further whole, all-comprehensive and fully 
articulated, in which thought can come to rest.”305   
 
It would be easy here to think that what Blanshard is offering is very similar to the 
correspondence view, especially when he says things like ‘truth is the approximation of 
thought to reality.’  However, we must keep in mind the Idealism presupposed in such 
statements.  The thoughts in our minds are the objects.  “Thought, we have insisted, is its 
object realized imperfectly, and a system of thought is true just so far as it succeeds in 
embodying that end which thought in its very essence is seeking to embody.”306   
 
For the coherentist when we say that something is true it is never the case that it is absolutely 
true or perfectly represents its coherence within the larger whole.  We must speak about truth 
knowing our limitations.  It is interesting to note that Blanshard still maintains that truth qua 
truth is unchanging.  However, we, by our very natures, cannot represent truth in its fullness.  
  
 We have neither said nor implied that truth itself changes.  What we  
have said is that while truth as measured by the ultimate standard is 
unchanging, our knowledge of that truth does change- which is a very 
different thing.307   
 
Indeed of the coherentist truth can never be separated from the person who identifies it.  It is 
important to realize here that the coherentist is certain about the truth with respect to her 
experience but cannot claim that the this certainty is grounded in some connection with an 
objective reality which is independent of those experiences.  Both the correspondence 
theorists and the coherentist have certainty but this certainty lies with different things. 
 
 
                                                
305 Ibid, 107. 
306 Ibid, 115. 
307 Ibid, 114. 
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The Nature of Truth: Pragmatism  
 
 
Another mainline theory of truth is the pragmatists’ understanding of truth.  Charles Pierce 
and William James are the founding heads of the pragmatist theory.  James believed that 
empirical investigation could be said to be true only if it was verifiable. He writes, “True 
ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.”308  “He also says that 
a true idea leads or guides us in our dealings with reality, and that a true judgment is what is 
expedient to believe.”309  Here it seems to be the case that the truth of a judgment relies in 
some ways on its being practical in our everyday lives.   
 
Pragmatists tend to relate truth and justification so that questions of justification and 
questions of truth end up being the same.  Richard Rorty, a contemporary pragmatist310 
writes, “I cannot bypass justification and confine my attention to truth: assessment of truth 
and assessment of justification are, when the question is about what I should believe now, the 
same activity.”311  In assessing William James, Rorty writes, “His point in analogizing truth 
to rightness and to goodness was that once you understand all about the justification of 
actions, including the justification of assertions, you understand all there is to understand 
about goodness, rightness, and truth.”312 By relating truth and justification together in this 
way, the pragmatic theory is often forced to be quite minimalist in its definition of truth and 
at times seems particularly relativistic.  Rorty actually argues that we must be very 
cautionary about our use of the word truth because of these implications.313 
 
                                                
308 James, William.  ‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth’ in The Nature of Truth, p. 212. 
309 The Nature of Truth, p. 186. 
310 There is some debate whether Rorty is in fact a pragmatist.  Pascal Engel labels him a deflationist who is 
arguing for a completely different concept of truth than either James or Pierce.  However, Rorty does claim to 
be a pragmatist and for our purposes we will assume that he is right.  See The Nature of Truth, p. 279. 
311 Rorty, Richard. ‘Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright’ in The Nature of 
Truth, p. 259. 
312 Ibid, 260. 
313 Ibid, 261. 
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What we find with the pragmatist theory of truth, then, is a need for verification and an 
emphasis on the practicality of the truth claim.  So that in some sense truth is defined by its 
usefulness within its particular context.  Truth in this sense is never seen as a static property 
of an object or statement, but, rather, as an active property which impacts those who claim 
it.314    
 
The Nature of Truth: Identity Theory 
 
Of all of the theories presented here the identity theory is perhaps the most conceptually 
challenging. Because of this it seems to be the ‘ugly duckling,’ so to speak, of truth theories. 
The Identity Theory states that “X is true if and only if X is identical to reality.”  This 
statement at once seems counter-intuitive and brings with it a myriad of questions and 
criticisms. 
 
While explaining the Identity Theory Jennifer Hornsby writes,  
 If one says that there is no ontological gap between thoughts and  
what is the case, meaning by ‘thoughts’ cognitive activity on the part  
of beings such as ourselves, then one is indeed committed to a sort of 
idealism: one has to allow that nothing would be the case unless there  
were cognitive activity – that there could not be a mindless world.  But  
someone who means by ‘thoughts’ the contents of such activity, and who 
denies a gap between thoughts and what is the case, suggests only that  
what someone thinks can be the case.315 
 
Such content Hornsby terms ‘thinkables.’316  For Hornsby, ‘thinkables’ are the same as facts.  
This is what makes the identity theory unique.  
According to the identity theory it is the content of thought, (i.e., thinkables), 
 which are candidates for identification.  Furthermore, the contents of our  
thoughts are identical with reality (i.e., facts).  As a result, Identity Theory  
denies the metaphysical assumptions of the correspondence theory.  It is wary  
of the objectifying nature of correspondence theories and sees the thinker as  
                                                
314 Rorty mentions that pragmatists took Darwinian biology seriously and we can see this connection with  
evolutionary theory and the pragmatists’ particularly active aspect to their understanding of truth.   
315 Hornsby, Jennifer.  ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’ in The Nature of Truth, p. 663. 
316 Hornsby acknowledges borrowing this term from John McDowell who has written several books on the 
nature of truth. 
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more connected with the thinkable.   
 
The denial of the objective reality or ‘God’s-eye-view’ of the correspondence theory gets to 
the root of the identity theorist’s project.  In a telling statement Hornsby remarks, 
 If there was something distinct from a thinkable (a reality, say) such  
that establishing that some relation obtained between it and the thinkable  
was a way of getting to know whether the thinkable was true then someone 
could be in a position of knowing what is known when the thinkable is  
known, yet of still not knowing whether it was true.  But of course one  
could never be in that position: to discover whether p is already to discover  
whether it is true that p. 317 
 
By relating the contents of our thought with reality, the identity theorist denies both the 
realist and idealist conceptions of truth.   
 
Conclusion: Section One 
 
In the above pages I have sought to present a clear and concise picture of some of the main 
theories on the nature of truth.  This will hopefully give the reader a context for what is to 
come in the remaining two parts of this chapter.  I acknowledge that every theory of truth has 
not been covered.  This was to do partly with limitations on space and mostly because of the 
nature of evangelical discussion regarding truth.  It seems to me that the dialogue amongst 
evangelicals concerning the nature of truth is typically restricted to the theories laid out in the 
above section.  
 
Section two will seek to present an account of truth that is faithful to Scripture.  In this 
section the reader will find differing pictures of truth in Scripture which will help the 
conclusion of the chapter in showing that the main philosophical positions laid out in section 
one are not able to encompass by themselves the way in which truth is used in Scripture.  
After assessing a Scriptural perspective on the nature of truth we will then turn to a current 
dialogue between evangelicals who espouse two different theories of truth: correspondence 
                                                
317 Ibid, 666. 
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and coherence.  This dialogue will allow the reader to concretize in her mind a specific 
instance where the nature of truth has divided evangelicals.  I will also, where appropriate, 
point to what seems to me to be the inadequacy of both positions. 
 
Once this has been done we will then be able to approach section four which will be devoted 
to grounding the nature of truth theologically.  We will draw out the scriptural presentation of 
truth as well as how talking about truth theologically will have implications for our language 
about truth.  The goal being to show the inadequacy of the classical definitions of truth which 
have not sought to integrate any explicit theological perspectives in the their construction.  
Furthermore, we found in chapter two the connection between an Enlightenment seeking for 
truth and the influence this way of thinking had on both Warfield and Henry.  Consequently, 
their understanding of inerrancy was largely influence by Enlightenment thought.  At the end 
of this chapter we will seek to draw some conclusions regarding the doctrine of inerrancy and 
the notion of truth that it presupposes.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section Two: Reflections on a Scriptural Conception of Truth 
 
Most contemporary evangelical discussion of truth revolves around whether or not truth has 
an objective status or whether it is created within a particular culture.318 Douglas Groothuis 
writes in the opening pages of Truth Decay,  
 Is the truth indissolubly connected with objective reality, or is it  
something more malleable, fungible and adaptable to circumstance?   
Do we construct truth – whether individually or as a culture – or do we  
receive truth as a gift, however unnerving it may be?  319 
 
                                                
318 An example of this debate is found in Grenz’s Renewing the Center and Erickson’s Reclaiming the Center. 
319 Groothuis, Douglas.  Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of Postmodernism.  
Illinois: Inter-Varsity Press, 2000, p. 10. 
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For the most part conservative evangelicals, following Groothuis, agree that truth is of the 
latter sort.  Truth, they contend, is connected with ‘objective’ reality and we receive it as a 
gift.  However, even though this is affirmed, there is the realization that Scripture is 
somewhat vague when it comes to philosophical constructions of the nature of truth.  Roger 
Nicole gives one of the firmest conclusions available when he writes that “The primary New 
Testament emphasis is clearly on truth as conformity to reality and opposition to lies and 
errors.”320  Groothuis concludes similar things in Truth Decay.  According to Groothuis the 
Bible does not offer a “carefully nuanced philosophical” position on the nature of truth but 
what it does affirm about truth is in opposition to the Postmodern position.321  
 
There are evangelicals, like Stanley Grenz, who would be unhappy with the specific 
delineation of the concept of truth in Scripture made by Groothuis.  David Alan Williams, 
who writes an insightful article on Scripture and truth, says that post-modern talk has much 
to teach us about our understanding of truth and also the nature of Scripture as a whole.322  
For Williams the notion of truth represented in Scripture is primarily structured by 
metaphorical language.323   
 
And there are other scholars within the church who would not be considered evangelical but 
who are asking similar questions of Scripture with regard to the nature of truth.  One such 
scholar is Wolfhart Pannenberg who has a detailed chapter on the nature of truth in Scripture 
in volume two of his Basic Questions in Theology.  In this chapter Pannenberg, who we will 
                                                
320 Nicole, Roger.  “The Biblcal Concept of Truth.” in Scripture and Truth, edited by D.A. Carson and John D. 
Woodbridge.  Zondervan Publishing House: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1983, p. 293. 
321Groothuis, Douglas.  Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of Postmodernism. Illinois: 
Inter-Varsity Press, 2000, p. 60. 
322 Williams takes a particular metaphorical approach to Scripture’s understanding of truth that I will not have 
time to cover here.  He concludes by seeing truth in a similar way to pragmatism as that which calls us to act.  
For more see: Williams, David Alan. ‘Scripture, Truth and Our Postmodern Context.’ in Evangelicals & 
Scripture. Edited by Vincent Bacote, Laura C. Miguélez and Dennis L. Okholm. Intervarsity Press: Illinois, 
2004. 
323 ‘Scripture and Truth in Our Postmodern Context”, p. 234. 
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return to in the next section of this chapter, presents a Scriptural account of truth that is 
intimately linked to eschatology and founded upon Jesus Christ as the truth. In doing this 
Pannenberg seems to offers an account of truth which is in accord with Scripture and at the 
same time avoids the typical dichotomy formed in evangelical circles between subjective and 
objective notions of truth.  However, before we look at Pannenberg’s thought any further we 
should look at the general picture of Scripture’s use and understanding of truth.   
 
Truth in the Old Testament 
 
According to the Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, the Hebrew word émeth, 
which is often translated into English as truth or faithfulness, has an underlying sense of 
certainty or dependability.324  It is a word that is often seen as an attribute of God as in 
Genesis 24:27; Exodus 34:6; Psalms 25:5, 31:5; Jeremiah 4:2, 10:10.  The Wordbook also 
says that this term can apply to God’s words.  For instance Psalm 119:151 says, “But you are 
near, O LORD, and all your commandments are true.”   
 
Further, it is a word that becomes the means by which mankind know and serve God as their 
saviour.  An instance of this is found in I Kings 2:4, “that the LORD your God may establish 
his word that he spoke concerning me, saying, ‘If your sons pay close attention to their way, 
to walk before me in faithfulness with all their heart and with all their soul, you shall not lack 
a man on the throne of Israel.’” [my italics]  Because émeth is used in this sense, it is 
characteristic of  those who have come to God.  Psalm 15:1-2 says, “O LORD, who shall 
sojourn in your tent?  Who shall dwell on your holy hill?  He who walks blamelessly and 
does what is right and speaks truth in his heart”.  
 
                                                
324 Harris, R. Laird ed. Theological Workbook of the Old Testament: Volume 1.  Moody Press: Chicago, 1980, p. 
116. 
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R.W.L. Moberly writes that ‘emeth has a meaning which is wider in scope than the mere 
‘true/false’ distinction allows.   
 When, however, the psalmist celebrates Yahweh’s torah and  
commandments as [‘emeth] (Ps 119:43, 142, 151, 160), he does not  
just mean that they are true as opposed to false, but that they also  
have the character of being trustworthy and reliable for people to base  
their lives on.  OT usage of [‘emeth] characteristically takes on such wider  
moral implications.325   
 
He goes on to say that the major theological significance of the term ‘emeth is its use in the 
development of the character of God.326  ‘Emeth is used to convey God’s faithful character 
(e.g., Exodus 34:5-7).  Also the term ‘emeth can be further understood when it is seen in 
connection with the words to which it is commonly combined.  It is often seen with hesed 
(God’s steadfast love), sedeq (righteousness) and mispat (justice) which according to 
Moberly, all contribute in our understanding of ‘emeth’s moral characteristics.327   
 
One scholar who does offer a significant amount of information on this topic seems to have 
written the authoritative account of truth when it comes to both the Old and the New 
Testaments’ usage. Anthony C.  Thiselton’s article, written in The New International 
Dictionary of New Testament Theology, is found in the bibliography of several other essays 
on the subject.  His work on this topic seems to be an authoritative voice amongst scholars 
seeking to come to some conclusions on the matter.  
 
Thiselton’s approach is holistic.  He does not believe that the traditional distinction between 
Greek and Hebraic understandings of truth is applicable to the discussion of truth within the 
Bible.  Rather he sees a consistent understanding of truth in both Testaments.  He writes, 
“For many years there has been a tendency in biblical studies to over-generalize about the 
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uses of aletheia and alethes in cl. Gk.  This has been done partly with a view of drawing a 
clear-cut contrast between Gk. and Heb. concepts of truth.”328   
 
Thiselton begins his treatment of ‘emeth by stating “the majority of O.T. scholars claim that 
for the Heb. writers “truth” is close to faithfulness in meaning, suggesting the idea of 
stability, firmness, or reliability.329  Because ‘emeth is rooted in the concept of firmness, 
Thiselton says that many scholars conclude that the Hebraic understanding of truth is very 
different from the Greek understanding of truth as something that is abstract.   
 If this view is adopted we have all the ingredients for postulating  
a radical and clear-cut contrast between Hebraic and Gk. conceptions  
of truth.  We have already suggested, however, that whilst such a contrast  
has validity in certain respects, it can be misleading and simplistic to build  
arguments on this foundation, unless certain strong qualifications are first  
made and observed.330   
 
However, strong qualifications must be made so that we do not make the same mistake that 
Thiselton believes Bultmann has made in his article on Truth in the Theological Dictionary 
of the New Testament.  Thiselton presents three reasons for not making this over-
generalization: 1) There are a variety of different contexts in which ‘emeth is used in the OT; 
2) Arguments based on etymology are not conclusive; 3) The fact that the LXX translates 
‘emeth using different Greek words could be a case of polysemy (i.e., in some contexts 
‘emeth means truth, in others it means faithfulness). 
 
So Thiselton writes that ‘emeth is used in many different senses and so any Scriptural 
treatment of the term ‘emeth which emphasizes the dichotomy between “Greek” and 
“Hebrew” understandings of truth is not being consistent with the Scriptural witness.  There 
are a number of places in the OT where truth can be seen as having a more “Greek” 
                                                
328 Brown, Colin ed.  The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology.  The Paternoster Press: 
Exeter, 1978, p. 874.   
329 Ibid, 877. 
330 Ibid. 
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connotation (i.e., in contrast to falsehood).  Thiselton points to Genesis 42:16, Exodus 18:21, 
Deuteronomy 13:14 and 1 Kings 17:24 as examples of this use.  We also have incidences of 
this in the Wisdom literature (i.e., Prov. 8:7, 12:19, 22:21, 23:23), as well as in the Psalms 
(i.e., PS 43:3, 45:4, 51:6).  However, Thiselton concludes,  
 Even when we take account of the varied ways in which [‘emeth] is  
used, it is still clear that in the vast majority of contexts truth is not a 
merely abstract and theoretical concept.  To this extent W. Pannenberg  
is correct when he asserts that in accordance with the OT background 
“the truth of God must prove itself anew.”  The God of Israel reveals his  
truth not only in his words but also in his deeds, and this truth is proved  
in practice in the experience of his people… It is not surprising, then, to  
find at times what would nowadays be called an existential view of truth  
in the OT.331  
 
With this said, however, Thiselton is careful not to lead us down an exclusively existentialist 
path.  He admits that passages like Psalm 119 have an existential ‘ring’ to them at times but 
Thiselton is keen to make sure that we recognize that the Psalmist also sees the law of God as 
a lamp unto his feet “which shows the believer the true state of affairs, although admittedly 
the true state of affairs as it relates in practise to him (“my feet…my path”).”332 
 
Thiselton ends his discussion of the OT view of truth with a reference to John Calvin.  He 
says in Calvin’s words “there is agreement between the sayings of God and the doings of 
God.”333 Thiselton sees this OT view of truth and the logical relationship between truth and 
faithfulness as being completely consistent with the NT conception of truth as 
correspondence between word and deed.  Black’s Bible Dictionary concludes the same when 
it says, “the O.T. concept of truth is, therefore, not so much an intellectual as a moral one.”334  
And so it is to the NT that we turn in order to continue our discussion of what it would mean 
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to talk of a Biblical view of truth before drawing some conclusions on whether there is any 
overall picture of truth in Scripture.   
 
 
 
Truth in the New Testament 
 
Volume one of the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, which is edited by Gerhard 
Kittel, was published in 1933.335  Its article on aletheia, the Greek word for truth, was written 
by the theologian Rudolf Bultmann.  It would not be inaccurate to say that the publication of 
this article ignited a longstanding debate about the difference between the “Greek” New 
Testament use of truth and that of the “Hebraic” Old Testament use.  Bultmann suggests that 
one must understand the Greek philosophical definition of aletheia in order to fully grasp its 
use in the New Testament.  However, Bultmann does not deny the influence that ‘emeth 
sometimes has on the use of aletheia in the New Testament.  For instance, he writes,  
 alhqeia is also that “on which one can rely” (in the sense of [‘emeth]).   
a. It signifies “reliability” or “trustworthiness.”… This can be understood  
only in the light of the [‘emeth] concept.336 
 
Where he seems to see a much bigger influence of the Greek concept is in the Johannine 
writings.  Thiselton’s critique of Bultmann has some warrant here but it should be noted that 
Bultmann does see a development of the term aletheia in John’s gospel that would not be 
characteristic of the Greek understanding.  In fact, as much as Bultmann sees John’s use of 
the term as being influenced by Greek notions, it can be said that he sees John’s use as 
distinguished from the Greek understanding.337  He concludes that in John’s gospel the 
“reception of alhqeia is conditioned neither by rational or esoteric instruction on the one 
                                                
335 This is date of the original German publication.  The English translation that is being used here, was 
originally published in 1964. 
336 TDNT, p. 243. 
337 Bultmann writes that there is a good deal of agreement between John’s writings and Hellenistic dualism but 
that nevertheless, for John, “the antithesis between alhqeia as divine power and yeudoß as anti-divine is not 
cosmological, in spite of the mythological form in which it is sometimes clothed (Jn 8:44).”  see: TDNT, p. 245. 
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side nor psychical preparation and exercise on the other; it takes place in obedient faith.”338  
Here we see the existential conclusion similar to Thiselton’s finding that ‘emeth is at times to 
be understood in an existential way.  We shall return to a discussion of John’s gospel later 
but first we need to look at the wider use of aletheia in the New Testament.339 
 
In the synoptic Gospels the term aletheia is used fairly infrequently. Apart from a few 
adverbial uses in the Gospels it would seem that if one wanted to find out how the New 
Testament uses aletheia, the Synoptics would not be the prime option for research.340  Paul 
however does use the term frequently and in interesting ways. 
 
Paul “puts a good deal of emphasis on truth”, but he uses it in a much ‘richer’ sense than it is 
commonly used today.341  Leon Morris defines three distinct ways in which this ‘richer’ 
sense is expressed in Paul’s writings: 1) The Truth of God, 2) The Truth of the Gospel and 3) 
Truth in Christian Living.342 
 
Paul speaks of the truth of God on many occasions.  For example, Romans 3:7 says, “But if 
through my lie God’s truth abounds to his glory, why am I still being condemned as a 
sinner?” And 15:8 states, “For I tell you that Christ became a servant to the circumcised to 
show God’s truthfulness…” This identification with truth and the being of God is fully 
realized for Paul in the person of Jesus Christ (Eph 4:21); however, even Morris concludes 
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342 Ibid. 
 120 
that “God has revealed the truth, indeed has sent his Son to live it and to proclaim it, but 
sinful people have refused to listen” [my italics].343   
 
The emphasis in this conclusion presupposes a primarily propositional truth, but this is not a 
necessary presupposition that is found in Paul.  For instance, 2 Corinthians 11:10, which 
states, “As the truth of Christ is in me, this boasting of mine will not be silenced in the 
regions of Achaia,” does not necessarily imply that Paul is talking primarily about 
propositions that Christ spoke which are in his memory.  Again, II Timothy 4:4 states, 
“…and will turn away from listening to the truth and wander off into myths.”  There is not 
reason to conclude that Scripture demands that we read truth here as a set of propositions 
which the sinner has stopped listening too.   
 
Paul uses aletheia in the context of the Gospel and points to Colossians 1:5, Galatians 2:5, 
etc.  “The Gospel and truth are closely connected.”  Morris connects this ‘fact’ with God’s 
desire that people would be saved and come to a knowledge of truth by citing I Timothy 2:3-
4: “This is good, and it is pleasing in the sight of God our Savior, who desires all people to be 
saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth.” The primary question we must ask is what 
does Paul mean when he uses the phrase ‘knowledge of the truth.’  He seems to suggest that 
people also turn away from this truth (II Tim 2:18) and that he could not do anything against 
it (II Cor 13:8).344   There is no doubt that some of these verses cited above ought to be seen 
in light of a propositional understanding of truth.  The context of II Timothy 2:18 is pretty 
clear and seems to indicate that the people who are “swerving from the truth” are doing so 
because they are claiming something that is not factually the case.  But this is by no means an 
indication that Scripture asks us to view truth in this way all the time.   
                                                
343 Ibid. 
344 The authorship of 2 Timothy is disputed.  However, the epistle does seem to be characteristically Pauline in 
thought and so for the purposes of this discussion the author will describe the epistle as being written by Paul.    
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Paul also sees truth as an aspect of Christian living.  Accordingly, “we should see truth as a 
quality of action as well as of speech.  Paul wants his converts to live the truth as well as to 
speak it.”345  For instance, we read in I Corinthians 13:6, “it [love] does not rejoice at 
wrongdoing, but rejoices with the truth.”  And so there is also a sense in Paul of the moral 
side of truth, which calls us into action.  Thiselton writes, “Thus we find that for Paul, as for 
Jesus, truth becomes a matter of correspondence between word and deed.”346 
 
Thiselton gives more aspects of the Pauline use of truth.  Truth has power.  It is part of the 
Christians’ armour and can even lead to salvation (e.g., Rom. 3:4; 2 Thess. 2:10; Eph 
6:14).347 It “is demanded of the Christian as a corollary of his union with Christ and status as 
a new creation” (e.g., I Cor. 5:8).348  Paul is also the only writer in the New Testament to use 
the verbal form of aletheia, althea, once in Galatians and the other time in Ephesians.349  In 
Galatians the context suggests that truth means the actual fact of the Gospel and in Ephesians 
“It is possible that aletheuo here entails integrity of life in addition to truthful speech.”350  
Paul uses the adjective of aletheia in I Thessalonians 1:9 and the context suggests that truth 
means that which is real or genuine as opposed to fake idols.   
 
If we were to limit our understanding of aletheia to what we have discussed above then we 
would need to draw at least two conclusions about the term.  1)  The Old Testament identifies 
truth with the being of God; 2)  Both the Old and New Testaments speak of truth in a variety 
of different ways.  Sometimes truth is seen as that which uncovers reality and other times it is 
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seen as that which is faithful or dependable; 3) Paul uses aletheia in ways that are consistent 
with the variegated use in the Old Testament, however we see in Paul a development from 
identifying truth with God to identifying truth with the person of Christ (Eph 4:21).   
 
However, we have not yet examined the Johannine texts which use aletheia more than any 
other author of Scripture and out of the New Testament, is the only writer who records Jesus 
as identifying Himself with the truth (John 14:6).  Thiselton writes, “Considerations about 
word-frequency alone suggest the importance of truth in John and the Johannine Epistles.”351  
To do any justice to talking about a Biblical understanding of truth requires examination of 
the Gospel of John and his letters.   
 
In the opening lines of John’s gospel we get a glimpse of the central focus of John’s use of 
aletheia.  “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, 
glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth…For the law was given 
through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ” (1:14,17).  Rudolf 
Schnackenburg says of this text that “the ‘truth’ has become an event” and rightly clarifies 
this statement to say that the person of Christ is the truth.352 
 
 Alhqeia is not simply ‘divine reality’, and certainly not in a Platonic  
sense.  Nevertheless, because Jesus not only reveals the truth in his words  
and actions, but also embodies it in his person, God’s reality becomes  
manifest in him, manifest as will and power to save.353   
 
John’s gospel does not talk about truth primarily with regard to intellectual instruction or 
factual statements.354  In John’s gospel truth is life.  Truth provides sanctification and power.  
Schnackenburg writes, 
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 The people who accept this truth do not receive intellectual instruction  
or enlightenment, but are ‘sanctified’ in the truth (17:17a, 19), filled  
with God’s life.  The truth becomes a reality and power in them  
(cf. 1 Jn 1:8; 2:4) which rescues them from their unfreedom and frees  
them for true freedom (8:23-36).  At the same time the truth must become  
the norm which governs their lives; they must ‘do the truth’ and practise  
love ‘in deed and in truth’ (cf. 3:21; 1Jn1:6; 3:18).  A person’s attitudes  
and actions show whether he is ‘of the truth’, that is, ‘of God’, or whether  
he has fallen into the power of ‘lies’ and so of the devil, the ‘liar from  
the beginning’, who ‘has nothing to do with the truth’ (cf. 8:44; 1 Jn 1:6; 
2:21). 355   
 
Truth is ontologically associated with divine reality in John’s writings.  According to 
Thiselton what John wishes to stress is that “in Christ the Logos, men can see God in his 
genuine actuality and reality.  If men can see God’s reality anywhere, it is in Christ.”  But to 
limit the idea of truth strictly to divine reality would be inaccurate.  As Thiselton points out 
there are times when John uses aletheia to mean that which is in contrast to falsehood.356  
Thiselton writes, “One of the most important uses of aletheia and alethes in Jn, is to convey 
the idea of reality, in contrast to whatever the situation may seem to look like on the 
surface.”357  Thiselton sees a clear example of this usage in John 6:55 when Jesus is speaking 
of the Eucharistic meal.   
 
John also uses the phrase “doing the truth,” which Thiselton says must be given special 
attention.  A prima facie read of this phrase brings OT understandings of truth to mind, but 
Thiselton is wary of making a strong link with this phrase and the OT ethical aspect of truth 
spoken above.  He says that Dodd and others have interpreted this phrase correctly by 
rejecting the notion that it simply means practising fidelity.358  There is no tension between 
                                                                                                                                                  
354 This is not to say that he never uses aletheia in this way.  For instance, the Samaritan woman speak about the 
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Christian faith and practise and to interpret truth in such a way that makes this tension would 
be inconsistent with the use of truth in John and in Scripture as a whole.359 
 
We finally get to the crux of the matter with John 14:6.  Thiselton admits that aletheia is used 
here in a distinct way that cannot be equated with any of the views of truth he has defined 
thus far in his article.  Writing about Dodd and Bultmann, he says,  
 Dodd and Bultmann interpret this verse along the lines of a  
Hellenistic or gnostic dualism, to mean that through Christ the  
soul ascends to the heavenly realm of truth.  Whilst we may question  
Bultmann’s assumptions about the relevance of gnostic background,  
he is nevertheless correct when he writes: “He (Christ) is the way in  
such a manner as to be at the same time the goal; for he is also  
he aletheia… as the revealed reality of God.”360   
 
 
Schnackenburg concludes the same when he writes that Bultmann, Dodd and others’ 
interpretation of John’s language in this passage as influenced by Hellenism and Gnosticism 
should be “considerably reduced.”361  Schnackenburg concludes that we must recognise the 
originality of the Johannine concept of truth.  It is not founded in Hellenistic or Gnostic 
philosophy nor is it the same as the Qumran understanding.362  By recording Jesus’ statement 
that He is the truth, John has captured an understanding of truth that transcends all prior 
conceptions.   
 For John Jesus is not only an interpreter of the old revelation and a  
teacher of truth, but also becomes himself, through his all-embracing  
direct revelation of the Father, the way through which we reach the  
Father.363   
 
Schnackenburg concludes saying, 
 
Truth is not an object with which people can do what they like,  
not a ready-made possession, which one can take over and administer.   
The truth which Christ has revealed must be opened up by the ‘Spirit of  
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truth’, ever more deeply explored and exposed to particular possibilities  
of understanding it (the Paraclete sayings, esp. 16:13).  It is a dynamic  
process, which makes it a duty for every generation to learn to understand  
the revelation brought by Christ anew in the Spirit of God.364    
 
However, not all commentators see the need to develop an account of truth which is based on 
the Christological reading of John 14:6.  This is because many commentators see ‘truth and 
life’ in this passage as clarifying the term hJ oJdo\ß and so they do not stand alone in 
describing Christ.365  For instance, George Beasley-Murray writes, 
 Despite the coordination of the three terms the Way, the Truth,  
and the Life, the emphasis clearly falls on the first, for the statement  
explains the assertion of v 4 (“You know the way”), and concludes  
with a deduction from the main clause: “no one comes to the Father  
except through me.” To say this is not to denigrate the importance of  
the second and third terms, for they explain how it is that Jesus is the  
Way: he is the Way because he is the truth, i.e., the revelation of God,  
and because the life of God resides in him (in the context of the Gospel  
that includes life in creation and life in the new creation, 1:4, 12-13; 5:26).366 
 
Even if the emphasis on Christ’s being the truth is not implied in this passage the conclusion 
seems similar to one if the emphasis was there.  Beasley-Murray concludes,  
 It is evident that v 6 presupposes the teaching on the Christ as  
the Logos, the Word made flesh.  The latter clause of v 6 must then  
be related to the Prologue, where it is stated that the Christ is the Life,  
the Light of men, who enlightens every one (1:4,9) [my italics].367 
 
It would seem that the identification of truth with Jesus, even if it is only to clarify Jesus as 
the way, is connected ontologically to his person so that we are justified in maintaining a 
conclusion similar to that of both Schnackenburg and Thistleston about the ‘personal’ nature 
of truth that is advocated by Scripture. 
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Thiselton draws similar conclusions about the use of truth when it is equated with Christ in 
14:6 as Schnackenburgh does.  For Thiselton, John 14:6 requires an understanding of truth 
that is not “abstract or supra-historical but revealed in the actual personal life of the Word 
made flesh.”368  On account of this Thiselton argues that the best way to understand the 
nature of truth in Scripture is in two ways.  First, he argues that we must conclude that the 
idea of truth is multiform which makes the criteria for truth change depending on which form 
truth takes; second, there is a kind of truth that is universal “which somehow undergirds and 
holds together particular expressions and experiences of truth in thought and life.”369 
Scripture seems to set up a Christological foundation upon which the nature of truth depends.   
 
In our discussion of Scripture and its use of the word truth we have seen that it varies in its 
understanding.  At times we see that truth is used as correspondence to facts and at other 
times there seems to be the idea that truth coheres and is dependent on other truths.  We have 
also seen the Old Testament’s moral use of truth which could be seen as reflective of the 
pragmatist/verificationist model of truth in that this type of truth entails a call to action.  
Finally we have seen an aspect of the identity theory of truth that equates God with truth.  
Specifically we found this to be the case in John’s writings where both Christ and the Spirit 
are identified with truth.370  It would seem that in light of this we would need to conclude that 
no single philosophical theory of truth, identified in the first section above, is able to fully 
describe what is being portrayed in Scripture.   
 
So, where to do we go from here?  If there is to be a foundation for all of our knowledge it 
must be the revelation of Jesus Christ, and if our knowledge is to be seen as built on this 
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foundation then we must see that Christ’s reconciling work continues and one day we will 
know fully as we are fully known.   Colin Gunton offers us a way forward, 
 The co-eternal Word is thus the basis of any and all meaning  
 as ‘foundation’: not only of the faith of the believer, but of the very  
 possibility of knowledge of any kind.  If Christ is the mediator of  
 creation, then he is the basis of created rationality and therefore of  
 human knowledge, wherever and whatever; we might say of all  
 human culture.371 
 
Surely this is the Christological foundation to which Scripture pointed us. By maintaining a 
Christological ‘center’ to our understanding of truth we are able to avoid the relativism that 
so many conservative evangelicals are concerned about without wholeheartedly accepting a 
specific philosophical view of truth which cannot do justice to the Scriptural portrayal.372  
When Christ is the center there seems to be a tension between the theories of truth discussed 
above (i.e., a tension between the objective notions of truth in correspondence theories and 
the subjective notion within coherence understandings).  This tension would appear to 
encourage us to enlarge our categories when speaking of truth.  We turn now to a brief 
discussion of some of the implications a Christological center has to our understanding of the 
nature of truth.373  This will allow us to conclude the chapter’s overall discussion concerning 
the doctrine of inerrancy and its reliance on specific understandings of truth.   
 
Section Three: Theological Reflections on a Particular View of Truth in Scripture 
 
William H. Willimon writes in an article for Christianity Today, “but isn’t it curious that 
Jesus did not say to his disciples, ‘I am here to tell you about the truth?’ He says, “I am the 
truth.””374  The fullness of God’s revelation about the nature of truth is found not in Christ 
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but as Christ.  When Jesus claims to be the truth we are ‘theologically-enlightened’ about the 
nature of truth, which ought to inform and influence any discussion on truth that would 
proceed.  Willimon goes on to write, 
 The truth is a person, personal.  This truth is not sheer subjectivity,  
either, for the truth of Jesus is utterly inseparable from him – his life,  
death, and resurrection.  We Christians really would have no idea what  
the truth is if it were not for our being met and called by Jesus.375   
 
The epistemological implications of this way of thinking are numerous.  Knowing the Truth 
becomes dependent upon God’s action toward his creation.  In a manner that is comparable 
to the theological concerns expressed by Barth and Kuyper in chapter five below, knowing 
the Truth would ultimately depend on the Holy Spirit’s action.  Truth cannot be accessed by 
anyone.376  It must be given and humbly received by mankind. 
 
It also might mean that all truths (i.e., created truths377) are derivative of the Truth that is 
Jesus Christ.  This would imply that all ‘created’ truths are signs of the one Truth and in 
some way witness or point to Him, the One through whom these truths were made.  Of 
course, this way of thinking pushes the traditional talk about truth.  Thinking about truth in a 
‘derivative’ way necessitates a certain kind of humility when the claim is made to know the 
truth.  Some truths may point more directly to the Truth and others may take quite circuitous 
routes.   
 
Seeing truth in this way is much more congruent with the kind of eschatological approach of 
Pannenberg.  To use Paul’s analogy of seeing as through a glass dimly, certain truths may 
reflect more accurately the person of Jesus Christ than others, but no one truth does this 
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univocally.  How accurately ‘created truth’ reflects Christ is wholly dependent on how much 
Christ by his Spirit reveals himself to us.  Again, this means that knowledge of the truth 
cannot be strictly identified as either subjective or objects as the traditional discussion of 
truth often does. 
 
If truth is identified with Jesus Christ then in a certain sense truth is always objective because 
by his very nature as God he is other than his creation.  And yet by becoming part of his 
creation in the incarnation the truth becomes a subject and so is not properly considered just 
an object.  The truth is present with us but cannot be constrained by us, nor can it be defined 
or determined by us.  We are dependent upon him, which means we are dependent on it.  So 
to speak of truth as an object would not seem to be an entirely accurate way of speaking. 
 
Perhaps using the distinction between archetype and ectype that Abraham Kuyper (see 
chapter five below for a more specific account of how Kuyper uses this distinction) and 
many of the Reformers used might be helpful.  If Jesus Christ is the archetype of truth then 
any truth of which we speak is the image or ectype of truth.  Therefore the truthfulness of our 
claims about truth is dependent on that which they image.  For something to be labelled true 
it must image the archetype.   
 
Willimon offers a radical picture of truth which pushes the subjective/objective boundaries.  
In a Barthian manner he writes of his concern for seeing truth in ‘objective’ ways and what 
the impact of Christ’s statement has on this ‘objective’ understanding, 
 Arguing that Christ and his way are “objectively true,” we run  
the risk of deceiving people into thinking that they are already capable,  
just as they are, of thinking about these matters without first knowing Jesus,  
without conversion.378 
                                                
378 Ibid. 
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When we take seriously the claim of Jesus Christ to be the truth the traditional categories that 
are used to talk about the nature of truth (i.e., subjective/objective) are no longer adequate.  
In light of a Christological notion of truth which takes into account the incarnation, Christ 
(and as a result truth) must be seen both to transcend creation (the objective criterion of truth) 
and be immanent in creation as well (the post-modern subjective criterion of truth).  An 
incarnational understanding of truth goes beyond these categories by not resolving them but 
leaving them in tension.  Jesus Christ was both in the world and the world was made through 
him.  He is both immanent and transcendent (John 1:10), and whatever conclusions one 
makes regarding the nature of truth it would seem that a Christological understanding of truth 
would not allow us to resolve the tension that usually arises from the traditional categories 
mentioned above.   
 
This is the implication given by Thiselton in the quote above.  Truth should not be viewed as 
abstract or surpa-historical.  Thiselton says that it is revealed in the person of Jesus Christ.  
However, even using the preposition in implies the truth somehow resides in Christ and 
could be abstract from him.  It would be better to speak of the truth of or as Jesus Christ so 
that this implication is not made.  Jesus Christ is the truth bar none.  The truth does not reside 
in him or live outside of him.  He does not dwell in the truth or come into contact with it as 
though it were one of Plato’s eternal forms.   
 
Thinking about truth in this way may mean that one is forced to conclude that the truths we 
know are not necessarily abstract, eternal truths but temporal images that sometimes image 
the One who is the eternal Word.  But this does not mean that we will never have access to or 
come into contact with the truth.  One theologian who has drawn similar theological 
conclusions, and to whom Thiselton points, is Wolfhart Pannenberg.  We end our reflection 
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on the nature of truth by turning to the particular theological expression of truth given by 
Pannenberg in Basic Questions in Theology.  
 
Pannenberg accepts the basic thesis that there are different understandings of truth within the 
Greek and Hebrew worldviews.  He understands the Greek worldview as primarily 
presupposing the essence of truth as unchangeable.  He writes,  
For Greek thought, the unity of truth excluded all change from it.   
Change would entail multiplicity, a succession of different forms, and then 
the full, whole truth, and truly constant, could not be found in anything.  It  
belongs to the essence of truth to be unchangeable and, thus, to be one and the  
same, without beginning or end.379 
 
However this does not mean that truth must be seen to be in constant flux if we deny the 
Greek assumptions about it.  According to Pannenberg, the Hebrew mind considered God to 
be constant.  He writes, “For the Hebrew, however, that [God’s constancy] is just not self-
evident.  It is not the result of logical necessity, that what-is, is.”  God’s constancy is known 
in his economy.  Therefore if God is the truth then this truth is also constant.  Disregarding 
notions of abstract truth does not mean disregarding notions of constant truth as long as these 
notions are theologically grounded.   This grounding is found in the constant economia of the 
Spirit.  Christology and pneumatology are combined so that the truth remains constant. 
 
For Pannenberg the tension we spoke of above will finally be resolved only in the Eschaton.  
According to Pannenberg, the answer to the question regarding the nature of truth lies in the 
“proleptic character of the Christ event.”380  The truth, which will finally and fully be known 
in the end has a Hegelian ring to it, which Pannenberg is willing to admit.  In fact, he says 
that Hegel’s understanding of truth “approximates” to the biblical understanding. 
 Hegel’s thesis that the truth of the whole will be visible only at the  
end of history approximates the biblical understanding of truth in two  
                                                
379 Pannenberg, Wolfhart.  Basic Questions in Theology: Volume Two.  SCM Press Ltd.: London, 1971, p. 19. 
380 Ibid, 24. 
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aspects…. truth as such is understood not as timelessly unchangeable,  
but as a process that runs its course and maintains itself through change… 
the unity of the process, which is full of contradictions while it is under way,  
will become visible along with the true meaning of every individual moment  
in it, only from the standpoint of its end.381 
 
Paul seems to suggest this in his first letter to the Corinthians when he says, “For now we see 
in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I will know fully just as 
I also have been fully known” (I Cor. 13:12).382   
 
But how do we know the truth now?  Is Willimon correct when he says, “There is a sense in 
which we cannot know the truth without first being made truthful”?  If we adopt 
Pannenberg’s model, that truth is an eschatological reality, then are we to adopt a 
hermeneutic of suspicion when it comes to truth now?  It seems to me that Scripture offers a 
way forward that both maintains a tension between the now and not yet, as well as, offers a 
way for us to have ‘glimpses’ of the truth in the present.  Pannenberg does not point us to the 
work of Spirit but it by the Spirit we are told the truth.   
 
The answer to our question needs to be rooted in Pneumatology.   “But when He, the Spirit of 
truth, comes, He will guide you into all the truth; for He will not speak on His own initiative, 
but whatever He hears, He will speak; and He will disclose to you what is to come” (John 
16:13).  It is by the Spirit that we receive ‘glimpses’ of the truth, who will one day meet us 
face to face.  By incorporating the Spirit’s function in giving truth we may be able to reject 
the scepticism that some post-modern notions of truth lead to and also deny the ‘objectivity’ 
of truth, which so many modern evangelical apologists seek today.   
 
                                                
381 Ibid, 22. 
382 The argument may be made at this point that just because we are unable to ‘see’ objective truth now does not 
mean that Paul is suggesting that there is no objective truth.  However, in light of the Christological model 
suggested above the truth that we see fully in the end will not be an object but a person.  This idea carries with it 
both theological and philosophical implications which we will not have time to expound on here.   
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By relying on the Spirit to reveal truth we recognise the transcendent character of “truth-
revealing.”  The scepticism that often results from speaking about truth as that which is 
created in particular societies is overcome by this transcendence.  The truth may be given to 
particular communities in particular ways but it is never created by them.  There is never a 
sense in which we can say that the truth that I know is dependent upon the particular 
community in which I am involved because the Spirit is free from each and every manmade 
community and in his freedom gives truth where and when he wills.   
 
With that said neither is truth able to be considered an object solely for our analysis and use.  
Because truth is given we are to rightly understand our position as “truth-receivers” and not 
those who create and master truth.  There is a certain responsibility that comes with this 
understanding of truth.  If the Truth is the Son of God and every other truth is derivative of 
Him then when we claim to know the truth we recognize that it is only by the free gift of God 
that we have been given this truth.  It is not ours, therefore, we cannot do anything we like 
with it.   
 
Willimon is right to be sceptical about affirming an objective nature to truth.  But the 
opposite of objective is not encounter/existentialism. At the end of his essay, Willimon who 
is openly influenced by Hauerwas, gets close to advocating the position that truth is lived.  Of 
course, this is a popular way of speaking about truth and the reason for this is a valid one.  
The concern is to allow truth to be more than just an intellectual exercise.  But the truth still 
has ontological status because it is identical to Jesus Christ.  We must in a very real way 
know the truth and then live by it.  But this living is a work of the Spirit.  We do not live the 
truth; we live by the truth through the Spirit.  Therefore, pneumatology is intricately 
connected to Christology so that when we know the truth we know Him by His Spirit.   
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By seeing the need to incorporate an adequate Pneumatology into our understanding of truth 
we are able to draw a similar conclusion to Thistelton when he writes, 
 Reverence for truth is not simply the pseudo-cynicism of our own  
age which tries to “unmask” everything, in the belief that no one and  
nothing can genuinely lay claim to truth.  It is the attitude which combines  
joyful confidence that truth can indeed be found, with a humble submission  
to  truth whenever and wherever it emerges.  Such openness to truth is  
required of those who worship the God of truth; whilst a due reverence for  
truth ensures honesty in a man’s dealings with his neighbor, both in word  
and deed.  This is the attitude, we have seen, to which both the OT and the  
NT bear witness.383 
 
 
Section Four: Truth and the Doctrine of Inerrancy 
 
If we return to our discussion in chapter one on the claims of inerrancy one thing that we 
were able to recognize is the dependence of inerrancy on the nature of truth.  The definition 
of inerrancy given in the ‘Chicago Statement’ insists that “inerrant signifies the quality of 
being free from all falsehood or mistake and so safeguards the truth that Holy Scripture is 
entirely true and trustworthy in all its assertions.”384  It also claims that “the authority of 
Scripture is inescapably impaired if this total divine inerrancy is in any way limited or 
disregarded, or made relative to a view of truth contrary to the Bible’s own; and such lapses 
bring serious loss to both the individual and the Church.”385  We will discuss the connection 
between authority and inerrancy in the following chapter but for now it remains for us to 
discuss the connection between the biblical view of truth and the doctrine of inerrancy.  If 
would seem that if the doctrine of inerrancy is dependent on a correspondence view of truth 
then it would by its own standard be impaired because as we have shown above this view of 
truth does not correspond with the Christological notion of truth at the heart of Scripture.   
 
                                                
383 TNIDNTT, 901. 
384 Inerrancy, p. 500. 
385 Ibid, p. 494. 
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It is clear that the doctrine of inerrancy does in fact presupposes a correspondence theory of 
truth.  In fact, Paul Feinberg says this in his chapter on ‘The Meaning of Inerrancy.’  “For 
pristine simplicity and clarity one can hardly beat Aristotle’s definitions of true and false.” 386   
Feinberg takes this position by showing that the main use of truth in Scripture is exemplified 
by passages which reflect such tendencies.  For example, he cites Psalm 119:142 “Your law 
is true” and v. 151, “all your commands are true.”  “It is this idea,” he writes, “that is 
appropriate to the English word inerrancy.”387  As we concluded earlier there are certainly 
some passages in Scripture that seem to imply a view of truth that would fit nicely with the 
philosophical position of correspondence.   
 
However, there are at least some if not an equal amount of ‘proof-texts’ which would seem to 
imply something different.  An implication of this would seem to be that if when the Bible 
speaks of truth it does not always imply the correspondence theory then when we speak of 
the Bible as true we ought to be justified in seeing the truth of the Bible as something other 
then correspondence to ‘objective’ reality.  If this is the case, then it would seem that the 
truth of Scripture would need to be rooted in, or founded upon, something (or someone) 
different than a strict correspondence theory would allow. 
 
Feinberg also uses the work of the Polish logician Tarski to support the definition of truth 
advocated by the doctrine of inerrancy.  He says, “The characteristics of Tarski’s definition 
are as follows: (1) Truth is defined in terms of language; (2) truth is defined in terms of 
sentences (that is, truth is a property of sentences), not of individual words; and (3) truth is 
defined in terms of correspondence.”388   
 
                                                
386 Ibid, p. 294. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Ibid, p. 295. 
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Recalling the conclusions made above, does the nature of truth advocated by Tarski and 
presupposed in the doctrine of inerrancy do justice to the biblical picture of truth?  The Bible 
seems to convey truth in ways that are different than the strict correspondence view would 
allow.389  Tarski’s view above would make truth reliable on propositional assertions.  But the 
Bible seems to be full of instances where truth is conveyed apart from propositional 
assertions.  One needs only to bring to mind the story Jesus tells of the prodigal son.  It is true 
that the story makes assertions but it would seem that the ‘truth’ of the assertions made (i.e., 
whether there was a son who was given his inheritance, etc.) is the least interesting part of 
the story. The truth that is conveyed by the telling of the story is the reason for the telling in 
the first place. 
 
An instance in Scripture that can be seen to be more typical of a coherence theory of truth is 
found in Genesis 11.  The story of the tower of Babel can be seen as historically true and so 
understood in light of the correspondence theory but the truth of the story would seem to be 
independent from the ‘facts’ portrayed.390  Whether God actually was displeased with a 
specific group of people in a city who had a common tongue is less interesting to the truth 
that one of the consequences of sin is our inability to understand each other.391   It would 
seem that Scripture is capable of conveying truth in ways that are not bound by the ‘rules’ 
stated by Tarski above.  We might say that there are ‘truths’ given by Scripture without 
reliance on propositional assertion or correspondence.   
 
                                                
389 In fact, it probably could be argued that the Bible conveys truth the majority of the time in ways which 
cannot be accounted for by the Correspondence Theory. 
390 The connection between correspondence and a literal reading of the text is one that seems necessary given 
the adoption of propositional truth and its correspondence to ‘objectivity.’   
391 This story has theological implication beyond the Old Testament.  The fact that the early church was given 
the Spirit and as a result spoke with a unified ‘tongue’ raises interesting questions.   The remark could be made 
that I am relying on my own interpretation of the text here but the point still stands that the ‘truth’ of the story 
seems to lie behind the correspondence of the proposition which make up the story and their connection with 
objectivity. 
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Feinberg is not innovative when it comes to this type of thinking amongst inerrantists. This 
type of thinking is consistent with the thought and theology of both B.B. Warfield and Carl 
F.H. Henry.  We saw in chapter 2 of this thesis that both Warfield and Henry rely on 
different foundations but that nevertheless these foundations justify the need for a doctrine of 
inerrancy and so in this way were connected to Enlightenment philosophy.   Now we will 
find that their understanding of truth would seem to be predicated upon an understanding of 
correspondence theory.   
 
One instance where we see this type of understanding coming out in Warfield’s writing is in 
his aptly titled essay ‘Christianity the Truth.’392  Warfield begins the essay with alluding to 
the Scriptural account of truth as Christological but does not spend any time elaborating on 
the implications of this.393  Rather, he then suggests that the gospel seeks “to propagate itself 
in the world as the only “truth,” and therefore only by those methods by which “truth” makes 
its way” [my italics].394  The methods by which truth makes its way in the world, according 
to Warfield, are apologetic in nature.   
 
Because Warfield understands Christianity to be the “reasonable religion,” he sees the task of 
Christians being to proclaim the truth of this reasonable religion to the world.  The 
proclamation of truth would seem to presuppose the propositional nature of truth according 
to the correspondence theory.  Also, Warfield speaks in this article of objective truth and 
cites Aristotle as an authority for establishing the principles, which should govern the 
controversy that this kind of understanding of truth will bring about.  He writes,  “The limits 
                                                
392 Warfield, Benjamin B.  Selected Shorter Writings.  Volume 2.  New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Co., 2001, pp. 213-18. 
393 Warfield does write on the implications of Jesus as the truth in an article entitled  ‘Incarnate Truth’ in 
Benjamin B. Warfield: Selected Shorter Writings, Volume II. Edited by John E Meeter.  P&R Publishing: New 
Jersey, 2001, pp 455-67. 
394 Ibid, p. 213. 
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of controversy for the saving truth of God must be sought then solely in objective 
considerations.”395  For Warfield, then, the truth of Christianity is able to be expressed in 
objective proclamation and Christians are able to convince the world of the truth of 
Christianity through reason and evidence.  That is why it is an apologetic religion.   
 
This objective proclamation is rooted in the One through whom all things are created.  In an 
article elaborating his understanding of Jesus being equated with the Truth, Warfield writes,  
 In like manner, that John has especially in mind here the highest  
manifestations of truth – our Lord’s trustworthiness in the great work of  
salvation – in no way empties the word of its lower connotations.  He is still the true 
Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world; and all the truth that is in the 
world comes from him and must seek its strength in him.396 
 
The fact that Christ is the truth entails three implications for Warfield.  First, Jesus Christ 
could never have uttered a statement which contained any admixture of error.  Second, no 
truth can be against the religion which Christ has founded.  And third, since Jesus Christ is 
the truth we are called to love the truth. 397 
 
That John has equated Jesus with the truth is not a subjective opinion, according to Warfield, 
but an “objective fact.”398  And this truth that John is thinking of is “chiefly Christ’s 
“faithfulness”.”399  This statement is as close as Warfield gets to an ‘Old Testament’ 
understanding of truth-as-faithfulness.  The question that needs to be raised is what does 
Warfield mean when he used the word ‘truth’ in contexts about Christ where the idea of 
faithfulness in less apparent?  It seems pretty obvious that Warfield moves from 
understanding truth as faithfulness to truth as propositional and objective correspondence.  
We see this in his first point given above.  He says that raising this point is almost an insult to 
                                                
395 Ibid, p. 218. 
396 Selected Shorter Writings, Volume II. p. 458. 
397 Ibid, 458-65 
398 Ibid, 457. 
399 Ibid, 458. 
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our intelligence because it seems so obvious.  What it means for Christ to be the truth is that 
any proposition given by Christ is inerrant.  It appears that all truth corresponds to the 
objective reality of the Son.  In discussing his second point he writes, 
 We must not, then, as Christians, assume an attitude of antagonism toward  
the truths of reason, or the truths of philosophy, or the truths of science, or  
the truths of history, or the truths of criticism.  As children of the light, we  
must be careful to keep ourselves open to every ray of light.  If it is light, its  
source must be sought in him who is the true Light; if it is truth, it belongs of  
right to him who is the plenitude of truth.400 
Ultimately, all ‘natural truths’ find their ground in the ‘supernatural truth’ of Christ and are 
commentaries of this truth that is Christ.401 
 
Carl F. H. Henry advances a similar understanding of objective truth although under what he 
sees as the mandate of Protestant Orthodoxy.  He writes,   
 When we speak of propositional revelation we are not, however,  
 referring to the obvious fact that the Bible, like other literature, is written  
 in sentences or logically formed statements.  The Bible depicts God’s very  
 revelation as meaningful, objectively intelligible disclosure.  We mean by  
 propositional revelation that God supernaturally communicated his revelation  
 to chosen spokesman in the express form of cognitive truths, and that the  
 inspired prophetic-apostolic proclamation reliably articulates these truths in  
 propositional revelation of the unchanging truth of God.402   
 
According to Henry, all of the truth of God can be understood as propositional.  He writes, 
“If God reveals himself intelligibly and truly, then that revelation takes propositional form.403  
He goes on to say, “regardless of the parables, allegories, emotive phrases and rhetorical 
questions used by these writers, their literary devices have a logical point which can be 
propositionally formulated and is objectively true or false.”  Henry is clearly presupposing a 
                                                
400 Ibid, 463. 
401 Because of his presupposition of correspondence theory Warfield has developed a Christological 
understanding of truth that has many implications for discussions on natural revelation and special revelation.  It 
is interesting to note here that in this article the only time the Spirit is mentioned is in the last paragraph in 
relation to mission.  In the next chapter I will try to draw out some of the deficiencies in pneumatology in both 
Warfield and Henry.  In some ways a strong doctrine of inerrancy is more liable to minimalistic pneumatology 
and I will seek to show why this is in the following chapter. 
402 Henry, Carl F.H.  God, Revelation and Authority, Volume II1.  Crossway Books: Wheaton, 1999, pp. 456-57. 
403 Ibid, p. 453. 
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correspondence theory of truth in his claims about the objective and propositional nature of 
truth. 
 
The problem with this type of understanding of truth as we have briefly discussed above is its 
inability to reconcile its claims with the personal and Christological/theological nature of 
truth found in Scripture generally.  This is the problem that neo-orthodox theologians like 
Karl Barth had with this understanding.  Also, Kevin Vanhoozer shows this understanding to 
be problematic.  He writes,  
 The assumption that truth pertains to statements has far-reaching  
 implications for the theological interpretation of Scripture.  At one extreme,  
 it is conducive to proof-texting- to abstracting individual statements of  
 Scripture out of their context and insisting that they nonetheless are true.   
 Second, the focus on statements makes it difficult to take seriously the  
 contention of the Fourth Gospel that Jesus is the truth (John 14:6).  Finally, to  
 reduce truth to what can be stated in individual assertions is to lose the  
 richness of truth’s expression through metaphors and through various forms of  
 literature…The issue is whether truth is always transparent to the indicative  
 mood of reason, or whether some truths can be mediated only via certain  
 forms of the poetic imagination (e.g., narrative, poetry, myth).404 
 
Are we to understand Truth as that which meets us in the person of Jesus Christ by the Spirit 
and then gets transformed into different propositions or whether we must presuppose some 
kind of propositional truth about the Son of God prior to an encounter with the Son of God?   
In other words, what is more basic: the person or the proposition?  For Barth and other neo-
orthodox theologians, it is the former; for Henry and inerrantists, it is the latter.   
 
It would seem that contemporary inerrantists are consistent with both Warfield and Henry in 
their understanding of the nature of truth.  In fact, it is now clear that it would be difficult for 
an inerrantist to completely deny all forms of correspondence theory because the propositions 
that are the revealed truths of Scripture are inerrant because they correspond to the objective 
                                                
404 Vanhoozer, Kevin J. ed. Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible.  Baker Books: Michigan, 
2005, p. 820. 
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reality known by God.  The doctrine of inerrancy would seem to be inextricably connected 
with this specific understanding of truth. 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we have laid out the basic philosophical theories of truth that are  
generally adopted by evangelicals.  We did this in order to set the stage for examining the 
way in which Scripture uses and seems to describe truth.  After examining the Scriptural 
content we concluded that none of the philosophical theories of truth able to fully encompass 
and speak about truth in the same manner as Scripture.  Because of this we moved forward 
look at some theological implications for developing a theory of truth which remained 
consistent with the Scriptural portrayal.  In the final section we related our discussion of truth 
back to the doctrine of inerrancy and showed how the doctrine of inerrancy is rooted in a 
very specific understanding of truth as correspondence.  We found that Warfield and Henry, 
as well as, contemporary inerrantists presuppose the propositional and objective nature of 
truth that correspondence demands and eluded to the claim that the doctrine of inerrancy 
depends on a view of truth that does not sufficiently account for the way in which Scripture 
uses and understands truth.   
 
In the following chapter we propose to examine the doctrine of inerrancy in light of its 
presuppositions regarding pneumatology.  In this chapter we will suggest that as a result of 
its reliance on a correspondence theory of truth, the doctrine of inerrancy is not able to 
maintain a pneumatology that is consistent with the ‘pouring out of the Spirit’ in the New 
Testament.  We will again look at Warfield and Henry as theological representatives of 
inerrancy and specifically look at their understanding of the Spirit and its connection with the 
authority of Scripture.  The goal of this chapter will be to show why inerrantists must root the 
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authority of Scripture in ‘properties’ of the text and not in the continuing work of the Holy 
Spirit.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 143 
~4~ 
 
Authority, Inerrancy and The Holy Spirit 
 
 
 
We are conscious too that great and grave confusion results from ceasing to maintain the 
total truth of the Bible whose authority one professes to acknowledge.  The result of taking 
this step is that the Bible which God gave loses its authority, and what has authority instead 
is a Bible reduced in content according to the demands of one’s critical reasonings and in 
principle reducible still further once one has started.  This means that at bottom independent 
reason now has authority, as opposed to Scriptural teaching.405 
 
 
We are now in a position to discuss what seems to be the root of the problem inerrantists 
have with other doctrines of Scripture.  According to the doctrine of inerrancy, the authority 
of Scripture is dependent upon the properties of an errorless text.  Inerrantists are all too 
often concerned that if Scripture cannot be said to be without error, or inerrant, then it cannot 
be authoritative for the Christian community (and in some cases the wider world in general).  
As we see in the quote of the Chicago Statement on Biblical Authority above, the Bible loses 
its authority if one does not maintain its complete and utter truth.  We saw in the previous 
chapter that the type of truth presupposed in this statement is rooted in a correspondence 
theory, which relegates truth to propositions.  If these propositions cannot be shown to be 
errorless then the Bible loses its authority.   
 
We saw in chapter two that a specific kind of foundationalism plays a crucial role in the 
theology of both B.B. Warfield and Carl F.H. Henry.  Because of a commitment to this 
foundationalism, both Warfield and Henry see inerrancy as the foundational property of the 
biblical text that supports its authority.  Using a ‘foundational’ metaphor, we might say that 
biblical authority cannot be built on any other foundation but an errorless original autograph.   
 
                                                
405 ‘The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy’ as cited in God Has Spoken by J. I. Packer.  Hodder and 
Stoughton: London, 1979, p. 154-55. 
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Warfield and Henry also presuppose different types of apologetics.  As we saw in chapter 
two Warfield seems to be comfortable with a certain kind of evidentialism406 while Henry is 
confident in reason and its ability to lead to faith.  These apologetic commitments combined 
with a foundationalism that depends on a doctrine of inerrant autographs force both Warfield 
and Henry to interpret the Reformed doctrine of the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti in a 
specific way.   
 
In this chapter we will discuss the relationship between the internal testimony of the Holy 
Spirit and the authority of Scripture in the thought of both Warfield and Henry.  Once we 
have understood this dynamic in these theologians, we will then turn to Calvin to see if the 
understanding which Warfield and Henry have about the interaction between the Holy Spirit 
and the authority of Scripture is similar to or different from Calvin’s thought.  The goal being 
to show that by presupposing certain philosophical assumptions (see chapter two) the 
doctrine of inerrancy is forced to place its understanding of authority not in the ‘hands’ of the 
third person of the Trinity but in a static (some might even say stagnant) property of the text 
of Scripture.  When this is done, the doctrine of inerrancy limits the continuing work of the 
Holy Spirit and separates itself from the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit which 
is crucial in Reformed theology.407   
 
Setting the Stage 
 
Before discussing the particular thought of Warfield and Henry on the Spirit an historical 
note needs mentioning.  There was a debate which took place between the Reformers and the 
radical Reformers on the specific relationship between Word and Spirit.  According to 
                                                
406 Evans, C Stephen.  The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: the Incarnational Narrative as History.  
Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996, p. 28. 
407 There are different traditions within Reformed thought.  For instance, Warfield’s interpretation of Calvin 
may represent a particular Reformed tradition that is different to Kuyper’s interpretation of Calvin.  When using 
the phrase ‘Reformed theology’ above, I mean a particular tradition which is informed by both Calvin and 
Kuyper. 
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Gordon Rupp the primary concern regarding the Holy Spirit centered around a particularly 
sharp dichotomy maintained by the Radical Reformers (i.e., Carlstadt, Müntzer and Denck) 
between the “inner” and “outer” Word.408   Rupp writes,   
 We have to consider how this close alliance of Word and Spirit  
became pressed by controversy and misunderstanding into an antithesis,  
until on the one side the Word approaches equation with “pure doctrine”  
and the Spirit becomes the cover for a human subjectivism.409 
 
Rupp argues that the dichotomy between an “inner” and “outer” word was not a particularly 
sharp dichotomy for the Reformers and that for Luther, Zwingli and the Strassburg 
theologians both parts were needed to expound one doctrine of Scripture.410  However, Rupp 
writes,  
 …the pressure of controversy led the radicals to stress more and more  
an inward word, the direct action of the Holy Ghost, or of the eternal  
Logos, upon the “ground of the soul,” and to oppose it sharply to the  
Biblicism of the so-called “Scribes of Wittenberg.”411 
 
According to Rupp, these early Radical Reformers did not believe that the Scriptures were 
univocally the Word of God.  They were a witness validated by the “inner” Word of the Holy 
Spirit.412  According to Rupp’s reading of Müntzer, Luther and the other Wittenberg 
theologians could only account for a fides historica because the external or “outer” word can 
only provide this kind of faith.   
 
The early Radical Reformers saw the need for the internal working of the Holy Spirit prior to 
any understanding of scriptural authority or authenticity.  A possible connection with 
Platonism can be made here.  By devaluing the ‘letter’ or the materiality of the “outer” word, 
                                                
408 This is a particular historical claim made by Rupp.  Whether Rupp is right to make this specific claim about 
the particular Radical Reformers he mentions will not be evaluated here.  For our purposes the fact that the 
dichotomy between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ word existed at the time is more relevant Rupp’s claim regarding who 
developed it.   
409 Rupp, Gordon.  ‘Word and Spirit in the first Years of the Reformation’ in Archiv für 
Reformationsgeschichte.  Volume 49, 1958, Issue 1/2, p. 13. 
410 Ibid, p. 22 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid, p. 23 
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the early Radical Reformers sought refuge in an experience of faith created by the “inner” 
word by which they meant the work of the Spirit within man.  Hans Denck, one of these 
Radical Reformers gives an example which makes the dichotomy clear, 
 But to say, Scripture is to be rated so high, because through it a man  
comes to the knowledge of God?  I answer, if somebody gave you a letter,  
and promised you great good in it, and you did not know how great and good  
he was… it would be folly to rely simply on that letter.  But if he really is  
what that letter says he is even then you don’t rely on the letter until you  
know whether he is really like this.  If you find he is really good and rich,  
then you say, “Ah Lord let me be your servant. I am not worrying about the  
letter.  I want no other reward than to be your servant and have you as my  
Lord.”  If a man is not in God’s house, the letter is no use to him.  If he is,  
he needs no writing to tell him God is good.413 
 
Luther was very opposed to this kind of thinking.  He reacted against this thought by saying 
that the Spirit works through the “outer” word, i.e., the preached Word of God, Baptism, 
etc.414  Rupp writes, “Thus, for Luther, Word and Spirit were not to be parted asunder, and 
we must not exaggerate the extent to which discussion of the relation between the “Outer” 
and “Inner Word” broke that Biblical connection.”415  He concludes his article by saying that 
only with Calvin are we given a full blown attempt to restore a balance between the 
“subjective” or “inner” word and the “objective” or “outer” word.416   
 
The question could be raised at this point concerning why any of this is important for a 
discussion of inerrancy.  This debate gives an example of an extreme dichotomy between 
Word and Spirit which ended in a devaluation by the Radical Reformers of the Spirit’s 
connection with the “outer” word.  What we must ask is whether there is a tendency in the 
doctrine of inerrancy for the pendulum to swing in the opposite direction; a direction which 
would magnify the “outer” word at the expense of the “inner” word.  We will examine the 
thought of both Warfield and Henry in this light before turning to Calvin to see if Rupp is 
                                                
413 Cited in  ‘Word and Spirit in the first Years of the Reformation’ by Gordon Rupp, p. 23. 
414 WA 18.137.5  Luther’s work cited in Rupp, p. 24. 
415 Rupp, 25. 
416 See section on Calvin below. 
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correct in concluding that Calvin restores the Balance between the “objective” word of 
Scripture and the  “subjective” word of the Spirit.   
 
Gary D. Badcock writes, 
 If the doctrine of the deity of the Spirit is the central concern of the fathers  
of the fourth century, and if the filioque preoccupies medieval  
pneumatologists, then the intrinsic connection of the work of the Spirit in  
the church with the doctrine of the Word of God as written and preached  
constitutes the distinctive emphasis of the pneumatology of the Reformation.417 
 
Badcock’s claim helps us to know where we ought to start looking for a discussion of the 
work and role of the Spirit in Warfield’s theology.  If Badcock is correct then we would 
expect to find Warfield’s discussion of the Holy Spirit connected to his doctrine of Scripture, 
and this is in fact the case.  Warfield’s understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit is largely 
embedded in his discussion of inspiration.418  The other times he spends talking about the 
work of the Holy Spirit is under the guise of his interpretation of Calvin’s thought and in his 
introduction to Kuyper’s work.  Warfield’s reading of John Calvin largely influenced his 
understanding of the Holy Spirit’s work.419  Because of this we will need to try and extract 
his own thought from his writings on two subjects: namely, the work of the Sprit in inspiring 
the biblical writers, and his interpretation of Calvin.  By looking at these sources we should 
be able to understand what his own position is regarding the internal testimony of the Holy 
Spirit.  Once we have done this then we will be able to find out whether the internal 
testimony of the Holy Spirit has any role to play regarding the authority of Scripture.   
 
                                                
417 Badcock, Gary D.  Light of Truth & Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit.  Eerdmans Publishing 
House: Grand Rapids, 1997, p. 86. 
418 Warfield makes a comment in his introduction to Kuyper’s work On the Holy Spirit that the early church was 
mostly concerned about the Spirit’s function “as inspirer of the prophets and apostles” and that it was not until 
Calvin that we were given a full treatment on the work of the Holy Spirit.  See Warfield, Benjamin B.  Selected 
Shorter Writings: Volume One.  Edited by John E. Meeter. P&R Press: New Jersey, 2001, pp 203-19. 
419 In fact, Warfield writes in his article ‘Calvin the Theologian’ that there have been complaints about Calvin’s 
Institutes being too subjective and that this has had the effect of him being constituted as “pre-eminently the 
theologian of the Holy Spirit.”   See: http://homepage.mac.com/shanerosenthal/reformationink/bbwcalvin1.htm 
Accessed 13/9/06 
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Another theologian’s writings that Warfield was aware of were those of his contemporary 
Abraham Kuyper.  In fact, Warfield composed the introduction for Kuyper’s work on the 
Holy Spirit.  In the introduction Warfield calls Kuyper “one of our own prophets.”420 
Warfield goes on to claim that a systematic treatise on the function of the Holy Spirit was 
only first produced during the Reformation by John Calvin and that Kuyper’s work is not a 
novelty amongst English-speaking churches but “a specially finely conceived and executed 
presentation of a topic on which we are all thinking.”421  Warfield writes a very favourable 
introduction to Kuyper’s work.  Furthermore, Kuyper and Warfield believed they were 
continuing the thought of Calvin with regard to the authority and work of the Holy Spirit and 
His influence on the church’s doctrine of Scripture, and yet they offer a remarkably different 
understanding of this doctrine.  It is my contention that although Warfield saw himself as 
continuing a Reformed doctrine of Scripture he drastically changed the work of the Spirit 
which consequently forces him to construct a doctrine of scripture that is different from 
Kuyper and ultimately inconsistent with Calvin’s thought. 
 
Kuyper saw man’s need for Scripture as being rooted in the Fall.  “But so long as the Church 
is on earth, face-to-face communion withheld, and our hearts accessible only by the avenues 
of this imperfect existence, Scripture must remain the indispensable instrument by which the 
Triune God prepares men’s souls for higher glory.”422  However, Scripture is not given 
directly from heaven.  Rather, the Holy Spirit inspires the writers of Scripture to translate 
divine thoughts into the “life of this world.”423  This does not mean, according to Kuyper, 
that the Holy Spirit dictates or commands every chapter of every verse to be written.  What 
Kuyper wants to affirm is that the end result is exactly what God wanted it to be.  He writes, 
                                                
420 Kuyper, Abraham.  The Work of the Holy Spirit.  WM.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co: Grand Rapids, 1956, p. 
xxvi. 
421 Ibid, xxix. 
422 Ibid, 60. 
423 Ibid, 62. 
 149 
“But “inspiration” is the name of that all-comprehensive operation of the Holy Spirit 
whereby He has bestowed on the Church a complete and infallible Scripture.  We call this 
operation all-comprehensive, for it was organic, not mechanical.”424  He continues to say, 
“But whether He dictates directly, as in the Revelation of St. John, or governs the writing 
indirectly, as with historians and evangelists, the result is the same: the product is such in 
form and content as the Holy Spirit designed, an infallible document for the Church of 
God.”425  The writers of Scripture may have been directed by the Holy Spirit at times 
consciously and at other times unconsciously but the important thing for Kuyper is that the 
end result is exactly what the Holy Spirit intended.426   
 
At this point there does not seem to be much difference in the thought of Kuyper and 
Warfield.  His understanding of inspiration is similar to Warfield’s doctrine of concursus (see 
chapter 1 above) in that both Warfield and Kuyper are concerned to deny any type of 
mechanical understanding of divine inspiration.  Warfield would probably be very 
comfortable with the claims Kuyper has made thus far.  But then Kuyper goes in a direction 
that certainly Warfield will not follow.  Kuyper says that any objectionable content in 
Scripture was actually put there by the Spirit in order to allow faith.   
 That the Scriptures themselves present a number of objections and in  
many aspects do not make the impression of absolute inspiration does  
not militate against the other fact that all this spiritual labour was controlled  
and directed by the Holy Spirit.  For the Scripture had to be constructed so  
as to leave room for the exercise of faith.427 
 
                                                
424 Ibid, 76. 
425 Ibid, 77. 
426 Kuyper does talk about the inner and outer work of the Holy Spirit.  However, this does not seem to be 
connected with the dichotomy of inner and outer word mentioned by Rupp above.  Kuyper uses this distinction 
to designate the different ways in which the Holy Spirit inspired the Old Testament and the New Testament 
writers.  He sees a need to distinguish the work of the Holy Spirit with the Old Testament writers and their New 
Testament counterparts.  This is primarily because of the Pentecost event and Jesus’ claim in John 16:7 that the 
Holy Spirit could not be sent until he had ascended. 
427 Ibid, 78. 
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This is where Kuyper and Warfield begin to disagree and where their doctrines of Scripture 
cease to resemble each other.  
 
Kuyper does not go into detail about what these ‘objections’ might be.  The important thing 
to notice is that he does not have a notion of apologetics that requires he put himself in a 
position of appealing to original autographs that do not have ‘objections.’  For Kuyper, there 
is no authority of Scripture without the Holy Spirit and there is no recognition of this 
authority without faith.  In a crucial passage Kuyper proclaims,  
 To have faith in the Word, Scripture must not grasp us in our  
critical thought, but in the life of the soul.  To believe in the Scripture  
is an act of life of which thou, O lifeless man! are not capable, except  
the Quickener, the Holy Ghost, enable thee.  He that caused Holy Scripture  
to be written is the same that must teach thee to read it.  Without Him  
this product of divine art can not affect thee.  Hence we believe… that  
these stumbling-blocks were introduced that it might be impossible for us  
to lay hold of its content with mere intellectual grasp, without the exercise  
of faith.428 
 
This particular understanding of the relationship between authority, faith and the Holy Spirit 
influences Kuyper’s later thought on the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti.  As a result 
the Spirit plays a vital role in the authority of Scripture.  For Kuyper the Spirit must ‘seal the 
Word.’  By this he means that the Holy Spirit “creates in the hearts of believers the firm and 
lasting conviction concerning the divine and absolute authority of the Word of God.”429  He 
writes further,  
 We mention the sealing of the Word first, for without faith in its  
divine authority it can not be God’s Word to us. The question is: How do  
we come in real contact and fellowship with the Holy Scripture, which, as  
a mere external object, lies before us?  We are told that it is the Word of  
 God; but how can this become our own firm conviction?  It can never be  
obtained by investigation.  In fact, it ought to be acknowledged that the  
more one investigates the Word the more he loses his simple and childlike  
faith in it.430 
 
                                                
428 Ibid. 
429 Ibid, 190. 
430 Ibid, 191. 
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Kuyper does not appeal to the in internal properties of the Scriptural text in order to establish 
its authority, i.e., errorlessness.  He asserts that the authority of Scripture relies solely on the 
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit who provides the faith that Scripture is authoritative.  
There is no way to convince an unbeliever of the authority of Scripture and to do so would be 
like casting the pearls of Scripture before swine.  This also means that one’s conviction about 
the authority of Scripture does not rely on his or her own intellectual ability but the Spirit is 
able to seal this conviction upon the heart of anyone who believes.  “And thus God’s elect 
obtain a firm assurance concerning the Word of God that nothing can shake, of which no 
learning can rob them.”431 
 
Warfield is certainly going to advocate a very different position.  This is probably because, as 
Mark Noll writes, “Warfield held that history, reason, and objective science could 
demonstrate the validity of Scripture as divine revelation.”432  Kuyper would never have 
suggested such an idea.  He placed little emphasis on apologetics (especially the kind which 
influenced Warfield).  Warfield, however, is very influenced by his particular understanding 
of the value of apologetics and we shall see in the pages that follow just how much this 
aspect of his thought influences his understanding of the work of the Spirit in relation to a 
doctrine of Scripture.    
 
 
Warfield and the Holy Spirit 
Warfield never wrote a treatise as such on the Holy Spirit and so it can be quite difficult to 
determine what Warfield does think about doctrines like the internal testimony of the Spirit.  
Warfield is explicit about the role of the Spirit in the production of Scripture and where he 
                                                
431 Ibid, 193. 
432 Noll, Mark. ed. The Princeton Theology 1812-1921.  Baker Academic Publishing Co: Grand Rapids, 2001, 
p. 41. 
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believes the authority of Scripture is derived.  However, when it comes to talking about the 
internal testimony of the Spirit we have to extract what Warfield thinks out of his 
representation of Calvin on the matter.  We could approach this in two ways: one, we could 
look at what Warfield says explicitly about the Holy Spirit and His relationship to the text of 
Scripture and then move on to His internal testimony in the believer; or two, we could look at 
Warfield’s reading of Calvin on this matter and then see how his understanding of Calvin 
influences his own explicit statements about the work of the Holy Spirit.  This latter approach 
would seem more beneficial to our purposes here because we will be able to discover why 
Warfield does not spend any significant amount of time developing the doctrine of the 
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in relationship to the authority of Scripture.  Once we 
have uncovered his interpretation of Calvin on this matter then we will be in a position to 
establish Warfield’s own thought on the role of the Spirit in establishing the authority of 
Scripture.  
 
According to Warfield433 Calvin’s doctrine of the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti was 
intimately connected with what Calvin calls “true faith.”  Calvin is clear that objective proofs 
cannot produce this “true faith,” but only by the internal working of the Holy Spirit is 
someone given “true faith.”  Warfield writes, 
 But objective proofs – whether the conclusive testimony of witnesses,  
or the overwhelming evidence of rational considerations – be they  
never [sic] so cogent, he does not consider of themselves capable of  
producing “true faith.”  And it is “true faith,” we repeat, that Calvin has  
in mind in his doctrine of the testimonium Spiritus Sancti.434 
 
                                                
433 For the rest of this section it should be assumed by the reader that anything mentioned about Calvin is given 
from Warfield’s perspective.  There will certainly be other ways of reading Calvin but this section will be 
focused only on how Warfield reads Calvin.  With this said, Warfield makes a crucial step here that is similar to 
what Henry does.  He says that the Holy Spirit confirms the revelation of Scripture.  Henry talks about the Holy 
Spirit assuring believers of Scripture.  Both seem to misunderstand how vital the role of the Holy Spirit is in 
Calvin’s thought.  For more on Calvin see below.   
434 Warfield, Benjamin B.  The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield: Volume V.  Baker Books: Grand Rapids, 2003, 
p. 74. 
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It is important to see the stress that Warfield finds in Calvin between the internal testimony 
of the Spirit and truth faith of the believer.  As a result of this connection, Warfield says that 
it seemed utterly unimportant to Calvin that someone could be convinced by stressing some 
type of rational evidence to them.  “No conclusions based on “reasoning” or “proofs” or 
founded on human judgment can compare in clearness or force with such a conviction, which 
is instinctive and immediate, and finds its ultimate ground and sanction in the Holy Spirit 
who has wrought in the heart this spiritual sense which so functions in recognizing the divine 
quality of Scripture.”435  
 
Having said this Warfield is quick to ask the question of whether the Holy Spirit’s internal 
testimony is to be conceived of as a new revelation, some kind of ungrounded faith or a 
grounded faith.  And if it is to be conceived of as grounded faith what is it grounded in?436  If 
the testimony is not grounded in something then the result would seem to be a blind faith and 
Warfield is concerned that Calvin has been wrongly interpreted as advocating this position.  
He is quick to show that Calvin’s doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit produces a 
faith grounded in evidence.  “It is not to supersede nor yet to supplement these recorded 
revelations that the testimony of the Spirit is given us, he insists, but to confirm them (I. ix. 
3).”437  
 
According to Warfield, Calvin would never have envisioned an understanding of the Spirit 
which produced a blind faith because Calvin held scientific proof in high regard.  For 
instance, Calvin thought that both the Canon and the integrity of the transmission of 
Scripture could be proved on historical-critical grounds.438   
                                                
435 Ibid, 78. 
436 Ibid, 80. 
437 Ibid, 80. 
438 Ibid, 92. 
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However, what cannot be proved by science is the divinity of Scripture.  This aspect of 
Scripture is wholly proved by the internal testimony of the Spirit. For Calvin, Word and 
Spirit are unable to be separated.  “Only in the conjunction of the two can an effective 
revelation be made to the sin-darkened mind of man.  The Word supplies the objective factor; 
the Spirit the subjective factor; and only in the union of the objective and subjective factors is 
the result accomplished.”439 
 
These “objective” factors Warfield labels indicia.  Warfield asks, 
 Are we to understand him [Calvin] as teaching that the Holy Spirit by His  
almighty power creates, in the souls of those whom God has set upon  
to bring to a knowledge of Him, an entirely ungrounded faith in the divinity  
of Scriptures and the truth of their contents, so that the soul embraces them  
and their contents with firm confidence as a revelation from God wholly apart  
from and in the absence of all indicia of their divinity or of the truth of their  
contents?440   
 
Warfield says, No.  The Holy Spirit cannot produce assurance in the believer about the 
authority of Scripture without the indicia.  However, he also states that the indicia are wholly 
insufficient on their own to convince us of the divinity of Scripture but it is by them that the 
Spirit brings us to this conviction.441  He writes,  
 But what about the indicia in conjunction with the testimony of the Spirit?   
It would seem to be evident that, on Calvin’s ground, they would have their  
full part to play here, and that we must say that, when the soul is renewed by  
the Holy Spirit to a sense for the divinity of Scripture, it is through the indicia  
of that divinity that it is brought into its proper confidence in the divinity of  
Scripture.442   
 
                                                
439 Ibid, 83. 
440 Ibid, 84. 
441 One may ask whether there is room in Warfield’s own thought for this position to exist.  Here he seems to be 
commenting specifically on Calvin’s understanding.  Turretin’s influence on Warfield may shed some light on 
this subject.  According to William Placher, Turretin saw “no need for the Spirit’s illumination to establish 
scripture’s authority.”  See The Domestication of Transcendence by William C. Placher.  Westminster John 
Knox Press: Kentucky, 1996, p. 169. 
442 Ibid, 87. 
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However, Warfield does mention that Calvin does not speak explicitly concerning what role, 
if any, the indicia play in the forming of faith under the work of the Spirit.443  They seem 
only to play a role in the conviction of the divinity of Scripture for a believer.   
 
Calvin can be seen to stress three main ideas according to Warfield.  First,  the Holy Spirit 
must be involved in a person’s life before that person can be convinced of the divinity of 
Scripture.  Second, the Holy Spirit uses the objective evidence in Scripture in His testimony 
to the believer.  Third, Word and Spirit are unable to be separated in Calvin and both are 
needed to bring about “true faith.” 
 
With these points establish we are now in a position to examine the specific things Warfield 
says about the authority of Scripture and how it may relate to the internal testimony of the 
Holy Spirit.  It is clear that Warfield sees a tension in Calvin between what he calls the 
objective indicia of Scripture and the subjective testimony of the Spirit.  We must remind 
ourselves here of the dichotomy of the inner and outer Word discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter.  We seem to be having glimpses of a similar dichotomy in Warfield’s talk about 
the objective indicia and the subjective testimony.   
 
It should become very apparent in our discussion below that Warfield spends a lot of time 
talking about the ‘objective’ qualities of Scripture that would make it authoritative.  This 
should not come as a surprise to us and the fact that he does this means that he remains 
consistent with what we would expect from him.  There is little doubt about the role that 
evidentialism in particular and apologetics in general plays in Warfield’s theology.  Perhaps a 
question that we must try to answer is how much did his understanding of Calvin’s doctrine 
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 156 
of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit play a part in his doctrine of Scripture?  It may be 
possible to argue that Warfield presupposed this ‘subjective’ role of the Spirit and as a result 
spent the majority of his intellectual efforts elaborating the role of the ‘objective’ indicia of 
Scripture and their connection to Scripture’s authority.   
 
To try to specify what percentage of Warfield’s thought was reliant on or presupposed the 
internal testimony of the Spirit and what percentage was reliant on the objective ‘proofs’ of 
Scripture’s authority is an impossible task.  What we can do is give the reader a taste of how 
Warfield develops his own understanding of Scriptural authority and see if it can be 
compatible with his own understanding of Calvin’s doctrine.   
 
It was Warfield’s desire to produce an understanding of Scriptural authority which was based 
on how the Apostles and even Christ himself viewed the Scriptures.  In the articles produced 
in, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, he sets out on such a task.  In what is clearly a 
summary of his work written as an introduction for The Independent Warfield writes, 
 Our Lord and his apostles looked upon the entire truthfulness and  
utter trustworthiness of that body of writings which they called “Scripture,”  
as so fully guaranteed by the inspiration of God, that they could appeal to  
them confidently in all their statements of whatever kind as absolutely true;  
adduce their deliverances on whatever subject with a simple “it is written,”  
as the end of all strife; and treat them generally in a manner which clearly  
exhibits that in their view “Scripture says” was equivalent to “God says.”444   
 
For Warfield there appear to be two types of indicia, internal and external.  An extensive 
amount of work was done to elaborate on the specifics of each.  For instance, Warfield wrote 
on both the church’s doctrine of inspiration (external indicia) and Scripture’s doctrine of 
inspiration (internal indicia).  He writes,  
 The more we contemplate this church-doctrine, the more pressing the  
 questions of what account we are to give of it, - its origin and persistence.  
                                                
444 Warfield, Benjamin B.  Selected Shorter Writings: Volume II.  P&R Press: New Jersey, 2001, p. 580. 
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How shall we account for the immediate adoption of so developed a doctrine  
of inspiration in the very infancy of the church, and for the tenacious hold  
which the church has kept upon it through so many ages? The account is  
simple enough, and capable of inclusion in a single sentence: this is the  
doctrine of inspiration which was held by the writers of the New Testament  
and by Jesus as reported in the Gospels.445   
 
According to Warfield, ultimately the reason why the church has accepted the Scriptural 
account of inspiration, as he has presented it, is because of its belief in the trustworthiness of 
Scripture.  He says that the church has always had an “instinctive feeling” that the 
trustworthiness of Scripture is foundational to trust in Christian doctrine.446  The reason why 
Scripture is trustworthy is because of the particular influence the Holy Spirit had on its 
writers.447  In order to show this trustworthiness Warfield develops a coherent way of 
understanding the inspiration of Scripture which allows for the authors to remain fully human 
while writing and at the same time the product of this work is literally God’s Word.   
 
Warfield must stress the divinity of Scripture because it is only authoritative if is a divine 
product.  In fact, it only can be wholly trustworthy if it is from God and of God. 
 Its authority rests on its divinity and its divinity expresses itself in  
its trustworthiness; and the New Testament writers in all their use of it  
treat it as what they declare it to be – a God-breathed document, which,  
because God-breathed, is through and through trustworthy in all its  
assertions, authoritative in all its declarations, and down to its last particular,  
the very word of God, His “oracles.”448  
 
It is clear that Warfield sees an intrinsic connection between divinity, authority and 
trustworthiness.  The writers of the New Testament treated the Scriptures, according to 
Warfield, as if they had divine authority and believed that what is written in the Scriptures 
                                                
445 Ibid, 114. 
446 Ibid, 121. 
447 There is little emphasis on the Spirit’s action towards the reader of the text of Scripture.  This may be 
because both Warfield and Henry see Scripture having a literal sense.  When Scripture is viewed in a strictly 
literal way then the tendency is to see the Spirit as applying the literal sense of Scripture to the reader but not 
interpreting it. I am grateful to Dr. Mark Elliot for pointing this out to me.     
448 Ibid, 150. 
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was the same as God speaking to them directly.  For the writers of the New Testament and 
for Jesus himself, the Scriptures were absolutely trustworthy.449 
 
 He is careful here not to fall into a dictation-theory of inspiration, however.  Warfield was 
not satisfied with the dictation-theory because he says it is not intimate enough.  The Holy 
Spirit’s work was much more intimate than the theory of dictation would allow.   
Scripture is the produce of man, but only of man speaking from God  
and under such control of the Holy Spirit as that in their speaking they  
are “borne” by Him.  This conception obviously is that the Scriptures  
have been given by the instrumentality of men; and this conception finds  
repeated incidental expression throughout the New Testament.”450   
 
So we see that the Spirit acted in such a way that the writings that were produced were 
exactly the product He wanted.   
  
Because of this Warfield is able to conclude,    
 Thus these books become not merely the word of godly men, but the  
 immediate word of God Himself, speaking directly as such to the minds  
and hearts of every reader.  The value of “inspiration” emerges, thus, as  
twofold.  It gives to the books written under its “bearing” a quality which  
is truly superhuman; a trustworthiness, an authority, a searchingness, a  
profundity, a profitableness which is altogether Divine.  And it speaks this  
Divine word immediately to each reader’s heart and conscience; so that he  
does not require to make his way to God, painfully, perhaps even uncertainly,  
through the words of His servants, the human instruments in writing the  
Scriptures, but can listen directly to the Divine voice itself speaking  
immediately in the Scriptural word to him.451  
 
This is where we see a potential problem in Warfield’s account and it seems to have a direct 
influence on his understanding of the internal testimony of the Spirit.  Warfield’s insistence 
                                                
449 A question immediately arises as to why the apostles thought that these writings were authoritative and 
trustworthy.  They did not seem to examine them to see if they proved to be inspired.  One might suggest that 
they were persuaded by the working of the Holy Spirit in their lives that the text ought to have authority for 
them.  Warfield is right that both the Apostles and the Lord Jesus himself saw the Scriptures as authoritative but 
held this conviction for different reasons than he offers his readers.  The very fact that one would suggest that 
we need evidence to prove the Bible’s authority seems foreign to any notion that the writer’s might have had.   
 
450 Ibid, 151. 
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on the immediate word in Scripture allows him to focus on the ‘external’ factors which 
influence the divine authority of Scripture at the expense of any contemporary work of the 
Holy Spirit.  He seems to completely bypass the role the Spirit plays in convicting the 
believer’s heart of the divinity and authority of Scripture.  
 
There is no doubt that he was aware of Calvin’s stress on the internal testimony of the Holy 
Spirit in leading man to believe in the divine trustworthiness of Scripture.  And although 
Warfield believed that the Holy Spirit did this though the indicia of Scripture, in his writing 
he seems to focus on the indicia at the expense of the internal testimony of the Spirit.452 This 
may be because of his commitment to apologetics and his reliance on evidentialism (or, 
perhaps the influence of Turretin’s theology; see note 401 above), but nevertheless, by 
stressing the evidences of Scripture’s divinity in order to establish authority, he relegates the 
continuing work of the Holy Spirit to the margins.  And it is a very easy step from this to 
making the inerrancy of Scripture the key for belief in its authority and he takes this step at 
the end of his article on ‘The Biblical Idea of Inspiration.’  He writes, 
 …so in the case of the production of Scripture by the conjoint action of  
human and Divine factors, the human factors have acted as human factors,  
and have left their mark on the product as such, and yet cannot have fallen  
into that error which we say it is human to fall into, because they have not  
acted apart from the Divine factors, by themselves, but only under their  
unerring guidance.453 (my italics) 
 
Inerrancy becomes the indicium that gives evidence of the divinity of Scripture.  As we have 
seen, Warfield ties any notion of authority directly to the divinity of Scripture.  Therefore, if 
we attack the inerrancy of Scripture we attack the very authority of Scripture itself.   
 
                                                
452 I am aware that it might be argued in response to this that Warfield obviously understood Calvin’s position 
and interpreted him correctly.  Furthermore, we should assume that he always has in his mind the place for the 
internal testimony of the Spirit even if he does not elaborate it in writing.  But I suppose this is partly my point.  
He does not show that the Spirit must be contemporarily involved in the process by which a person comes to 
trust in the authority of Scripture.   
453 Ibid, 163. 
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Warfield spends the majority of his writing on Scripture developing the ‘external’ proofs by 
which someone may be convinced of the authority of the text.  He is certainly aware of 
Calvin’s doctrine of the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti.  In fact, he spends sixty pages 
developing the concept and yet spends little time in his other writings showing how he 
believes this doctrine relates to the authority of Scripture.  As we have seen in previous 
chapters, Warfield spent a lot of time focusing on evidence which may have led him to 
downplay the importance of the testimony of the Holy Spirit which he found in Calvin.  To 
put it another way, he spends a lot of time writing on the ‘outer’ word and virtually no time 
on the ‘inner’ word.454  If someone were only to read his writings on the inspiration and 
authority of Scripture they would have no idea whether or not he even knew about Calvin’s 
thought on the internal testimony of the Spirit.  It seems fair to suggest that however much 
Warfield believed and maintained a Reformed perspective on the internal testimony of the 
Spirit in his own life it does not play a large role in his writings on the authority of Scripture.   
 
Another contributor and defender of the doctrine of inerrancy whose thought we have looked 
at in previous chapters is Carl F. H. Henry.  Because of his role in framing the contemporary 
thought on inerrancy it will be useful to examine his understanding of the Work of the Holy 
Spirit and to see if he differs at all from what we have seen of Warfield and Kuyper above.   
 
Carl F.H. Henry and the Holy Spirit 
 
We have seen in a previous chapter of this thesis that Henry held very strongly to a rational 
understanding of revelation.  We noted that according to Henry any person of normal rational 
capabilities could see the truth of the Christian revelation in Scripture.  This conviction 
comes from a specific scientific understanding of revelation, which in turn allows Henry to 
                                                
454 As far as I can tell Warfield does not use these words but they represent a dichotomy that would not be 
inappropriate to his work. 
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develop a distinctively rational apologetic founded upon a written revelation which includes 
inerrant properties. 
 
When we examine Henry’s writing on the contemporary work of the Holy Spirit and his 
continued testimony to mankind of the validity of Scripture we find little mentioned.  In a 
chapter entitled, ‘The Ministry of the Holy Spirit’ where Henry spends his most sustained 
time discussing the current activities of the Spirit there is only one sentence in the entire 
chapter that seems to allude to Calvin’s doctrine of the internal testimony.  Henry comments,  
“The Spirit assures us through the written Word itself that Scripture is indeed the revelatory 
Word of God (Eph. 6:17; Heb 4:12).”455  The rest of the chapter is weighed down by a 
discussion of the modern Pentecostal movement in the US and the different arguments for 
and against its understanding of glossolalia.   
 
Henry is committed to revelation being primarily propositional in nature.  As a result there is 
univocity between Scriptural revelation and God.456  Carl R. Trueman writes, “On the issue 
of propositionalism, Henry is no doubt at his most vulnerable when arguing for the univocity 
                                                
455 Henry, Carl F.H.  God, Revelation and Authority, Volume VI.  Crossway Books: Wheaton, 1999, p. 386. 
456 In The Domestication of Transcendence, William Placher argues that univocity is a shift that modern 
theology makes in response to different pressures caused by modern ways of thinking.  Placher argues that 
unlike Aquinas and the Reformers, modern theologians needed to speak of God in a concrete and authoritative 
way and so moved away from the basic principle of God’s mysteriousness that Aquinas and the Reformers held 
in common.  For these thinkers, because God is transcendent our language about him can only be analogous.  
According to Placher, key modern theologians understood analogous language as not being strong enough to 
handle the challenges posed to theology at the time.  He traces this shift from Cardinal Cajetan and Fransisco 
Suárez to Jacob Martini, Johannes Andreas Quenstedt and Francis Turretin.  One of the interesting points about 
Placher’s claim is the connection to Francis Turrentin.  If Placher interprets Turretin’s Institutes correctly and 
Turretin is following Suárez and making a subtle move away from analogy toward univocity, then there are 
many implications that follow.  As was seen in a previous chapter, there is most definitely a connection between 
Warfield and Turretin with regard to common sense philosophy.  An entire thesis could focus on whether a 
specific understanding of the univocity of language in Turretin influences Warfield’s development of inerrancy.  
Could there be a strong connection between univocity and inerrancy?  Placher is not concerned with this 
question but his charge against Turretin makes it an appropriate question to ask.  For further information see: 
Placher, William C.  The Domestication of Transcendence.  Westminster John Knox Press: Kentucky, 1996. 
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of human language about God.”457  According to Trueman, Henry’s univocal thinking was 
passed down from his mentor Gordon H. Clark.  Alan Padgett agrees and writes, 
 Henry’s greatest weakness is an undefended reliance on the philosophy 
  of Gordon H. Clark.  This has led to a rationalistic theology, where logic  
 is over-valued and propositions alone are considered to be true.  Even faith  
 in Christ becomes a “kind of literal shorthand” for belief in propositions  
 (3:438).  The Person of the Logos is reduced to an impersonal, abstract  
 system.”458 
 
Because of the univocal relation between the propositional revelation of Scripture and God, 
Henry only needs the Spirit to assure believers of Scripture’s authority.459  Henry’s doctrine 
of Scripture does not require a strong contemporary work of the Holy Spirit to maintain its 
authority.460  That is why we find Henry focusing on the Spirit’s past work of inspiration and 
writing comparatively little on the whether the Spirit has a role to play in the Church’s 
contemporary belief in Scriptural authority.   
 
Henry is very wary of the neo-orthodox account of authority in functional terms.  He says 
that according to David H. Kelsey, Barth 
 becomes a watershed for [sic], since he understands “scriptural authority”  
 in functional terms, Kelsey comments that in Barth’s view “the texts  
 are authoritative not in virtue of any inherent property they may have,  
 such as being inspired or inerrant, but in virtue of a function they fill in  
 the life of the Christian community.461 
 
But it is these ‘inherent properties’ on which Henry hangs his entire system.  These 
properties ensure, for Henry, the objectivity and scientific nature of theology.  As a result he 
                                                
457 Trueman, Carl R.  ‘Admiring the Sistine Chapel: Reflections on Carl F.H. Henry’s God, Revelation and 
Authority’ in Themlios. Vol 25. No. 2, pp 48-58, 2000. 
458 Padgett, Alan.  Review of God, Revelation and Authority.  in Journal of the American Academy of Religion.  
Vol. 52.  No. 4, pp 785-786, 1984. 
459 As we mentioned above in note 395 and will see below this is the reverse of Calvin’s understanding.  For 
Calvin, the indicia provide assurance and the Holy Spirit is the key to biblical authority.  What this means is 
that the Scriptures would still have authority without these indicia. 
460 This fact is reflective of mainstream inerrantists, as well. 
461 God, Revelation and Authority, Volume IV.  p. 84. 
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can find no room for linking scriptural authority with functionality.462  Henry concludes that 
understanding biblical authority in terms of its functionality leads to relativism.  He writes,
  
 The erosion of fixed rational biblical truth by a functional correlation  
with inner believing response involves each and every biblical concept;  
no fixed meaning survives for any doctrine whatever if the functional  
premise is to be consistently applied.463   
 
According to Henry, the authority of Scripture is given in no other way than by the past work 
of the Holy Spirit in divinely inspiring data so that once the Spirit had done his work the 
Scriptures would be authoritative for all of mankind and would evidence that authority by 
very specific properties, i.e., inerrancy.  He summarizes this act of the Spirit in the following 
way, 
 In Scripture we are dealing with what the Holy Spirit tells and foretells,  
with divinely inspired data, with what is known by special revelation,  
with what the Spirit communicates in a definitive way.  God is the authority  
who renders Scripture authoritative; inspiration is the special phenomenon that 
imparts this character of divine authority to the writings and logically necessitates 
fulfillment of written prophecies.464   
 
Any other way of talking about biblical authority implicitly assumes, according to Henry, 
that “the truthfulness of the Bible is not held to be guaranteed by divine inspiration but is to 
be attributed or mediated by something else.”465  This ‘something else’ could be experience 
or subjective feeling, viz., the kind of mediation that Henry feared the neo-orthodox doctrine 
of Scripture led to.466 
                                                
462 This is where one might be able to draw some type of evangelical and Barthian views of Scripture together.  
What if the property that Scripture has which makes it authoritative is not inerrancy but rather being the text 
where Christ promises to dwell.  The reason Scripture is authoritative is because Christ promises to meet us in 
this text and no other.  The promise is tied to this specific text and even though Christ is free to meet us 
somewhere else he promises to meet us here.  Looking at authority this way might give the text of Scripture an 
“objective” quality, which may make it more compatible with many evangelical concerns but retains the 
Christo-centrism of Barth’s method.   
463 Ibid, p. 95. 
464 Ibid, p. 75. 
465 Ibid, p. 45. 
466 An important question to note is whether the doctrine of inerrancy accomplishes the mediation Henry wants 
here.  He seems to want the Spirit to mediate authority and believes that his doctrine of inspiration establishes 
this.  By binding inerrancy and authority together as he does one wonders whether the Spiritual mediation he 
 164 
 
With all of this being the case one would expect Henry to be adamant about the doctrine of 
inerrancy.  One would expect that if the authority of Scripture is based on its past inspiration 
evidenced by its inerrancy that Henry would be very concerned to tie inerrancy and authority 
together as the passage from ‘The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy’ quoted above 
does, in fact do.  Henry does not seem to want to make such a move while discussing 
authority.  He comments, “The first claim to be made for Scripture is not its inerrancy or 
even its inspiration, but its authority.”467  The comment is made in the midst of Henry’s 
explication on how Scripture has been conferred authority from the Son.  It does allude to an 
altogether different priority for Henry than some of his followers would be comfortable 
with.468   
 
But what does Henry mean when he uses the term authority?  By authority does he mean, as 
one author has written, “it is the ultimate and final mediated standard of truth and criterion 
for judgment and evaluation”?469  Henry seems to understand authority in an ethical way.  
Authority is talked about in terms of ‘rights.’  If someone has authority they have the right to 
do what they are doing.   
 
This authority, in fact, all authority is derivative.  All authority is God-given.  According to 
Henry, God alone has underived authority.  He has absolute authority, which is then passed 
                                                                                                                                                  
seems to seek is not replaced by errorless propositions of the text so that authority ends up being mediated by 
postulating an errorless text. 
467 Ibid, p. 27. 
468 At this point in volume IV Henry’s words would be a cause of concern for inerrantists.  He seems to make 
less of a link between authority and inerrancy when he is writing about authority, but later in the volume when 
he is writing about inerrancy he blatantly connects the two.   
469 Lightner, Robert P.  A Biblical Case for Total Inerrancy: How Jesus Viewed the Old Testament.  Kregel 
Publications: Grand Rapids, 1998, p. 78. 
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down to the Son.  The Son passes this authority on to the apostles and the apostles inscribe it 
as Scripture. 
 
He bases his understanding of authority on the term exousia used in the New Testament.  
 This is what exousia means in revealed religion: authority and power  
 that the living God alone can wield underivedly and unrestrictedly.  In  
 the New Testament we face the fact that God’s exousia is the power and  
 authority given to Jesus Christ and under him, to his disciples…Jesus’  
 exousia is the presupposition of whatever authority the apostles have in  
 respect to the things of God, that is, of all apostolic authority.470 
 
One of the crucial questions at this point is whether the Bible is for Henry a “special locus of 
divine exousia.”471  According to Henry, the Bible is the only source for our knowledge of 
the divine creation, fallen mankind and God’s offer of forgiveness.  In fact, it is “the only 
knowledge-basis we have for anything we say about the person and work of Christ, about his 
distinctive authority, and about the authority he conferred upon the apostles.”472  This is why 
establishing its authority is more important for Henry than establishing its inerrancy.  Henry 
does believe that it is the special locus of divine exousia.  And like all authority, the Bible has 
authority because God has given it such.   
 
God’s authority is His alone to share.  But all authority of any kind, according to Henry, is in 
some sense derived from this One source.  “Whether we speak of men or angels, of civil 
government, even of Satan, none of them holds underived authority.  God alone is the 
absolute power of decision.”473  This, of course, begs the question about whether God uses 
errant sources to wield authority.  It would seem that if one maintains that all authority is 
given by God then it must mean that things that err can still be authoritative.  If this is the 
                                                
470 God, Revelation and Authority: Volume IV.  pp. 26-27. 
471 Ibid, p. 27. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Ibid, p. 25. 
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case then the link between the authority of Scripture and the need for an inerrant text 
becomes very tenuous.   
 
Nevertheless, Henry spends a significant amount of time going through a similar exegetical 
process to that of Warfield in showing how both Christ and the apostles presupposed the 
authority of the Old Testament and how the apostles believed that there writings possessed 
the same authority.  By establishing this, Henry finds the foundation for belief in the 
authority of Scripture.  The foundation for belief in the authority of Scripture comes from the 
Scriptures themselves.   
 
Henry moves on from discussing the authority of Scripture to how one is to understand truth 
and then into a discussion of inerrancy.  During this discussion the issue of authority rises 
and Henry is explicit about the need to hold both inerrancy and authority together.  He writes, 
“Only logical imprecision can begin with errancy and conclude with divine authority.  What 
is errant cannot be divinely authoritative nor can God have inspired it.”474  He writes further,  
 The inevitable consequence of insisting on biblical authority and  
 inspiration on the one hand and on an errant Bible on the other is, of  
 course, that inspiration ceases to be a guarantee of the truth of what the  
 Bible teaches; the authority of Scripture must then somehow be divorced  
 from the truth of its content.  The problem with such alternatives is that they  
 destroy the objective truth of the Christian religion, trivialize theology, and  
 lead finally to scepticism.475 
 
The Henry who thought that Scriptural authority was the primary category to establish seems 
to be long lost.  We find much more insistence on the logical incompatibility between an 
errant text and its authority and the need to uphold biblical inerrancy in order to maintain 
biblical authority.  “To affirm the errancy of the text but to insist on the divine authority and 
reliability of the Bible requires one to impose upon the notion of biblical authority ‘the death 
                                                
474 Ibid, p. 192. 
475 Ibid, p. 192-93. 
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of a thousand qualifications.’”476  By the end of his discussion of biblical inerrancy there is 
no doubt in his mind that one cannot consistently hold both that Scripture is authoritative and 
that it is errant.477  Inerrancy then becomes the key property of Scripture, which ensures its 
authority.   
 
So what becomes of the Spirit?  Henry has a very strong doctrine of the inspiration of 
Scripture which, like Warfield, sets the stage of his doctrine of inerrancy.  It would appear 
that the Spirit does not have much of a role to play in regard to Scriptural authority after His 
work of inspiration was complete.  There is no sense in Henry (as there is in Kuyper) that the 
Spirit continues to make the Scriptures authoritative for the elect.  Rather, the Spirit is 
relegated to the role of assurance giver.  He is the one who gives assurance of authority that 
is based on the ‘objective’ inerrant qualities, which can be rationally validated.  It could be 
argued that when Kuyper talks about ‘sealing the word’ he is using language that is 
consistent with Henry’s mentioning of the Spirit’s assurance.  The problem with this 
argument is that Kuyper makes this act of sealing vital in his understanding of authority 
where Henry just makes passing mention of it.  With that said we should now turn to an 
examination of Calvin’s doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit to see if we can find 
any correlations between his thought and that of Kuyper, Warfield and Henry. 
 
 
Calvin’s Doctrine of the Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit 
 
We started this chapter looking at Abraham Kuyper’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit as it relates 
to his understanding of Scriptural authority and we end with one of the fathers of the 
Reformation, John Calvin.  It is important that we end here for a number of reasons.  As we 
saw in chapter one of this thesis, inerrantists often claim historical precedent is found in the 
                                                
476 Ibid, p. 181. 
477 This is largely to do with Henry’s philosophical commitments, which we have discussed in a previous 
chapter. 
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Reformers for their understanding of Scripture.  What this chapter has sought to show is that 
by maintaining a particular doctrine of inerrancy, as found in Warfield or Henry, inerrantists 
are liable to find little need for the a contemporary involvement of the Holy Spirit in their 
account of biblical authority.  What we shall be asking in this final section is whether or not 
Calvin’s understanding of the authority of Scripture is consonant with the contemporary 
inerrantist doctrine.   
 
Of course there is a danger inherent in this type of questioning.  As Stephen Holmes has 
remarked in an unpublished paper on Calvin’s doctrine of Scripture there is a danger of 
forcing foreign ‘thought-worlds’ and ‘doctrinal questions’ on to the Institutes.  In a footnote 
relevant to our purposes Holmes remarks, “As I have noted elsewhere, and will develop later 
in this chapter, the (sterile) debate about whether Calvin’s doctrine of Scripture is inerrantist 
or neo-orthodox is a classic example of this failing: he can at times sound like both Warfield 
and Barth, which demonstrates only that the conceptual distinctions developed to 
differentiate their positions were not ones Calvin had made.”478 
 
In order not to be accused of introducing foreign categories into Calvin’s thought we will 
stay strictly with his own account of biblical authority.  With this said, however, it would 
seem that inerrantists are correct when they argue that Calvin unashamedly believed in the 
total inspiration of the Scriptures and presupposed their infallibility.  As many have already 
argued there should be no doubt that this is the case.  Like most of his contemporaries, 
Calvin was deeply committed to the trustworthiness of Scripture.479  The question we must 
                                                
478 Holmes, Stephen R.  ‘Calvin on Scripture.’   
479 A classic example of where Calvin holds in tension his belief in both the trustworthiness of Scripture and its 
possible ability to err is found in his commentary on Genesis 1:26.  Here he shows that astronomers have 
proved something differently than the account given by Moses (Calvin accepted the tradition at the time that 
Moses was the author of the Pentateuch).  Calvin writes,  “Moses makes two great luminaries; but astronomers 
prove, by conclusive reasons that the star of Saturn, which on account of its great distance, appears the least of 
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ask in this section is not whether he thinks Scripture is trustworthy and authoritative but why 
he does.  And as we shall see, the answer lies primarily in the contemporary work of the Holy 
Spirit.   
 
Richard Muller writes, 
 The orthodox generally preserve the same order and/or priority of  
discussion as was found in Calvin’s Institutes:  the testimony of the Spirit  
remains the primary key to the authority and divinity of Scripture, with the 
evidences standing as ancillary testimony and, more importantly, as the  
necessary result of the divine work performed in the inspiration and writing  
of the text.480  (my emphasis) 
 
To say that the function of the Holy Spirit is the primary key in Calvin’s understanding of the 
authority of Scripture is true but can be misleading.  One can also say that the Holy Spirit is 
the primary key in the inerrantists’ understanding of the authority of Scripture and so 
conclude that these two positions are consistent with each other.  However, it is more 
complicated than this.  As we have seen, Warfield and Henry can both claim that the Holy 
Spirit is the primary key to the authority and divinity of Scripture but the locus of this claim 
lies in the Spirit’s past work of inspiration.  Their thought at this point is very consistent to 
                                                                                                                                                  
all, is greater than the moon. Here lies the difference; Moses wrote in a popular style things which without 
instruction, all ordinary persons, endued with common sense, are able to understand; but astronomers 
investigate with great labor whatever the sagacity of the human mind can comprehend. Nevertheless, this study 
is not to be reprobated, nor this science to be condemned, because some frantic persons are wont boldly to reject 
whatever is unknown to them. For astronomy is not only pleasant, but also very useful to be known: it cannot be 
denied that this art unfolds the admirable wisdom of God… Lastly since the Spirit of God here opens a common 
school for all, it is not surprising that he should chiefly choose those subjects which would be intelligible to all. 
If the astronomer inquires respecting the actual dimensions of the stars, he will find the moon to be less than 
Saturn; but this is something abstruse, for to the sight it appears differently. Moses, therefore, rather adapts his 
discourse to common usage. For since the Lord stretches forth, as it were, his hand to us in causing us to enjoy 
the brightness of the sun and moon, how great would be our ingratitude were we to close our eyes against our 
own experience? There is therefore no reason why janglers should deride the unskilfulness of Moses in making 
the moon the second luminary; for he does not call us up into heaven, he only proposes things which lie open 
before our eyes. Let the astronomers possess their more exalted knowledge; but, in the meantime, they who 
perceive by the moon the splendor of night, are convicted by its use of perverse ingratitude unless they 
acknowledge the beneficence of God.”  Calvin’s doctrine of accommodation is at work here in his explanation 
of how the Spirit could inspire Moses to write what he did and not have it correspond to the current 
astronomical science of his day.  Because of Calvin’s doctrine of accommodation he can believe both in the 
trustworthiness of Scripture and modern science’s conclusions about our universe which seem to differ in some 
ways to the biblical perspective.  The current debate on evolution would find much help from Calvin’s way of 
thinking in this passage. 
480 Muller, Richard A.  Holy Scripture, The Cognitive Foundation of Theology: Volume II.  Baker Academic 
Press: Grand Rapids, 2003, p. 266. 
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Calvin.  However, Calvin also speaks of a contemporary internal witness of the Spirit in the 
life of the believer and without this work Scripture would not be recognised as authoritative 
by the believing community.   
 
It is important to see Calvin in his historical context.  When he talks about the authority of 
Scripture, Calvin is very concerned that it is considered and established outside of the 
influence of the Roman Church.    Calvin calls it a pernicious error to contend that Scripture 
only has as much weight as the church consents too.  Furthermore, according to Calvin, one 
mocks the Holy Spirit when the question about who will convince people of the authority of 
Scripture is asked as if a man or institution could establish this.481  Calvin writes,   
 Therefore illumined by his power, we believe neither by our own nor 
by anyone else’s judgment that Scripture is from God; but above human  
judgment we affirm with utter certainty (just as if we were gazing upon the  
majesty of God himself) that it has flowed to us from the very mouth of God  
by the ministry of men.482  
 
When Calvin talks about “anyone else’s judgment” it is clear from the context of his writing 
that he has in mind the Roman Church.  God alone can prove the conclusion that Scripture is 
authoritative and this is done by the work of the Spirit.483 
     
We found earlier that Kuyper uses the term ‘sealed’ to express the particular action of the 
Spirit and our belief in Scripture’s authority.  This is also language that Calvin uses in his 
                                                
481 Calvin, John.  Institutes: Volume I, edited by John T. McNeill.  The Westminster Press: Philadelphia, 1960, 
p. 75. [1.7.1] 
482 Ibid, p. 80. 
483 In First Theology Kevin Vanhoozer develops a specific account of how this takes place within the church.  
Vanhoozer argues that Scripture is the locus of divine communicative action “consisting of three aspects.  First, 
the Father’s ‘locution’: the words are the authorized words of the Father/Author.  Second, the ‘illocutionary’ 
dimension: what God does in Scripture is testify, in various ways, to Christ.  Finally, to return to the catechism, 
we may best view the Holy Spirit’s work as God’s ‘perlocution,’ that is, as what happens as a result of 
speaking.”  Vanhoozer argues later that the Spirit has a contemporary role in bringing about all three aspects of 
the divine communicative action:  he convicts us of God’s locution so that the text is authoritative for the 
church, he illumines the words so that the reader finds Christ, and he sanctifies believers so that the desired 
result is achieved.  Vanhoozer is consciously using language compatible with Calvin’s testimonium Spiritus 
Sancti internum.  By doing so, he concludes similarly to Gordon Fee that the Spirit is the key to everything.  See 
Vanhoozer, Kevin J.  First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics.  InterVarsity Press: Illinois, 2002, 
chapter 7.  
 171 
description of the Spirit’s work.  “For as God alone is a fit witness of himself in his Word, so 
also the Word will not find acceptance in men’s hearts before it is sealed by the inward 
testimony of the Spirit.”484 
 
The temptation here is to separate Word and Spirit.  Calvin has a very high doctrine of the 
inspiration of Scripture.  “Hence the Scriptures obtain full authority among believers only 
when men regard them as having sprung from heaven, as if there the living words of God 
were heard.”485  He believes that the Scriptures are from God in their entirety.  But how do 
we know this?  According to Calvin, our assurance comes only by the inner testimony of the 
Spirit.   
 
A crucial point for us to see is that the authority of Scripture is connected to both the past act 
of the inspiration of Scripture and the present act of ‘sealing’ the Word in the believer.  To 
attempt to convince someone of Scripture’s authority based on the past actions of the Spirit 
alone, which may or may not have given the text certain inerrant properties is to disregard the 
importance that Calvin places on the current work of the Spirit.486  Calvin acknowledges that 
there are ‘evidences’ in Scripture that support its divine authorship, but he is very insistent 
that these ‘evidences’ (or indicia) can only confirm the authority of Scripture that has been 
established by the internal testimony of Scripture.    
 For Calvin these “arguments” for the credibility of Scripture were  
“human judgments” that were “vain” arguments in themselves.  Our faith  
in Scripture, according to Calvin, could be assisted by these arguments, but  
only after we believed in Christ and accepted the authority of the biblical  
witness to him under the leading of the Holy Spirit… Calvin completely  
rejected the notion that rational proofs of the divinity of Scripture were  
necessary before one could have faith in it.  He accepted, however, the  
encouragement such arguments could give to believers after their faith in  
                                                
484 Ibid, p. 79.  [1.7.4] 
485 Ibid, p. 74.  [1.7.1] 
486 Admittedly, Calvin does not use nor know of any doctrine of inerrancy but the point still stands when 
comparing his view of authority with the inerrantist position. 
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Scripture had been established by contact with the Word itself and by consent  
to the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.  Scripture could not be known as  
authoritative outside of faith in it, according to Calvin.487   
 
And Calvin himself writes, 
  
 Unless the certainty, higher and stronger than any human judgment, be  
present, it will be vain to fortify the authority of Scripture by arguments,  
to establish it by common agreement of the church, or to confirm it with  
other helps.  For unless this foundation is laid, its authority will always  
remain in doubt.  Conversely, once we have embraced it devoutly as its  
dignity deserves, and have recognized it to be above the common sort of 
things, those arguments- not strong enough before to engraft and fix the 
certainty of Scripture in our minds- become very useful aids.488  (my italics) 
 
It would appear that this is why Richard Muller calls the contemporary work of the Spirit a 
primary key to understanding Calvin’s doctrine of biblical authority.  The certainty of the 
Bible’s authority, according to Calvin, will always remain in doubt if the Church in any way 
establishes it or one tries to establish it by some type of rational argument, which provides 
some kind of evidence of this ‘proof.’  If we are to be certain about the Bible’s authority it 
can only be established by a gift of the Spirit.  “But those who wish to prove to unbelievers 
that Scripture is the Word of God are acting foolishly, for only by faith can this be 
known.”489  The inner testimony of the Holy Spirit is given to those whom the Spirit wills to 
give it.  For Calvin, there is no other way to establish this authority.   
 
The concern that is often raised in response to the doctrine of the internal testimony of the 
Spirit is that it leaves us with a “dead letter” understanding of Scripture.  By this it is meant 
that Scripture on its own is useless for salvation.  Calvin does seem to agree with this idea.  It 
                                                
487 Rogers, Jack B. and McKim, Donald K.  The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical 
Approach.  Harper & Row: New York, 1979, p. 105.  For a discussion of Warfield and his elevation of these 
evidences in Scripture to equal status with the internal testimony see: Dowey, Eward A.  The Knowledge of God 
in Calvin’s Theology.  Columbia University Press: New York, 1965, p. 116. 
488 Institutes, Volume I.  pp. 81-82. [1.8.1] Calvin’s understanding here seems parallel to the contemporary 
debate amongst Thomists regarding whether Aquinas’ proofs were intended to establish God’s existence apart 
from faith.  For an example of the debate see:  Kerr, Fergus.  Contemplating Aquinas on the Varieties of 
Interpretation.  SCM Press: London, 2003.   
489 Institutes: Volume I.  p. 92.  [1.8.13] 
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would appear that when the ‘letter’ of Scripture is cut off from ‘Christ’s grace” then it, in 
Calvin’s words, “slays its readers.”490  He says,   
 The letter, therefore, is dead, and the law of the Lord slays its readers  
where it both is cut off from Christ’s grace [II Cor. 3:6] and, leaving the  
heart untouched, sounds in the ears alone.  But if through the Spirit it is  
really branded upon hearts, if it shows forth Christ, it is the word of life  
[cf. Phil. 2:16] “converting souls,… giving wisdom to little ones,” etc.   
[Ps. 18:8, Vg.; 19:7, EV].491 
 
Calvin cannot conceive of Scripture being effective or used for what it is intended for 
without the work of the Spirit.  He will not allow Word and Spirit to be separated.  It would 
seem to work conversely, as well.  The Spirit needs the Word to achieve his purposes in the 
world.  In fact, one might say that Word and Spirit are mutually dependent on each other.  
Neither achieves its purpose separate from the other.  Calvin writes,  
God did not bring forth his Word among men for the sake of a  
momentary display, intending at the coming of his Spirit to abolish it.   
Rather, he sent down the same Spirit by whose power he had dispensed  
the Word, to complete his work by the efficacious confirmation of the  
Word.”492   
 
We would be unjustified in attributing to Calvin the dichotomy between inner and outer word 
mentioned above.  However, his language does seem to be a precursor to such a move.  
Where those who advocate such a position differ from the tradition in which Calvin belongs 
is their exaltation of the outer word at the expense of the inner word.  Without trying to force 
Calvin into a position foreign to him, it seems that we can at the very least conclude that he 
would be against any dichotomy which places an emphasis on the outer word to the neglect 
of the inner word.  According to him, the internal work of the Spirit and the external 
existence of the text are inseparable when speaking about the authority of Scripture.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
490 Ibid, p. 95. [1.9.3] 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
We started this chapter with a quote from the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy.  This 
quote introduced a connection between belief in the inerrancy of Scripture and belief in 
biblical authority.  The statement concluded that if inerrancy is not held then ‘the Bible 
which God gave loses its authority.’  It is not unreasonable to say that this is at least one of 
the significant concerns raised by the doctrine of inerrancy.  In fact, it is conceivable that for 
many inerrantists, maintaining the authority of Scripture is the primary reason for continued 
belief in errorless original autographs.  However, it would appear that this comes at a price.   
 
This chapter was not written to challenge every aspect of the doctrine of inerrancy.  Rather, it 
was written to explore how the main exponents of the doctrine (i.e., Warfield and Henry) 
understand the contemporary role of the Holy Spirit.   We found that the price paid is a 
significantly downgraded pneumatology with respect to the Bible’s authority in the 
contemporary church.  By placing so much emphasis on the Spirit’s past act of inspiration, 
both Warfield and Henry find little need to continue Calvin’s emphasis on the internal 
testimony of the Holy Spirit.  As a result, the indicia which Calvin saw as only providing 
assurance for an already established belief in the authority of Scripture, become that which 
establish its authority.  To say this in another way, the outer word takes precedence in their 
understanding of biblical authority and the inner word is marginalized.   
 
One might respond by saying that Calvin was incorrect when he spoke of the internal 
testimony of the Spirit, but showing Calvin’s consistency with both the early church’s 
understanding of the Spirit and the tradition which followed is not possible here.  However, 
we can conclude that both Warfield and Henry break with the thought of Calvin at this point, 
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and inasmuch as Calvin represents the traditional view of the church, they break with it as 
well.   
 
Trying to understand the dynamic between Word and Spirit seems to be the most important 
task for anyone thinking through their own understanding of biblical authority.  If one 
elevates the Spirit over the Word, what results is a kind of subjectivism or fideism.  To the 
contrary, if one elevates Word over Spirit, what results is a kind natural theology or deism 
where God is no longer needed.  Surely, Calvin (and with him many of the other Reformers) 
was right to hold in tension both Word and Spirit so that faith in the Bible’s authority is 
ultimately given as a gift of God.   
 
In the chapter that follows we will examine two different doctrines of Scripture which seem 
to allow the Spirit to function in a more crucial manner than the doctrine of Scripture found 
in Warfield or Henry will allow.  We will look at Barth’s understanding of the threefold word 
of God and Abraham Kuyper’s doctrine of Scripture. Once we have seen other doctrines of 
Scripture then we will be able to offer some concluding remarks about the overall theological 
implications for the doctrine of inerrancy. J.I. Packer in his book, God Has Spoken, gives an 
applicable challenge, 
 Readers of this book, who, like its writer, are children of an age that is  
 heavily conditioned against the ‘old paths’ will feel that this approach raises  
 problems.  It is no part of our concern to deny this; we would only invite our  
readers to consider, in light of what we have said, whether alternative approaches do 
not raise greater problems still.493 
 
And so it is to alternative approaches we now turn in order that we may understand the 
different ways of speaking about biblical authority which are not founded upon the doctrine 
of inerrancy. 
                                                
493 God Has Spoken, 134. 
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~5~ 
 
Alternative Doctrines 
Of Scripture  
 
 
 
In this chapter we will be examining two theologians who have doctrines of scripture that are 
markedly different to the doctrine of inerrancy.  We first look at the thought of Karl Barth 
with particular emphasis on his doctrine of scripture as it is developed in § 19 of  Church 
Dogmatics  I/2.  Then we turn to the Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper and his work 
Principles Sacred Theology.  Although he was considered an inerrantist of his time, he offers 
a very different doctrine of scripture than the one developed by the majority of inerrantists 
today.  
 
 
Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Scripture 
 
Trying to write a succinct analysis of Barth’s doctrine of scripture is no easy task.  This is 
mostly due to Barth’s prolific writing, which has generated numerous theses exploring his 
thought.  There is always a danger when writing anything on Barth’s thought that one will 
have missed an obscure reference in one of the many multi-paged footnotes in the Church 
Dogmatics or in one of his works published separately from the Dogmatics.  But there is also 
another danger that has to do with compartmentalizing Barth’s thought.  As John Webster 
has observed, Barth’s thought in the Church Dogmatics is “one cohesive argument, and no 
single stage within the argument is definitive for the whole…”494   
 
However, this should not discourage us from the task at hand.  There are presuppositions that 
Barth has which drive him to make some of the conclusions that he makes and there are 
                                                
494 Webster, John.  Karl Barth.  Continuum: London, 2004, p. 50. 
 177 
certain things that can be said about his doctrine of Scripture.  For the purpose of this chapter 
we will have to limit our reading of Barth to § 19 of  CD I/2.  We find Barth’s most 
developed doctrine of scripture in this specific text and it will give us enough scope to 
analyze this doctrine in the pages that follow.   
 
In the Church Dogmatics Karl Barth offers us a perspective on the role of scripture within the 
life of the Church,495 which like all of his theology revolves around the person of Jesus 
Christ.  In order for us to understand Barth’s view of scripture we must see its connection to 
the Son of God, the Word made flesh. However, before looking at Barth’s doctrine of 
scripture there are at least two presuppositions in Barth’s thinking that need explanation 
because they play a crucial role in his theology in general and a specific role in his 
understanding of scripture.   
 
 
First, some scholars have connected Barth’s theology with an apparent influence by 
existentialism and, although he loathes the term, they conclude he is ultimately not able to 
escape its influence.  The existentialist influence is apparently largely dependent upon the 
thought of Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard.  He was not able to accept the exitientialsim of 
Schleiermacher largely because of Schleiermacher’s ‘natural theology.’  Trevor Hart writes, 
 Schleiermacher, having learned from Kant that theology could not  
properly be a matter of knowledge, preferred nonetheless to trace religion  
and to root theological reflection not in the moral sphere, but in another  
dimension of human existence, the capacity for what he describes as a  
‘sense of absolute dependence’ or, more theologically, ‘God-consciousness’.   
What this amounts to is a claim that all humans (whether or not they are  
                                                
495 It is vital for one to see Barth’s doctrine of Scripture (as well as all theology) as created within the church.  
Unlike Warfield and Henry, Barth did not see his doctrine of Scripture as being apologetic in nature.  John 
Webster writes, “Because Barth begins by firmly placing theology within the church, he steers away from 
conceptions of the discipline as some sort of rational act in which we transcend the life of the church or try to 
place that life on a better foundation.”  For a further discussion of this see John Webster’s Karl Barth. 
Continuum: London, 2004, p. 53.   
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aware of the fact) are naturally fitted for an encounter with Infinity.496 [my  
italics] 
 
Ultimately Barth is unable to accept the idea of man being naturally fitted for any type of 
encounter with God whether it is experiential or cognitive.  For Barth, there is an infinite 
qualitative difference between the Creator and His creation.  This is the first presupposition 
that is behind Barth’s talk about the role and position of Scripture within the life of the 
Church.   
 
 
As can be seen in Barth’s reply to Brunner regarding natural theology there is no room in 
Barth’s thinking for a natural tendency or capacity for belief.  Because of the fall, sinful man 
is incapable of knowing God.  There is no natural point of contact or epistemic capacity 
between God and man as such.  By the witness of Holy Scripture and the proclamation of the 
church, the Holy Spirit creates this contact between God and man today.497  Hart continues,  
 The conclusion to be drawn from all this, for Barth, is that ‘we have  
 no organ or capacity for God’ (CDI/1, p.168), and that this lack is not  
 partial but total (see CD I/2, p. 257).  There is, in other words, no natural  
 propensity or aptitude for God in humans; it is unbelief and ignorance rather 
 than faith and knowledge which are the most natural manifestations of  
 humanity with respect to God  (GD, p. 456).498 
 
This complete transcendence of God makes Him unable to be known or spoken about by 
human beings.499  If we can keep in our minds the idea that God is completely transcendent 
and that only because of the event of the incarnation does God become immanent as Jesus 
Christ then we are well on our way to grasping Barth’s understanding of Holy Scripture and 
its authority within the life of the people of God.   
                                                
496 ‘Revelation’ by Trevor Hart.  Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000., p. 39 
497 Hartwell, Herbert.  The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction.  London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 
1964, p. 84.   
498 Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, 42. 
499 This is in part Barth’s response to the neo-Kantian philosophy of his day in which something is known as it 
is made into an object and then classified and labeled by the mind according to a universally given set of 
categories.  Barth agues that God cannot be known in this way.  God must not be made into an object for His 
creation to examine. 
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The second presupposition that plays a role behind the scenes as it were in Barth’s doctrine 
of Scripture is his understanding of God’s complete and utter freedom from and in His 
creation.  For Barth God is not bound by anything he has created and is absolutely free to act 
when and where he wants within his own creation.  “God may speak to us through Russian 
Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, or a dead dog.  We do well to listen to 
Him if He really does.”500  God must not be bound by any of our doctrines or understandings 
of Him.  In fact, God is not even bound by Himself.  Barth writes, 
God is not prevented either by His own deity or by our humanity  
 and sinfulness from being our God and having intercourse with us as  
 with His own.  On the contrary, He is free for us and in us.  That is the  
 central content of the doctrine of Christ and of the doctrine of the Holy  
 Spirit.  Christology and Pneumatology are one in being the knowledge  
 and praise of the grace of God.  But the grace of God is just His freedom, 
 unhindered either by Himself or by us.501   
 
So, for Barth, it must be the case that God is absolutely free.  And because of our sinful 
nature we are unable to know God without God making the first move towards us.  God is 
completely free to make or not make this move and it is in His freedom that the incarnation 
takes place.  It is in His freedom that revelation of Himself occurs.  The unveiling of that 
which is veiled takes place only by the free act of God as Jesus Christ.   
 
 
Just talking about God’s freedom is not accurate enough, however.  One cannot speak about 
God’s freedom apart from God’s love.  According to Barth, God is the One who loves in 
freedom.  Barth defines God’s being in terms of His action.  In fact, God’s essence is His 
action.  For God to be is for God to act.  This action that is who God is, Barth understands, to 
be God’s love.  To love us is part of God’s overflowing essence which in itself matches 
                                                
500 CD I/1, p. 55. 
501 CD I/2, p. 3. 
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God’s existence.502   “In the fact that he determines to love such another, His love overflows.  
But it is not exhausted in it nor confined or conditioned by it.”503  This overflow of love 
toward the creation is both completely free and necessary for God.  It is both because of 
God’s essence being equal to God’s act.  God is free to love because nothing outside of God 
necessitates this loving and at the same time God must love because this act of loving is 
God’s essence.  What God does, God is.504   There does not seem to be any way of talking 
about God’s freedom apart from his loving action in Himself and toward creation.  
 
 
It is this God, who is not bound by His creation but freely loves it, whom Barth presupposes 
when he develops his understanding of scripture.  It is vital that we not lose sight of these 
presuppositions in our analysis of Barth’s doctrine of scripture in the following pages 
because Barth’s doctrine of God completely determines his doctrine of scripture.  Because of 
this, Barth’s understanding of scripture could never looks like an inerrantist’s understanding.  
The differences will become clearer in the pages that follow. 
 
 
Barth’s doctrine of scripture develops in the midst of his discussion of the text of scripture 
being a witness to divine revelation and how this text becomes the word of God for the 
church. There are times when reading Barth’s Dogmatics when it would be easy to show 
Barth equating the Word of God with the text of Scripture.  For instance in CD I/2 Barth 
says, “Holy Scripture is the Word of God to the Church and for the Church.”505  This 
statement taken on its own looks like a good ‘proof-text’ for Barth’s equation of the Word of 
God with the text of Scripture.  But it would be unfair to Barth’s theology to equate the two 
in this way.  This is mainly because of the second presupposition mentioned above, i.e., 
                                                
502 CD II/1. p. 273. 
503 Ibid, 280. 
504 Ibid, 274. 
505 CD I/2 p. 475 
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God’s freedom.  For Barth the text of scripture cannot be univocally God’s Word because 
this would inhibit the freedom of God.  Barth writes, 
 The statement that the Bible is the Word of God cannot therefore say  
 that the Word of God is tied to the Bible.  On the contrary, what it must  
 say is that the Bible is tied to the Word of God.  But that means that in this 
 statement we contemplate a free decision of God – not in uncertainty but  
 in certainty, not without basis but on the basis of the promise which the  
 Bible itself proclaims and which we receive in and with the Church.506   
 
Part of the issue here is one of dependency.  Barth is always concerned to keep God from 
becoming determined.  Furthermore, he is concerned to keep the Word of God, i.e., the 
eternal Son of the Father, from becoming determined as well.  When he states that the Word 
of God is not tied to the Bible but rather that the Bible is tied to Word of God, he seems to be 
stressing this point.  The Word is not dependent upon the text of Scripture, i.e., is not tied to 
the text, does not have to go where the text leads or drags.  It is the other way around.  It is 
the text that is tied to the word and is determined by the action of the Word.  To say this any 
other way would be to violate God Himself and to violate the freedom and sovereignty of 
God.507   
 
 
It is perhaps worth mentioning at this point what Barth means when he speaks of the Word of 
God.  Barth incontrovertibly means the second person of the Trinity, the same Word that 
became flesh and now sits at the right hand of the Father.  He says in the middle of his 
writing on scripture, “There is only one Word of God and that is the eternal Word of the 
Father which for our reconciliation became flesh like us and has now returned to the Father, 
to be present to His Church by the Holy Spirit.”508 
 
 
                                                
506 CD I/2 p. 513 
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
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According to Barth, when the church gives scripture the label “word of God” it is appealing 
to the incarnational promise that the Word will meet it within creation.   
 In Holy Scripture, too, in the human word of His witnesses, it is a matter 
of this Word and its presence.  That means that in this equation it is a matter  
of the miracle of the divine Majesty in it condescension and mercy.  If we take  
this equation on our lips, it can only be as an appeal to the promise in virtue of  
which this miracle was real in Jesus Christ and will again be real in the word  
of his witnesses.  In this equation we have to do with the free grace and  
gracious freedom of God.509 
 
When the church says that the Bible is the word of God it is appealing to God that His Son 
would become present in a manner remarkably similar to the incarnation.  However, Barth is 
clear that there is not an exact correlation between what happened in the incarnation and how 
the text becomes the word of God.  Nevertheless, this does appear to be the prominent model 
that shapes his doctrinal position.   
That the Word had become Scripture is not one and the same thing  
as its becoming flesh.  But the uniqueness and at the same time general  
relevance of its becoming flesh necessarily involved its becoming Scripture.   
The divine Word became the word of the prophets and apostles by becoming  
flesh.510 
 
Bruce McCormack presents the subtlety of Barth’s understanding of the ‘incarnational’ 
aspect of scripture’s becoming in the following way, 
 First, what the Bible is, is defined by the will of God as expressed in his  
act of giving it to the church.  And this means that where and when the Bible  
becomes the Word of God, it is only becoming what it already is.  But, second,  
where and when the Bible does not become the Word of God, there God has  
chosen provisionally, for the time being, not to bear witness to himself in and  
through its witness to this particular reader or this particular set of readers 
of it.  This changes nothing whatsoever as to the true nature of the Bible as  
defined by the divine will which came to expression in the giving of the Bible  
to the church.  It only means that God does not will, of the time being, that the  
Bible should become what it is for these readers.  Thus, the being-in-becoming  
of the Bible as Holy Scripture, as the Word of God, is a being-in-becoming  
that takes place under two conditions.  The one is the relation of faith and  
obedience in which the would-be interpreter stands to the God whose Word  
the Bible is.  And the other, truly decisive condition is that God is willing to  
grant faith and obedience to the would-be interpreter so that the first condition  
                                                
509 Ibid. 
510 Ibid, 500. 
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might be fulfilled.511 
 
So is there ever a sense when the Word of God can be said to be written?  It seems to me that 
the text of Scripture acts as a catalyst for the Word of God to be written in that it is only 
when Christ meets the text at the same time that it is being read do we find the Word of God 
written.  Furthermore, this event is done by the act of God through the working of the Holy 
Spirit.  This is the promise of God to His Church that they will hear the Word of God, i.e., 
encounter Christ, through the reading of the text of Scripture.   
 Yet the presence of the Word of God itself, the real and present speaking  
 and hearing of it, is not identical with the existence of the book as such.   
 But in this presence something takes place in and with the book, for which  
 the book as such does indeed give the possibility, but the reality of which 
 cannot be anticipated or replaced by the existence of the book.512 
 
Because there is no necessary or a priori equation between the text of Scripture and the Word 
of God Barth calls the Bible the witness to revelation.  Webster writes, “the language of 
witness has a double purpose: it gives full weight to the function of Scripture as the bearer of 
revelation, and it does so without taking away from the fact that the Bible is a collection of 
human texts.”513  Just as John the Baptist in Grünewald’s Crucifixion is pointing to the Christ 
with his long bony finger, so Scripture points to, or witnesses to Jesus Christ, the revelation 
of God by the action of the Holy Spirit.  “The Bible is God’s Word to the extent that God 
causes it to be His Word, to the extent that He speaks through it.”514   
 
 
Just as the Bible cannot be strictly identified with the word of God neither can it be strictly 
identified as the revelation of God.  This is ultimately for the same reason.  Jesus Christ is 
properly the revelation of God.  All other “revelations” are derivative of him and dependent 
upon him.  Therefore, the Bible can only properly be labelled a witness to divine revelation, 
                                                
511 McCormack, Bruce L.  ‘The Being of Holy Scripture Is in Becoming’ in Evangelicals & Scripture. Edited by 
Vincent Bacote, Laura C. Miguélez and Dennis L. Okholm.  InterVarsity Press: Illinois, 2004, pp. 66-7. 
512 CD I/2 p. 530 
513 Webster, John.  Karl Barth.  Continuum: London, 2004, p. 65. 
514 CD I/1 p. 109 
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i.e., a witness to Jesus Christ.  But Barth carefully nuances this understanding.  He writes, “If 
what we hear in Holy Scripture is witness, a human expression of God’s revelation, then 
from what we have already said, what we hear in the witness itself is more than witness, what 
we hear in the human expression is more than a human expression.  What we hear is 
revelation and therefore the very Word of God.”515 
 
 
Notice that one hears the very Word of God, one does not read the Word of God.  This is 
because the Word speaks to us by the Spirit through the text.  The text is not identified with 
the Word but witnesses to it.  This idea in Barth relates to the presuppositions mentioned 
above.  Barth’s understanding of revelation is dominated by his concern for God to remain 
free.  He writes,  
 We must leave it to revelation itself to introduce itself either in its unity  
and entirety or indeed at all.  Revelation is never behind us: always we can  
only follow it.  We cannot think it: we can only contemplate it.  We cannot  
assert it and prove it: we can only believe it, believe it in recollection and  
expectation, so that if our faith is right and well-pleasing to God in what we  
then think and say, it can assert and prove itself.516 
 
Scripture is the word of God in a very real sense; when we hear it as such.  It is the word of 
God when God speaks through it but it is never able to be the word God without God’s action 
through it.  If it were, then God would be controlled by the text and since God’s freedom 
must be maintained, equating the two (word of God and text of scripture) is not an option for 
Barth.   
 
 
The question about the inspiration of scripture naturally arises at the point.  Doesn’t 
inspiration somehow guarantee that the text is the word of God?517  As one would suspect, 
Barth sees no such guarantee.  In fact he states that until 1700 the doctrine of inspiration was 
                                                
515 CD I/2 p. 473. 
516 Ibid, 484. 
517 See chapter one above for inerrantist position on inspiration. 
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more about the free grace of God but only in the post-Reformation period with the gradual 
uncertainty about the church’s doctrines of sin, justification, judgment and grace did the 
church develop a more “supernaturalistic” character of inspiration.518  He wrties,  
 This new understanding of biblical inspiration meant simply that the  
statement that the Bible is the Word of God was now transformed (following 
the doubtful tendencies we have already met in the Early Church) from a  
statement about the free grace of God into a statement about the nature of the  
Bible as exposed to human inquiry brought under human control.  The Bible  
as the Word of God surreptitiously became a part of the natural knowledge of  
God, i.e., of that knowledge of God which man can have without the free  
grace of God, by his own power, and with direct insight and assurance. 
 
Barth explains that his view of inspiration is actually more radical than the 
“supernaturalistic” view he believes must be discarded.   
 We must attack it rather because its supernaturalism is not radical enough.   
The intention behind it was ultimately only a single and in its own way very  
“naturalistic” postulate: that the Bible must offer us a divina et infallibilis  
historia; that it must not contain human error in any of its verses; that in all its  
parts and the totality of it words and letters as they are before us it must  
express divine truth in a form in which it can be established and understood;  
that under the human words it must speak to us the Word of God in such a  
way that we can at once hear and read it as such with the same obviousness  
and directness with which we can hear and read other human words; that it  
must be a codex of axioms which can be seen as such with the same formal  
dignity as those of philosophy and mathematics…Therefore we have to resist  
and reject the 17th-century doctrine of inspiration as a false doctrine…In it the  
Word of God could no longer be the Word of God and therefore it was no  
longer recognised as such.  The Bible was grounded upon itself apart from the  
mystery of Christ and the Holy Ghost.  It became a “paper Pope,” and unlike  
the living Pope in Rome it was wholly given up into the hands of its  
interpreters.  It was no longer a free and spiritual force, but an instrument of  
human power.519 
 
Barth’s understanding of the inspiration of scripture would appear to be driven by his 
commitment to a specific translation of theopneustos. Barth rejects Warfield’s translation520 
and instead translates theopneustos as ‘of the Spirit of God.’  Barth notes that his literal 
translation encompasses the idea of God breathing but also entails a lot more.  ‘Of the Spirit 
                                                
518 CD I/2 p. 522. 
519 Ibid, p. 525. 
520 See chapter one. 
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of God’ means “given and filled and ruled by the Spirit of God, and actively outbreathing 
and spreading abroad and making known the Spirit of God.”521 
 
 
Barth concludes this brief excursion on the meaning of theopneustos by saying that in the end 
all we can say about the meaning of this word used in relationship to scripture is that it is part 
of the free grace of God.  “At the decisive point all that we have to say about it can consist 
only in an underlining and delimiting of the inaccessible mystery of the free grace in which 
the Spirit of God is present and active before and above and in the Bible.”522  Barth refuses 
so say anymore about it.  The interesting point to mention for our purposes is that Barth does 
not conclude that the Bible is inerrant because of the use of this word in 2 Timothy.  For 
Barth, there is no necessary connection between the use of theopneustos and the doctrine of 
inerrancy.   
 
 
But it is in Barth’s refusal to strictly equate the text of the Bible and the Word of God where 
he loses all credibility with inerrantists.  For in their minds he has just undermined the only 
source of certainty that one has for faith.  If the Bible is not absolutely and objectively the 
Word of God for men then we can have no certainty, according to inerrantists, that God is 
really who the Bible claims him to be.  And yet Barth turns this kind of thinking on its head.  
For Barth the very claim that the Bible is the Word of God is a confession of faith that is 
given by the Holy Spirit.  And so to talk about an ‘objective’ and ‘certain’ foundation for our 
faith in the text of Scripture does not make sense to Barth. 
 The Bible is the concrete means by which the Church recollects  
 God’s past revelation, is called to expectation of His future revelation,  
 and is thus summoned and guided to proclamation and empowered for it.   
 The Bible, then, is not in itself and as such God’s past revelation, just as 
 Church proclamation is not in itself and as such the expected future  
                                                
521 CD I/2 p. 504. 
522 Ibid, p. 504. 
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 revelation.  The Bible, speaking to us and heard by us as God’s Word,  
 bears witness to past revelation.  Proclamation, speaking to us and heard  
 by us as God’s Word, promises future revelation.  The Bible is God’s Word  
 as it really bears witness to revelation, and proclamation is God’s Word as it 
 really promises revelation.523   
 
The Bible is the witness to revelation in Barth because a witness has the role of pointing 
beyond itself to another.  It is a servant of this other and vouches for the truth of the other but 
it is not the other.524  This is a very important point that must not be missed.  As a witness to 
revelation the Bible points to the only revelation of God that we know, Jesus Christ, whom 
the witness speaks of as the Word of God.  And, in fact, Barth believes he is simply restating 
what the Bible claims for itself.525   
 
 
Barth affirms “Holy Scripture is the Word of God for the Church, that it is Jesus Christ for 
us, as He Himself was for the prophets and apostles during the forty days.”526  He draws on 
Luther’s understanding of Scripture as the cloak of Christ which allows him to be seen.  He 
writes in a significant footnote to his thought on scripture, 
 
 We must leave it to revelation itself to introduce itself either in its  
 unity and entirety or indeed at all.  Revelation is never behind us:  
 always we can only follow it.  We cannot think it: we can only contemplate  
 it.  We cannot assert and prove it: we can only believe it, believe it in  
 recollection and expectation, so that if our faith is right and well-pleasing  
 to God in what we then think and say, it can assert and prove itself.  This, 
 then, is the conclusion and demand to which we are led by a right  
 understanding of the unity of Holy Scripture… Luther once spoke of the  
 unity of Holy Scripture in this way: “For Holy Scripture is the garment  
 which our Lord Christ has put on and in which He lets Himself be seen  
 and found.  This garment is woven throughout and so wrought together  
 into one that it cannot be cut or parted….”527   
 
                                                
523 CD I/1 p. 111 
524 Ibid 
525 Notice the similar method here to the inerrantist position.  Both Barth and inerrantists believe they are 
developing a position that is congruent with how scripture speaks of itself. 
526 CD I/2 p. 544 
527 Ibid, 484 
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And so through the reading of Holy Scripture Christ meets us.  This is His promise to us that 
in it He, the Word of God, would be with us always.  Where shall we find Him?  We find 
Him in the text that witnesses to Him.  But this finding is not done on our own.  At every 
point the Holy Spirit assists us.  He is our guide.  This is why Barth says the specific things 
he does about the relationship between scripture and the church. 
 
For Barth Scripture is not the church’s book.  The church is Scripture’s people.  He writes, 
“It is the Canon because it imposed itself upon the church as such, and continually does so.” 
And further, “No, the Bible is the Canon just because it is so.  It is so by imposing itself as 
such.”528  So the first thing to recognize is that the Bible is over the church and is used by 
God to become the event of His own encounter with us.  
 
So what or who gives Scripture authority?  Francis Watson recognizes that there is not much 
trace of the anxiety about inerrancy in Barth, which is true.  We do not find Barth appealing 
to an errorless original autograph to provide a foundation for Scripture’s authority.  Rather 
we see Barth weaving together the Spirit of God and the faith of the people of God to provide 
an understanding of Scripture’s authority.   
 
Watson writes, “The truthfulness and trustworthiness of this human speech can be guaranteed 
not by subjecting it to general criteria of ‘historical reliability’ and the like, but only by 
showing it to be grounded in the truthfulness and trustworthiness of divine speech.”529  And 
further, 
 The truthfulness and trustworthiness of the Bible are therefore  
 guaranteed by its intrinsic relationship to the truthfulness and  
 trustworthiness of the divine self-disclosive speech-act that takes  
 place in Jesus.  For Barth, the Bible is ‘the Word of God’ in that the  
                                                
528 CD I/1 p. 107. 
529 ‘The Bible’ by Francis Watson.  Webster, John. ed. The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 60. 
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 Word God spoke once for all continues to address us in the word  
 and testimony of the biblical writers.530 
 
The text of Scripture is authoritative within the Church because it is the place where the 
Word of God meets us.  By faith, which is itself a gift of God, we recognize this Word and 
accept it.  Christians do not hold the Koran or any other religious text as authoritative 
because they do not witness to the one Word of God.  And, although, God is free to 
encounter someone wherever He chooses, and He could choose the Koran, He promises to 
meet us where the written and proclaimed Word are.  So it seems to be the case that the Bible 
is authoritative because through its human words we are able to encounter the Son of God, 
Jesus Christ Himself.  That this will happen is the church’s hope.   
 
But none of this occurs without the work of the Spirit.  The Spirit’s role in all of this is vital 
because He is the one who gives us ‘eyes to see’ and ‘ears to hear.’  By the power of the 
Spirit we are able to meet Christ in the text of Scripture and so again it becomes authoritative 
for the church.  It becomes the Word of God for us.  In the same way that Christ had 
authority amongst the disciples as the Word of God so the Biblical text has authority amongst 
Christ’s current disciples.  This is not because the Bible is some kind of divine book sent 
directly from heaven.  It is simply because it becomes the Word of God for us as we meet 
Christ in it.    
 
This is the faith of the church, a faith which is in fact given by God Himself. 
 Faith is not one of the various capacities of man, whether native or  
 acquired.  Capacity for the Word of God is not among these.  The  
 possibility of faith as it is given to man in the reality of faith can be  
 understood only as one that is loaned to man by God, and loaned  
 exclusively for use.531 
  
                                                
530 Ibid, 61. 
531 CD I/1 p. 238. 
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In faith we hope to encounter Christ in the reading of Holy Scripture and in the proclamation 
of the Word.  And the church does, in fact do this!  The reason why scripture has authority 
within the church is the simple fact that God keeps his promises.  The church has met Christ 
in the text of Holy Scripture which has imposed itself upon the church.  And so, the church 
continues to turn to Holy Scripture because she continually desires to meet Christ and in faith 
believes that this is where He is to be found.  One might say that it is here where God freely 
loves to meet us.   As the quote from Luther above conveys, it is the garment that Christ puts 
on when he wishes to be seen and found. 
 
Finally, through the gift of faith the church meets Christ.  The Church experiences the Son of 
God as the Word of God in the written text of Scripture and through its own proclamation.  
This is how the church knows the Son through its experience of him.  Barth writes, 
 If knowledge of God’s Word is possible, this must mean that an  
 experience of God’s Word is possible.  We have defined knowledge  
 as confirmation of human acquaintance with an object whereby its  
 truth becomes a determination of the existence of the man who has  
 the knowledge.532 
 
And further, 
 
 Jesus Christ Himself lives in the message of His witnesses,  
 lives in the proclamation of His Church on the basis of this message,  
 strides forward as the Lord of grace and judgment to meet the existence  
 of the hearer of the Word.  Experience of God’s Word, then, must at least  
 be also experience of His presence, and because this presence does not rest  
 on man’s act of reconciliation but on God’s making Himself present in the  
 life of man, it is acknowledgment of His presence.533   
 
And this is what the church does in faith.  It acknowledges the presence of Christ within its 
life by the power of the Holy Spirit through the text of Holy Scripture and its own 
proclamation by the reading of Scripture and participating in the Sacraments.  If we are to 
                                                
532 Ibid. 198. 
533 Ibid, 206. 
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ask Barth why the Bible has authority for the church it is simply because the presence of the 
living Word, the Son of God is within it waiting to meet us.   
 
And we must not downplay the role of faith in Barth’s understanding of Scripture.  For in the 
phrase ‘we believe that the bible is the Word of God’ there is an element of faith involved 
that is crucial.  For Barth the Word of God as scripture is a statement of faith.  It cannot be 
proved by some type of scientific method forced upon it.  It can only be received in faith as 
that which it is: the Word of God for us.   
 We must say at once, that of itself the mere presence of the Bible  
 and our own presence with our capacities for knowing an object does  
 not mean and never will mean the reality or even the possibility of the  
 proof that the Bible is the Word of God.  On the contrary, we have to 
 recognise that this situation as such, i.e., apart from faith, only means the 
 impossibility of this proof.534 
 
Of course, this line of thought has many implications for apologetics and whether or not 
methods like evidentialism are valid ways of bringing about faith.  Unfortunately the scope 
of this chapter cannot allow us to address this, but it seems fair to say that Barth would 
challenge much of modern-day apologetics.535   
 
However, this evidences another area where Barth’s thought would make many inerrantists 
uneasy.  We must keep in mind that inerrantists use inerrancy as a means of proving the 
authority of scripture both within and without the church and for Barth this is simply getting 
the cart before the horse.  An encounter with Christ which produces faith must happen prior 
to a belief in the authority of scripture.  Now this encounter can happen when one meets the 
Word in Scripture for the first time, but the point is that one cannot believe in the authority of 
scripture without this encounter.   
                                                
534 CD I/2 p. 506. 
535 For a discussion of why Barth does not start with an apologetic prolegomena see John Webster’s Karl Barth.  
Continuum: London, p. 54. 
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The encounter language is one that often leaves Evangelicals in general and inerrantists in 
particular dissatisfied.  As Kevin Vanhoozer has asserted in a recent article on the topic, 
Evangelicals are sceptical of Barth because of what appears to be the ‘subjective’ nature of 
his doctrine of scripture.536  It is clear that Barth is primarily concerned with the Subject of 
scripture, i.e., that to whom scripture points, and that he refuses to think of scripture in any 
way that would determine God’s action.537  But does this mean that Barth can speak of no 
‘objective’ quality to the text?   
 
However, as Vanhoozer suggests, “The notion that the Bible is caught up in divine discourse 
casts new light both on Scripture’s ontology and its role in the economy of divine 
revelation.”  The Bible is the book that Christ cloaks himself with when he wishes to be 
found.  If we are to talk about some kind of ‘objective’ status of the text in Barth, then surely 
this is where we should start.  And although the text has its being in becoming, as 
McCormack’s quote showed above, because this text is where God promises to encounter his 
people it retains a unique status among other texts produced by mankind.  This is the closest 
Barth’s doctrine of scripture gets to the Evangelical concern for objectivity and although it is 
not the same as appealing to an inerrant original autograph it may be a window by which 
Evangelicals can continue in dialogue with Barth’s thought. 
 
Another theologian who seemed to have a more ‘Evangelical’ understanding of the 
‘objectivity’ of scripture is Abraham Kuyper.  However, he has much of the same 
                                                
536 This particular reading of Barth comes from Van Til and Gordon Clark who both have had a large impact on 
the way that Evangelicals read Karl Barth.  As Vanhoozer has clearly articulated in the article quoted above this 
may be a misreading of Barth which leads Evangelicals to distrust his theology.  See chapter 2 in Karl Barth 
and Evangelical Theology edited by Sung Wook Chung.  Paternoster: Michigan, 2006.   
537 This is perhaps where Vanhoozer’s case for divine speech-act pushes Barth too far.  For Vanhoozer God’s 
action is tied to the locution of the text.  Certainly, Barth could not make this move. 
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Pneumatological emphasis as Karl Barth.  We turn to an analysis of his doctrine of Scripture 
now in order to give another alternative doctrine of scripture, one that might be more 
sympathetic to Evangelical concerns but that does not need to establish a doctrine inerrancy 
to found scriptural authority.  
 
This problem evangelicals have with Barth is related to our discussion of the 
nature of truth in the previous chapter; if we understand truth as 
correspondence to facts, then Barth’s account seems weak, as it ducks the 
notion of truth. Barth’s doctrine of Scripture presupposes, or perhaps gives 
rise to, a rather different understanding of truth, truth as encounter, 
perhaps. 
 
But the inerrantist/evangelical critique still poses some problems for a 
doctrine like Barth’s. Truth must have some propositional content, particularly 
given the literary form of large sections of the Bible that are composed of 
(what appear to be) historical narratives. However much we want to insist that 
the truth of the Christmas narratives is primarily located in their witness to 
the living Christ, either Mary was or wasn’t a virgin; it either happened in a 
Bethlehem animal shed or somewhere else; and to dismiss these questions as 
irrelevant to the truth of the passage (in the manner of a radical Bultmannian, 
perhaps), seems difficult, at least. 
 
We may accept, then, that Barth’s emphasis on the freedom of God, the gift of 
revelation, and the promised present activity of the Spirit, serve together to 
dethrone the inerrancy question from being the most important, or even the only 
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question we ask about Scripture, but they do not remove the need to ask it 
entirely. For this reason, perhaps, Kuyper is more interesting. 
 
Abraham Kuyper’s Doctrine of Scripture 
 
Kuyper’s doctrine of scripture would suggest that there is a way to affirm inerrancy and yet 
not place the importance on it that many contemporary inerrantists seem to do.  I will suggest 
in what follows that by having a strong doctrine of sin Kuyper must rely on the work of the 
Spirit to bridge the gap between Creator and Creation.  Because of his particular 
pneumatology Kuyper finds fault with the kind of apologetics affirmed by Warfield and 
Henry.  His suspicion of these apologetics is congruent with why he is ultimately unable to 
regard the inerrancy of Scripture as key to maintaining the authority of Scripture.538   
 
Early on in his Sacred Theology Kuyper conveys his understanding of the effects of sin on 
the creation.  It would appear that Kuyper is comfortable suggesting that sin has effected all 
aspects of the created order and not just primarily the will as at least some readings of the 
tradition would seem to indicate.  Because Kuyper believes that sin pervades all aspects of 
the created reality he is suspicious of science and its claims to discover truth.  Because sin 
affects man’s epistemological capacity it would appear that his ability to do science is 
partially impaired.539   
 
Sin has affected man’s nature and as a result sin has weakened his energy of thought.540  In 
fact, Kuyper goes as far to say that because of sin we often use “a false and apparently 
logical, but in reality very unlogical, reasoning” which cannot be put right by the act of 
                                                
538 I offered an introductory comment on Kuyper’s understanding of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit at 
the beginning of chapter 4.  Here I am seeking to present a more complete picture of his thought in order to 
conclude the following chapter with a call for inerrantists to reconsider the Kuyperian perspective.  
539 I say partially because Kuyper is clear that our ability to reason logically has not been affected by sin for if it 
was, the result would be insanity. 
540 Kuyper, Abraham.  Sacred Theology.  Sovereign Grace Publishers, Inc.: Indiana, 2001, p. 30. 
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reasoning alone.  He calls this the “darkening of our consciousness” and because of this 
darkening, mankind’s spiritual sense is defective.541  It is important to note here that Kuyper 
makes the distinction between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ sciences.  Kuyper spends most of 
his time, when talking about the effects of sin on science, examining particularly the 
‘spiritual’ sciences, and showing that as a result of sin there is a disharmony within creation.  
 Disharmony rules our innermost parts.  The different senses, in the  
utterances of our inner selves, affect each other no longer in pure accord,  
but continually block the way before each other.  Thus discord arises in our  
innermost selves.  Everything has become disconnected.  And since the one  
no longer supports the other, but antagonizes it, both the whole and its parts  
have lost their purity.  Our sense of the good, the true, the beautiful, of what  
is right, of what is holy, has ceased to operate with accuracy.  In themselves  
these senses are weakened, and in their effect upon each other they have  
become mixed.  And since it is impossible, in the spiritual sciences, to take one 
forward step unless these senses serve us as guides, it readily appears how  
greatly science is obstructed by sin.  And finally, the chiefest harm is the ruin,  
worked by sin, in those data, which were at our command, for obtaining the  
knowledge of God, and thus for forming the conception of the whole.542   
 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be any hope in Kuyper’s mind of mankind’s ability to 
prove the existence of God.  According to Kuyper, all attempts to do this have failed and 
must fail because of the effects of sin on the created order.  But Kuyper also seems to 
indicate that we should be suspicious of some of the conclusions or ‘truths’ obtained by the 
natural sciences because of this sinful state.  He concludes the section on the relation between 
sin and science with this comment, 
 From which it by no means follows, that you should skeptically doubt  
all science, but simply that it will not do to omit the fact of sin from your  
theory of knowledge.  This would not be warranted if sin were only a  
thelematic conception and therefore purely ethic; but much less, now,  
since immediately as well as mediately, sin modifies so largely all those  
data with which you have to deal in the intellectual domain and in the  
building-up of your science.  Ignorance wrought by sin is the most difficult  
obstacle in the way of all true science.543   
 
                                                
541 Ibid. 
542 Ibid, 31. 
543 Ibid, 32. 
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One of the effects of sin’s dominion in creation is the “struggle for truth.”  There would be 
no struggle after what is true if sin did not cause the estrangement of creation from its proper 
object of knowledge, the Creator.  An interesting aspect of Kuyper’s understanding of truth, 
which is particularly relevant to our purposes is that truth is not the opposite of mistake.  He 
says, “It will not do to say that seeking after truth is directed exclusively against the 
possibility of mistake.  He who in good faith has made a mistake, has been inaccurate but not 
untrue.”544   Rather, the search for the truth is actually mankind’s attempt to escape the “fatal 
power of what Christ called the lie.”545  Untruth, or the lie, seems to have some kind of 
ontological status in Kuyper’s thought.  He labels it a power which “affects injuriously the 
consciousness of man” and “intentionally brings into our mind a representation of existing 
things which proscribes reality, with the avowed aim of estranging us from it.”546 
 
This would seem to imply that to speak of something as inerrant would not to imply that it is 
without mistake.  So to say that scripture is inerrant would not make it immune from making 
mistakes regarding history, science etc.  On Kuyper’s logic an inerrant scripture would be a 
scripture not affected by the power of the lie, which desires to estrange us from our Creator.  
It would appear then that one could claim inerrancy for scripture and yet still find 
‘inaccuracies’ within its content. 
 
Accordingly, the struggle for truth  
 does not aim at the correction of simple mistakes in the representation,  
neither does it combat prejudice, nor rectify inaccuracies; but it arrays itself  
against a power which ever in a new form entangles our human consciousness  
in that which is false, makes us servants to falsehood, and blinds us to reality.547  
 
                                                
544 Ibid. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid. 
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Because of this power over us Kuyper believes it is ridiculous to believe that science, either 
natural or spiritual, can ever decide absolutely between truth and falsehood.  He says, “To 
believe that an absolute science in the above-given sense [i.e., a science that is able to clear 
away whole series of fallacious representations of reality] can ever decide the question 
between truth and falsehood is nothing but a criminal self-deception.”548  This is an act of 
self-deception because of the subjective starting point of all knowledge.  In a way 
reminiscent of post-modern concerns, Kuyper argues that science always comes to 
conclusions that are a result of its own subjective starting-point.  Of course, one must 
remember that the struggle for truth happens because of sin and so the subjective factor of 
our scientific results would also appear to be related to the reality of sin.   
 
At this point the position that Kuyper is espousing would seem to lead to some sort of radical 
scepticism.  However, he quickly develops the idea that faith actually counteracts the 
scepticism that may result from seeing the universal affects of sin on creation.  Kuyper 
argues that, in fact, faith is a universal foundation that is common among all types of 
knowledge.  He disagrees with the traditional dichotomy between faith and knowledge and 
seeks to show that faith functions universally inside and outside the scientific world.549  In a 
lengthy comment he writes, 
 To take a position with reference also to this antithesis [between faith  
and knowledge], it is necessary that we go back to the formal function of  
faith, and investigate whether this function does or does not exhibit an  
universal character.  For if it does, this universal function of faith must also  
influence that particular function by which the scientific result is obtained,  
and the extent is traceable to which the function of faith is able to exert itself,  
as well as the point where its working stops.  We purposely consider this  
function of faith, next to wisdom, as a similar reaction against Scepticism.   
All Scepticism originates from the impression that our certainty depends  
upon the result of our scientific research.  Since, however, this result  
constantly appears to be governed by subjective influence, and is affected  
                                                
548 Ibid, 34. 
549 One can start to see how the Reformed epistemologists are indebted to Kuyper here. 
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by the conflict between truth and falsehood which is the result of sin, there  
is no defense against Scepticism except in the subject itself.550   
 
Faith is the only means people have of obtaining certainty.  It is the only bridge between the 
ego and the non-ego or in Kantian terms, the phenomena and the noumena.551  By faith, he 
does not mean some kind of religious belief.  He is clear that faith is knowledge which we 
possess that has not been demonstrated.  Faith is understood generally according to Scripture, 
to mean “assurance” and “proving” of objects which either we do not perceive or which do 
not show themselves.  It is this understanding that drives Kuyper’s position on the universal 
role of faith in the certainty of what we know. 
 
Faith is that which is the foundation of all demonstration.  “A proof proves only what it 
proves definitely and conclusively, and everything which in the end misses this conclusive 
character is not obtained by your demonstration but from elsewhere; and this other source of 
certainty is the very point in question.  Or rather, - for even now we do not speak with 
sufficient emphasis,- this other source, which we call faith, is the only source of certainty, 
equally for what you prove definitely and conclusively by demonstration.”552  Furthermore, 
faith is understood as the instrument by which we possess certainty and without it we would 
have no certainty about anything.  It is the means by which our ego believes our senses and 
so is foundational to all knowledge, scientific or otherwise.  Kuyper concludes, 
 All this but shows the utter untenability of the current representation  
that science establishes truth, which is equally binding upon all, exclusively  
on the ground of observation and demonstration, while faith is in order only  
in the realm of suppositions and of uncertainties.  In every expression of  
his personality, as well as in the acquisition of scientific conviction, every  
man starts out from faith.  In every realm faith is, and always will be, the  
last link by which the object of our knowledge is placed in connection with  
our knowing ego.  Even in demonstration there is no certainty for you  
because of the proof, but simply because you are bound to believe in the  
force of the demonstration… And for this reason it was very important to  
                                                
550 Ibid, 37.   
551 Ibid, 41. 
552 Ibid, 39. 
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show that faith is the element in our mind by which we obtain certainty,  
not only in the spiritual, but equally in the material sciences.553 
 
Kuyper’s suspicion of the ultimate authority of the material sciences to establish certainty 
about the things we know is rooted ultimately in his understanding of the fallen creation.  For 
Kuyper, science is not primarily concerned with truth because science would still exist in a 
world that was not fallen since the desire to discover things about the world would still be 
there.  The difference that sin makes to the picture is that there is no necessary connection 
between our reflection on the created world and the truth of the conclusions drawn.  In fact 
the possibility of doing science at all in a fallen world is only possible upon a foundation of 
faith.  For Kuyper, it is faith that bridges the gap between ourselves and the created world 
outside of us.   
 
The role of faith becomes more important in Kuyper’s thought as he addresses his 
understanding of how it is that theology is a science.  It is important to remember that Kuyper 
distinguishes between material sciences and spiritual sciences.  It would seem that the kind of 
faith Kuyper envisions as being foundational to the natural sciences is a kind of natural faith 
that is shared by all of creation, but when he starts talking about theology as a science the 
type of faith that is foundational to this kind of science does not seem to be the same as that 
of the material sciences.  The reason for this may have something to do with the particularly 
‘dependent’ character of theology.  What Kuyper means by this will become clear in what 
follows.  We now turn to the second aspect of Kuyper’s thought that is particularly influential 
in forming his understanding of Scripture: theology as science. 
 
According to Kuyper theology is a science precisely because it seeks to gain knowledge 
about God.554  What makes the science of theology different to all other sciences is its 
                                                
553 Ibid, 46. 
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particular relationship to the object of knowledge it is pursuing.  “For all other investigations 
the investigating subject places himself above the object to be investigated…But when the 
thirst for knowledge directs itself to Him whom man and all creation owe their origin, 
existence, and consciousness, the circumstances are materially changed.”555 Kuyper 
understands the science of theology to be dependent on the action of the object of study to 
reveal Itself.  This ‘dependent’ characteristic of theology is what makes it different to all 
other types of science.  When seeking knowledge of God, man “stands no longer above, but 
beneath the object of his investigation, and over against this object he finds himself in a 
position of entire dependence.”556 
  
It is possible to see a similarity here between Kuyper’s thought and Barth’s.  Both in 
different ways are concerned not to objectify that which theology seeks to identify.  Barth 
does this by presupposing God’s utter freedom so that he cannot be objectified or controlled 
by his creation.  Kuyper, in a similar way, speaks of the dependent nature of theology.  
Theological knowledge must wait for God to reveal himself.  This kind of knowledge is 
dependent on God’s action. 
 
This dependent character of theology is crucial in Kuyper’s overall conception of theology as 
a science.  He compares theological knowledge with that of an absolute stranger falling into 
the hands of the police.  The police are entirely dependent upon what this person determines 
to reveal to them and if he does not utter a single syllable from his mouth the police find 
themselves facing an enigma they cannot solve.  Our knowledge of God happens in a similar 
                                                                                                                                                  
554 Kuyper spends some time reflecting on the etymological distinctions that are inherent in qeologia and 
concludes that the Greeks used this term to mean speaking of God, speaking about God, knowledge that God 
has of Himself, and knowledge that we have of God.  In the Western church this term came to mean the 
knowledge of God that He has revealed of Himself to creation.  This is the primary meaning that Kuyper 
employs. 
555 Sacred Theology, 96. 
556 Ibid. 
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way in that we are completely dependent on God’s utterance if we are to know anything 
about Him.  Kuyper writes,  
 They [the police] are entirely dependent upon the will of that stranger  
either to reveal or not to reveal knowledge of himself.  And this is true in  
an absolute sense of the Theologian over against God.  He cannot investigate  
God.  There is nothing to analyze.  There are no phenomena from which to  
draw conclusions.  Only when that wondrous God will speak, can he listen.   
And thus the Theologian is absolutely dependent upon the pleasure of God,  
either to impart or not to impart knowledge of Himself.557 
 
Kuyper adopts the distinction of the ‘old Theologians’ between ectypal and archetypal 
theology.  All of our knowledge of God is ectypal in that what God reveals of himself to us is 
not identical with God’s own self-knowledge, i.e., archetypal.  “All knowledge remains 
received knowledge, and it is not God himself, but the knowledge He has revealed to us 
concerning Himself which constitutes the material for theological investigation.  Hence 
ectypal Theology.”558  All of our knowledge of God is a copy of the knowledge that God has 
of Himself.  Kuyper maintains this distinction because he believe that no man can investigate 
God Himself and so the knowledge we have must be ectypal.   
 
In maintaining this distinction Kuyper separates himself from one of the theological 
assumptions that lead to the doctrine of inerrancy examined in the pages above.  As we have 
seen in a previous chapter, Carl Henry has a univocal understanding of revelation.  This 
understanding is the exact opposite of the distinction between ectypal and archetypal 
theology in Kuyper.  According to Henry, the knowledge that God reveals of Himself to us is 
exactly the same knowledge that God has of Himself.  Kuyper will not make this conclusion.  
As we see below, this is primarily because of what it means for mankind to be created. 
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This is not to say that the knowledge God has given us is less true than the knowledge that 
God has of Himself.  Kuyper uses the picture Paul gives that “now we see in part, but then 
we will see face to face” to illustrate the difference between ectypal and archetypal theology.  
It is not as though, Kuyper argues, in the self-knowledge of God there are ten parts, six of 
which he has decided to reveal to us.  Rather we see the whole as though we are looking 
through a dimmed glass.559   
 
The distinction between archetypal and ectypal is ultimately founded on an understanding of 
the relation between Creator and creation.  Man is the ectype over against God as the 
archetype.  Therefore man’s knowledge must be ectypal.  What it means for man to be 
created in the imago dei is that he is the ectype of the archetype.  Kuyper continues, “Rather, 
therefore, than lose ourselves in this intellectualistic abstraction, we adopt the names of 
Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in the originally fuller sense, i.e. as standing in immediate 
relation to the creation of man after the image of God.  As man stands as ectype over against 
God, the archetype, man’s knowledge of God can therefore be only ectypal.”560  According 
to Kuyper this is why man’s knowledge of God must be a dependent knowledge.  He 
concludes, “This is what we mean when we call Theology a dependent knowledge- a 
knowledge which is not the result of an activity on our part, but the result of an action which 
goes out from God to us; and in its wider sense this action is God’s self-revelation to His 
creature.”561 
 
The argument Kuyper makes for the continued distinction between archetypal and ectypal 
knowledge of God is not prima facie what one would expect.  By rooting the distinction in 
the imago dei Kuyper seems to imply that it is properly part of the doctrine of creation and 
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yet he speaks in terms of ultimately seeing ‘face to face’ which implies that in the eschaton 
we will have archetypal knowledge of God.  However, Kuyper does not mention the doctrine 
of sin and its relation to this epistemological distinction.  Therefore, it would not seem that 
we have an ectypal knowledge of God not because we are fallen but rather because we are 
created.  If this is the case then what it means to “see face to face” does not imply archetypal 
knowledge of God.   
 
Regardless of this, the fact that Kuyper maintains this distinction is of crucial importance.  If 
we combine the foundation of faith with the ectypal knowledge that is obtained by the 
dependent theological science then one is inclined to ask how this knowledge is obtained and 
what the role is of faith in this attaining.  Kuyper’s answer relies on a detailed 
pneumatology.562  It is by the work of the Holy Spirit that man has faith and is able to receive 
the ectypal knowledge revealed to him by God.  The Holy Spirit’s continuing action in the 
world is decisive in Kuyper’s thought at this point. 
 
To use the phrase “the Holy Spirit’s action in the world” may not be accurate enough.  This 
is because Kuyper is very adamant that the church produces theology and not theology the 
church.  Knowledge of God is ultimately only given to those whom God by His Spirit wills 
to give it.  This revelation is given to those who have been given the gift of faith by the Spirit 
and as a result theology, per se, comes out of the church which makes it confessional in 
nature.563 
The Church does not spring from theology, but theology has its rise in the life  
of the Church.  And if the objection is raised, that in this way theology is robbed of its 
character of universal validity and thus becomes unscientific, we answer: (1) that for 
                                                
562 Comments have already been made about Kuyper’s pneumatology in chapter 4.  We will spend some more 
time looking at this area of his thought after dealing with the principium of theological knowledge below. 
563 Kuyper does admit that in Scripture there are cases where revelation of God happens without regeneration 
but he is quick to say that this is an exception and not the rule.  In general, regeneration precedes spiritual 
illumination. 
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universal validity the acceptance of all individuals is not demanded; but only of those 
who are receptive to the truth of a matter and are well informed of it; (2) that every 
convinced theologian in the presence of his opponent also appeals from the mind that 
has been ill-informed (male informatum) to the mind that is to be better informed 
(melius informandum).564  
 
The implications of this way of thinking vary.  One implication has to do with apologetics.  If 
Kuyper is correct and theology only rises out of the church then theological science is not 
able to speak to anyone to whom the Spirit has not first given the gift of faith.  Theology, 
then, would appear to have little apologetic value.  Only those who have been reborn, 
according to Kuyper, received the illumination of the Spirit and so are able to see the object 
of theological science.565  Therefore, theology is not universal in scope and cannot be 
because unlike other sciences its object of knowledge is related differently to the subject than 
the material science’s object to its subject.   
 
Again, Kuyper and Barth are not far from each other in their thinking at this point.  Barth 
also places theology within the church and the implications for apologetics in his thought are 
the same.  Theology cannot simply be a rational exercise which transcends the church.566  
Both thinkers distance themselves from a certain kind of  modern theological assumption that 
theological knowledge is like any other kind of knowledge that is accessible to anyone of 
normal cognitive aptitude.  This is why Kuyper speaks of the principium  of theology in the 
distinct way that he does. 
 If the object of theology had stood coordinate with the objects of the  
other sciences, then together with those sciences theology would have  
been obliged to employ a common principium of knowing.  But, since,  
on the other hand, the object of theology excluded every idea of  
coordination, and thinking man, who asked after the knowledge of God,  
stood in a radically different relation to that God than to the several  
kingdoms of created things, there had to be a difference in the principium  
of knowing.  With every other object it was the thinking subject who took  
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knowledge; here it was the object itself that gave knowledge.567 
 
Kuyper seeks to understand this principium, or foundation, of theology.  This principium 
must be different to all other scientific foundations of knowing because of the particular 
relationship between the subject and object of theological knowledge.  Moreover, it must be 
different because of the dependent characteristic of theological knowledge. 
 
So what is the foundation of theological knowledge?  Kuyper acknowledges that it has been 
customary to regard Scripture as the foundation but he is concerned with this understanding.  
He writes,  
 This has made it customary to seek the proper principium of theology  
immediately in the Holy Scripture, by which was meant of course simply the  
material principium of knowing (principium cognoscendi materiale).  The  
knowledge of God, which God Himself had communicated by numerous facts  
and revelations, and which under his guidance was embodied in the Holy  
Scripture, was the gold which theology was to delve from the mine of the  
Holy Scripture.  Meanwhile this could not be intended otherwise than as an  
abbreviated manner of speech.  A principium is a living agent, hence a  
principium of knowledge must be an agent from which of necessity  
knowledge flows.  And this of course the Bible as such is not.  The  
principium of knowledge existed before knowledge had emerged from  
this principium, and consequently before the first page of Scripture was  
written.  When, nevertheless, the Sacred Scripture is called the sole  
principium of theology (principium unicum theolgiae), then the Scripture  
here is taken as a plant, whose germ has sprouted and budded, and has  
unfolded those buds.  It is not, therefore, the naked principium, but the  
principium together with what it has brought forth.  Speaking more  
accurately, we should say that the material principium is the self-revelation  
of God to the sinner, from which principium the data have come forth in the  
Holy Scriptures, from which theology must be built up.568   
 
Accordingly, the proper principium of theological knowledge is not Scripture.  The problem 
is that Scripture is so often understood to be the principium that it becomes the object of 
knowledge similar to scientific objects of exploration.  In a telling remark, Kuyper 
comments, “It is unfortunate, however, that in olden time so little attention was paid to the 
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formal principium.  For now it seemed altogether as though the still darkened understanding 
was to investigate the Scripture as its object, in an entirely similar way to that in which this 
same understanding threw itself on plant  
and animal as its object.”569   
 
If the formal principium is not Scripture then what is it?  The principium, according to 
Kuyper, is the action of the Holy Spirit.  Through the action of the Holy Spirit, or more 
accurately, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit on the sinful mind of man the 
knowledge of God is received.  Kuyper writes,  
 There is no third something, that guarantees to our consciousness the reality 
  of this principium.  The working of this principium upon our consciousness is  
direct.  This is really self-evident, since every principium finds its particular  
character in this, that it is itself ground, and therefore allows no other ground  
under itself; but in the case of the principium of theology ideas have been so  
confused, that a separate study of it cannot be omitted.  For the sake of  
clearness we start from the ultimate cause, i.e., from special inspiration.  God  
from His own mind breathes (inspirat) into the mind of man, more particularly  
into the mind of sinful man, and that, too, in a special manner.  This, and  
nothing else, is the principium, for which knowledge of God comes to us  
sinners, and from which also theology as a science draws its vital power.570 
 
And further,  
 
 If, therefore, our knowledge of God is only derived from the self- 
communication of God, i.e., the fruit of inspiration, then God as inspirer  
(Deus inspirans) must be the principium, the first agent in our knowledge of  
God; and the finding of something back of this principium, from which it  
should follow or flow, is simply inconceivable.571   
 
It is clear from the comments above that the Spirit of God is the foundation of all knowledge 
of God.  Kuyper is clear that this fact cannot be demonstrated and as such cannot be 
disproved.  It is sufficient unto itself and needs no proof.572  He does admit that the early 
church fathers believed this also to be the case because of their understanding of Scripture.  
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“They founded their confession of the Scripture ultimately upon no other testimony than the 
witness of the Holy Spirit.”573  Evidence may be added to this testimony, but it is never the 
foundation for belief.  The foundation for belief is solely based on the work of Spirit in the 
life of sinners.   
 
This understanding of the principium finally relates to Kuyper’s assessment of the 
relationship between Holy Scripture and the principium.  All of what has been said thus far 
has led us to the point where we are now in a position to speak about Kuyper’s doctrine of 
Scripture which must be seen in light of everything discussed prior to this.  His doctrine of 
Scripture only makes sense in light of these things.   
 
Questions concerning the ontology of Scripture have been the dominant Evangelical concern 
when it comes to speaking about the doctrine of scripture.  However, for Kuyper, this does 
not seem to be the most important aspect of what it means for scripture to be scripture.  This 
is not to say that Kuyper does not hold to an orthodox understanding of the inspiration of 
scripture or that he does not believe that scripture is the Word of God.  Rather, Kuyper is 
concerned to address how it is that we recognize scripture as these things.  It should come as 
no surprise that Kuyper does not believe that we come to know these things based on rational 
arguments or empirical evidences related to Scripture itself.  There is no sense in Kuyper that 
we are able to speak about these things without the aid of the Holy Spirit.  In one instance he 
writes,  
 And the witness of the one central revelation which neither repeats  
nor continues itself, lies for us in the Holy Scripture.  Not, of course, as  
though the Bible, by itself, were sufficient to give, to every one who reads it,  
the true knowledge of God.  We positively reject such a mechanical  
explanation; and by their teaching of the witness of the Holy Spirit as  
absolutely indispensable for all conviction concerning Scripture, by their  
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requirement of the illumination for the right understanding of the Scripture,  
and by their high esteem of the ministry of the Word for the application of the  
Scripture, our fathers have sufficiently shown that such a mechanical  
explanation cannot be ascribed to them.574     
 
Kuyper draws on the church fathers’ understanding of Scripture as a source for his 
understanding of the role that the Spirit plays.  There is no sense in Kuyper that the Spirit 
merely assures of the convictions we have about Scripture which are apparently based on the 
evidences of Scripture itself.  Rather, the Spirit is the one doing the convicting in the life of 
the believer so that any belief about Scripture is a direct result of his work in the believer.  
There is even a sense that in order for Scripture to be the Word of God the Spirit must do this 
work in the believer.  If this is the case then it would appear that it makes no sense to call the 
Scriptures the objective Word of God.  It would seem that they only are the Word of God in 
relation to a believing subject.  “To him who does not feel that, at the moment when he opens 
the Holy Scripture, God comes by and in it and touches his very soul, the Scripture is not yet 
the Word of God, or has ceased to be this; or it is this in his spiritual moments, but not at 
other times, as when the veil lies again on his heart, while again it is truly such when the veil 
is taken away.”575 
 
Kuyper is careful to explain that the revelation of God does not come individually to each 
sinner.  He envisions it more like a banquet table that has been set up for the entire church.  
This one revelation is organically connected to all believers and is accessed through 
Scripture.  The crucial point is the Pneumatological one.  As was seen in the last quote, even 
though the central revelation of God does lie in scripture it can only be accessed by the will 
and work of the Spirit.   
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The scripture is the document of this revelation but not the revelation itself.  This is similar to 
the archetypal/ectypal distinction made previously.  The image of the revelation is in 
Scripture not revelation itself.  Kuyper likens this to the production of a photograph.  “Even 
as your person, by an optical process, photographs itself and produces its own image upon 
the collodion plate, so it is likewise the Revelation itself which has given its own image in 
the Holy Scripture.  The scripture as the document of the central Revelation is therefore 
organically connected with that Revelation itself.”576 
 
However, the action of God has not ended when the scripture had been written.  To go back 
to the photograph analogy: it would seem that in order for us to even recognize the image of 
ourselves in the picture we need a special lens through which we look at this picture.  
Similarly, in order for us to recognize scripture as the Word of God we must have the special 
lens of the Holy Spirit affecting our ‘vision’.  With this perspective Kuyper can conclude, 
 At no single point of the way is there place, therefore, for a support  
derived from demonstration or reasoning.  There is no man that seeks,  
and seeking finds the Scripture, and with its help turns himself to his God.   
But rather from beginning to end it is one ceaselessly continued action  
which goes out from God to man, and operates upon him, even as the light  
of the sun operates upon the grain of the corn that lies hidden in the ground,  
and draws it to the surface, and causes it to grow into stock.577 
 
It is clear that one’s recognition of scripture as the Word of God is solely up to the Spirit’s 
work in one’s life.  There is a strong sense of the providence of God upon which Kuyper 
relies.  There is no sense that a ‘scientific’ examination of Scripture or a logical analysis of 
scripture is able to produce faith in its being the Word of God.   
 For no single moment, therefore, may we entertain the admission  
that argument may be the ground of conviction.  This would be a “passing  
into another kind,” which is logically condemned.  Faith gives the highest  
assurance, where in our own consciousness it rests immediately on the  
testimony of God; but without this support, everything that announces itself  
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as faith is merely a weaker form of opinion based on probability, which  
capitulates the moment a surer knowledge supersedes your defective evidence.578   
 
No recognition of scripture as the Word of God is possible without this testimony.  It is this 
testimony, the testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is the foundation of theology.  However, 
Kuyper does seems to speak of scripture as being in some sense the principium of theology.  
We have established that he acknowledges that the principium must be a living agent and yet 
there are times where he calls scripture the principium.  So what does he mean by this? 
 
It would seem that Kuyper wants to maintain that when we seek to know anything about 
God, the instrument though which we obtain this knowledge is Scripture.  Because of the Fall 
there is nowhere else for man to turn but scripture which God has provided by the inspiration 
of the Spirit.  It is in this sense that Kuyper speaks of scripture as the principium of theology.  
Even though scripture is this ontologically, there can be no recognition of it apart from the 
Spirit.  Kuyper uses the language of the Reformers by talking about the providential 
specialissima to describe the action of God in “rendering this Scripture a special revelation 
for this and that given person.”579   
 
This leads Kuyper to conclude that if God were to take away the faith we have that scripture 
gives us His special revelation then we could no longer believe the things we do about 
scripture.  “If God then withdraws Himself, if in the soul of men He bear no more witness to 
the truth of His Word, men can no longer believe, and no apologetics, however brilliant, will 
ever be able to restore the blessing of faith in Scripture.  Faith, quickened by God Himself, is 
invincible: pseudo-faith, which rests merely upon reasoning, is devoid of all spiritual reality, 
so that it bursts like a soap-bubble as soon as the thread of your reasoning breaks.”580   
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But a further clarification needs to be made.  As Harriet Harris writes in her chapter on 
Kuyper’s doctrine of Scripture in Religious Pluralism and Public Life, “It is a manner of 
speech to call Scripture the principium of theology, but one that suffices if understood 
properly.”581  She is correct to say that it is a ‘manner of speech’ because it is here and here 
alone where one’s knowledge of God is obtained.   
 The description of this action of God, i.e. the providing of this  
central Revelation for our human race, is contained in the Holy Scripture.   
He who would know this central Revelation, must seek it therefore in the  
Holy Scripture.  And in that sense the question, where the special principium  
with the central Revelation to our race as its fruit is now to be found, must be  
answered without hesitation as follows: In the Holy Scripture and in the Holy  
Scripture alone.582 
 
It would appear that the characteristic that makes scripture the principium of theology is that 
it is the place where the special revelation of God is found.  In so much as it is here, and here 
alone, where this revelation is found, Kuyper is able to define scripture in this way.583    
 
So it would seem that the principium of theology can be understood as scripture but is not 
fully defined by scripture.  This is partly realized in Kuyper’s understanding of the 
temporality of scripture.  The giving scripture is strictly a temporal event that occurred as a 
result of the fall.  Because of this when creation has been fully redeemed the scripture will no 
longer have a role to play in our knowledge of God.  We will then have a completely natural 
knowledge of God.584 
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Because of sin, the special revelation of God accessed through scripture is of vital 
importance to theology.  Ontologically, scripture is like a glittering sapphire.  The problem is, 
ontologically we are like blind men.  So even though Kuyper sees scripture as being very 
valuable it is only by the illumination of the Spirit that we are able to see scripture as it truly 
is.  Kuyper is aware that many have tried through certain types of arguments to reveal the 
glimmer of scripture.  He draws the conclusion that internally, i.e., inside the church, these 
may help to combat doubt; however, externally, i.e., outside of the church, any arguments of 
this kind have no value.  Why is this?  It should be no surprise that the answer lies with 
Kuyper’s commitment to pneumatology.  “The witness of the Holy Spirit is and ever will be 
the only power which can carry into our consciousness the certainty concerning the special 
revelation.”585 
 
Because of the nature of the Spirit’s interaction with scripture in Kuyper’s thought, questions 
concerning the ontology of Scripture seem to play a tertiary role.  At times Kuyper talks of 
scripture merely as a vehicle or instrument for God’s purposes.  His wording is quite strong 
when he remarks, “By itself the Bible is nothing but a carrier and vehicle, or, if you please, 
the instrument prepared by God, by which to attain His spiritual purpose, but always through 
the ever-present working of the Holy Spirit.”586  Kuyper’s comment is indicative of his 
understanding of Scripture.  He is not concerned to talk about scripture merely in terms of its 
ontological status.  He does not elevate scripture to a position which makes its ontological 
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status of primary importance.  To do so would be to make it the proper principium of 
theology which it can never be.   
 
Kuyper’s focus is always upon God’s action toward creation.  When it comes to discussing 
scripture, Kuyper is adamant that the work of the Spirit is what is primarily important to our 
knowledge of God.  Without him and his work it would not matter how long we stared at the 
text of scripture or how long we debated about its inerrant qualities; nothing would result 
except maybe a pseudo-faith.  By emphasizing the Spirit in the way he does Kuyper is not 
drawn into rationalistic or empirical debates concerning the text of scripture.  Kuyper’s faith 
that Scripture is the fountain from which our knowledge of God springs is founded on 
nothing else than the work of the Spirit in him.   
 
The implications for what it would mean to label Kuyper as an inerrantist are becoming clear.  
There seems to be a connection between Warfield’s inerrancy and Kuyper’s doctrine.  Harris 
comments, “In 1881, the year that A.A. Hodge and B.B. Warfield published their article 
defending the verbal inspiration of Scripture and the inerrancy of the original autographs, 
Kuyper proclaimed the very same doctrines in his rectorial address at the Free University.”587  
However, she admits that these doctrines did not feature strongly in his Sacred Theology.  
This begs the question as to why inerrancy would not feature strongly in Kuyper’s writing 
when the majority of the time he is concerned with revelation and Scripture.   
 
As we saw in chapter four, Kuyper connected the authority of Scripture and the internal 
testimony of the Spirit in such a way that Scripture has no authority apart from this witness.  
This is congruent with the area of Kuyper’s thought we have examined in this chapter.  It 
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would seem that the doctrinal weight of inerrancy would not be as much in Kuyper’s thought 
because of his particular Pneumatological emphasis.  It may be that Scripture is infallible and 
inerrant.  It seems pretty clear that Kuyper was happy to affirm these properties of the 
original autographs, but I suppose one question is, “what does it matter?”  
 
If, according to Kuyper, one’s belief that Scripture has authority over his life is rooted not in 
any rational argument that it should have authority nor in any empirical investigation into its 
claims, but first and foremost because God has touched this person’s heart in such a way that 
he believes that Scripture has authority, then it would seem these proofs become less 
important.  As Kuyper says, they may help when the person has times of doubt, but they are 
unable to be the cause of this person’s belief.   
 
Ultimately, the central assumption has to do with apologetics.  What is the function of 
apologetics in the world?  For Kuyper, apologetics serve the humanness of the church, not 
the humanness of the world.  The Spirit must provide faith and it is on the foundation of this 
work that our faith should and must rest.  No other foundation is appropriate or reliable.  In 
the conclusion of the following chapter we will look at the implications of this way of 
thinking for the church’s current understanding of inerrancy and how it might be understood 
according to these implications. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a summary of two further doctrines of Holy 
Scripture which are not entirely in agreement with the inerrantist position.  The first section 
examined Karl Barth’s doctrine of Scripture.  We found that in Barth Scripture is not 
revelation but its witness.  The One revelation from God is the person of Jesus Christ.  In 
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Barth there is no confusion between the revelation of God and Holy Scripture.  They cannot 
be identified.   
 
We showed that Barth’s doctrine of scripture was founded upon two primary 
presuppositions: God’s complete transcendence and God’s essence as being one who loves in 
complete and absolute freedom.  Because of these two presuppositions Barth is unable to 
identify the Word of God with the text of Scripture and he is unable to accept any theological 
idea that would be connected with natural theology.   
 
Because of His transcendence God’s revelation must meet us and He does so as the Word of 
God in three forms.  God meets us as the person of Jesus Christ, in the written witness to His 
Word from the Apostles and in the proclamation of His Word within the Church.  Barth 
understands the Word of God in this threefold form.   
 
But because of God’s freedom He is necessarily not tied to either the written word or the 
proclaimed word and so chooses to meet us in those things.  And so for Barth the authority of 
scripture lies in the fact that Christ promises to meet us at or in that text.  Furthermore, Christ 
is free not to make himself known for a period of time in the text or to a specific reader or 
specific readers of the text.  Meeting Christ in the text involves faith and this faith is the gift 
of a God who loves in freedom.  In order for Scripture to be the Word of God man must be 
given faith to see it as such.  
 
Because of Barth’s particular understanding of scripture as the witness to revelation he had 
no great interest in the doctrine of inerrancy.  In fact, it could be said that Barth opposed such 
a doctrine because he felt it took away some of the graciousness of a God who made contact 
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with and revealed Himself to and through erring human beings.  Ultimately, for Barth, the 
authority of Scripture rests in the person to whom it witnesses not on errorless propositions.   
 
Following on from Barth we have a clear statement Kuyper’s doctrine of scripture.  This 
doctrine is solidly based on his understanding of the contemporary work of the Spirit within 
the church.  One’s belief in the authority of the Bible is solely dependent upon the free gift of 
the Spirit of God.   
 
Because of his understanding of sin and its effects on creation Kuyper was careful not to base 
his understanding of biblical authority on anything that could be affected by the fall.  
Therefore, the only authority that can be trusted is that of God.  Kuyper did not need the 
evidence of an errorless text to establish his understanding of biblical authority.  Rather, he 
recognized that the only authority that could be fully trusted was that which was established 
by the work of the Spirit of God within the life of the church.  Ultimately, Scripture has 
authority because of the Spirit’s testimony and this testimony is His gift to the church.   
 
Both theologians examined above highly regarded scripture.  Both thinkers develop doctrines 
that are highly dependent on the active contemporary work of the Holy Spirit.  And while 
Barth denied the doctrine of inerrancy as it had developed in his time, Vanhoozer has 
commented that we might label Barth’s view of scripture as an inerrant witness.588  And 
although there is no doubt that Kuyper used the language of inerrancy and found it helpful, 
neither thinkers’ doctrines of scripture will allow them to accept the specific doctrine of 
inerrancy as it is defined in this thesis.  
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Both see the contemporary witness of the Spirit as foundational to any development of the 
authority of scripture.  Whereas, the doctrine of inerrancy places the past inspiration of the 
Spirit as the foundation for Biblical authority, Barth and Kuyper heavily rely on His current 
work in order to establish Biblical authority.  Barth’s need for past inspiration of the Biblical 
text may be dubious and Kuyper’s thought perhaps not as fully developed as one would like, 
nevertheless neither need the Spirit to ‘produce’ the text in the same way as inerrantists do.  
This is because of the specific Pneumatological perspective that they share.   
 
This means that the statement “If the Bible was not originally inerrant, it cannot have 
authority” has absolutely no weight in either theologian.  When one situates the action of the 
Spirit in the specific manner that both have, then this statement means nothing.  Why is the 
Bible authoritative?  Both would answer, “Because I have been given faith that this is where 
God has revealed or is revealing himself.”  And the Spirit gives this faith.  It’s not something 
that can be accessed by anyone ‘examining’ the Bible as many inerrantists imagine.  This 
specific Pneumatological position is one major aspect of their doctrines of scripture that 
distinguishes both Barth and Kuyper from their inerrantists contemporaries.   
 
With this Pneumatology always in the back of our minds we turn to the concluding chapter of 
this thesis.  In this chapter we will incorporate all that has been established in the previous 
chapters in order to present a clear picture of both the philosophical and theological 
presuppositions involved in the doctrine of inerrancy.  Once this has been done we will 
briefly examine the way in which a couple of contemporary post-modern theologians attempt 
to understand biblical authority before offering conclusions of our own about a way forward 
for the doctrine of inerrancy that may not involve so many of the presuppositions that the 
current doctrine requires. 
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~6~ 
 
A Way Forward 
 
 
Where do we go from here?  In chapter four we looked at the connection between inerrancy 
and biblical authority and followed that chapter with two very different understandings of 
biblical authority, neither of which needed to commit to any particular definition of 
inerrancy.  Each of the different ways of establishing biblical authority have their strengths 
and weaknesses.  So in this chapter I want to suggest a way forward for those of us who 
believe that Scripture is authoritative in our lives but feel that inerrancy might not be the 
principle way of establishing this belief.  The picture of a way forward presented in this 
chapter will look more like the impressionism of Monet than the precision of a photograph 
by Ansel Adams.     
 
The way in which the doctrine of inerrancy must be challenged is in its claim to be the 
foundation for a person’s faith, and hence the priority for inerrancy ought to be reduced.  
Colin Gunton offers some insight into what our foundation should be.  In the quote below 
Christology and pneumatology are not separated.  In an Irenaean fashion, the hands of God 
cannot act alone.  Because of the close tie between Christology and pneumatology, Gunton’s 
thought gives us a glimpse of how we might go forward in our understanding of where the 
priority for the doctrine of inerrancy lies.  He writes, 
 The co-eternal Word is thus the basis of any and all meaning as  
‘foundation’: not only of the faith of the believer, but of the very possibility  
of knowledge of any kind.  If Christ is the mediator of creation, then he is the basis of 
created rationality and therefore of human knowledge, wherever and whatever; we 
might say, of all human culture.  But that point must be developed pneumatologically 
also, so that all rationality, truth and beauty are seen to be realised through the 
perfecting agency of God the Spirit, who enables things to be known by human minds 
and made by human hands.  Christ is indeed the Truth, but the truth becomes truth in 
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all the different ways in which it is mediated by the Spirit.  Pneumatology is thus the 
key to any adequate theology of revelation and of its mediation.589   
 
By establishing a Christological foundation through the work of the Spirit, Gunton links all 
knowledge to Christ.  By doing this it actually becomes impossible to argue using 
foundations that are ‘secular’ in nature, i.e., rationalistic.  According to Gunton, because 
Christ is the mediator of all creation then ultimately He is the one upon whom all of our 
knowledge and certainty is established.   
 
Being sceptical of foundationalism does not imply doing away with foundations (as many 
postliberals would agree).  However, if Gunton is correct then this foundation is always 
known by faith through the gift of the Spirit.  It cannot be argued for on the basis of creation, 
either natural or rational.  It must be gifted.  When this is applied to the authority of Scripture 
it entails that knowledge of this authority is also gifted.  The rational evidences may support 
what is known by the gift of the Spirit but are never in a position to prove what only the 
Spirit can.  Apologetically, this means trusting much more in the work of the Spirit to open 
eyes rather than in our ability to force them open by natural means.   
 
If Christ truly is the foundation for all of our knowledge then we ought to be very careful not 
to let him become replaced by something else.  It would seem that we would be in danger of 
being unfaithful when we allow something else to take a position that only Christ can truly 
occupy.  But it is one thing to suggest that Christ is the foundation, and quite another thing to 
say what this might look like in terms of the doctrine of inerrancy. 
 
                                                
589 Gunton, Colin E.  A Brief Theology of Revelation.  T&T Clark: Edinburgh, 1998, p. 124. 
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Abraham Kuyper, who we met briefly in chapter four and then again more substantially in 
chapter five might be considered an inerrantist in a general sense.590  However, he did not 
seem to allow the doctrine of inerrancy to become foundational to his belief in the authority 
of scripture.  In one passage he writes, 
 But however firmly the organic relation both of our race and of  
revelation must be maintained, it is not asserted that the Holy Scripture  
is enough for the individual.  This is not the case at all, and he who thinks  
that the Holy Spirit really gave the Scripture, but now leaves its appropriation  
to our natural reason, is woefully mistaken.  On the contrary, the Holy Spirit,  
who gave up the Scriptures, is Himself the perpetual author (auctor perpetuus)  
of all appropriation of their contents by and of all application to the individual.   
It is the Holy Spirit who, by illumination, enables the human consciousness to  
take up into itself the substance of the Scripture; in the course of ages leads  
our human consciousness to ever richer insights into its content; ands who,  
while this process continues, imparts to the elect of God, as they reach the  
years of discretion, that personal application of the Word, which, after the  
Divine counsel, is both intended and indispensable for them.591 
 
When the authority of scripture is thought of in this sense the motivation for reading it 
changes. It is not because the Bible is prima facie the Word of God written.  Rather, one 
reads the Bible in order that he might hear the Spirit speaking and in so doing be continually 
transformed into the community of Christ. 
 
There are many implications of this way of thinking.  It clearly makes the church a people of 
the book.  The authority of scripture is most easily recognized within the church.  It is this 
community who has been constructed by the Holy Spirit by His speaking through the Biblical 
text, which is then able to recognize the authority of the Bible.  The question of whether the 
Bible can in any way act authoritatively outside of the community which is formed by the 
Spirit’s appropriation of it is a question often raised.  But the question presupposes a 
                                                
590 I am aware that the doctrine of inerrancy was not fully developed and available to Kuyper and those of his 
time.  However, Richard B. Gaffin, Jr. writes a convincing article showing many of the ways in which Kuyper 
would have been sympathetic with claims of inerrancy.  See: Richard B. Gaffin, Jr.  ‘Old Amsterdam and 
Inerrancy.’ in the Westminster Theological Journal vol. 44, pp. 250-89, 1982 and vol. 45, pp. 219-72, 1983. 
591 Kuyper, Abraham.  Sacred Theology.  Sovereign Grace Publishers, Inc.: Indiana, 2001, p. 169. 
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separation between pneumatology and authority that must not be made.  Wherever Scripture 
is found to be authoritative it is a direct result of the Spirit’s work.   
 
So does the Bible have authority?  Yes.  Not because it was once inspired by God and so 
contains inerrant properties which anyone either in or outside the church would be able to 
acknowledge.  Rather, it has authority precisely because the Spirit appropriates it to 
accomplish his purposes.  Its authority is reflective of the Holy Spirit’s current authority 
within the church and will continue to be authoritative as long as the Spirit is working to 
bring about His purposes.   
 
It seems that one of the main points of the doctrine of inerrancy is that in order to have an 
authoritative Bible the Bible must have been first given without error.  It would be consistent 
then for inerrantists to concentrate on the past work of the Holy Spirit in creating an errorless 
autograph.   What is evident is that the Spirit does play a primary role in establishing biblical 
authority, but it is the past work of the Spirit that does this.  It is the past work of the Spirit 
one must continually appeal to if he is going to show the Bible to be authoritative.   
 
Without this decisive act of the Spirit there could be no doctrine of inerrancy.  It is only 
because God has ‘breathed’ the Scriptures that they can be said to be inerrant.  The Spiritual 
work of inspiration guarantees the inerrancy of the product of this inspiration, which in turn 
guarantees the authority of the product of this inspiration.  To put it more simply, divine 
inspiration guarantees inerrancy and inerrancy provides the foundation for biblical authority. 
 
What is important about this condition is the kind of emphasis placed on the Holy Spirit.  
There is little to no appeal by the inerrantist to the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit that 
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happens in a believer’s life today.  It would almost seem that this aspect of the Spirit’s work 
is an added extra on top of the more tangible evidences of inerrancy.  The picture we are 
given by the doctrine of inerrancy has a remarkable resemblance to the Barth and Brunner 
debate over natural theology.  What it comes down to is this: Has God given us something 
that is part of the created realm by which we can access His truth through our own natural 
faculties, or must God work in the life of a person prior to their coming into contact with a 
specific aspect of creation in order for them to see how this aspect of creation supports the 
belief they have about God already.  One might argue that the doctrine of inerrancy supports 
a type of natural theology where the Bible becomes the aspect of creation that all can access 
and by which all can come to know God.  If this is the case then the Holy Spirit comes after 
belief is established by the encounter with Scripture and confirms this encounter.  Faith is not 
so much a gift as a natural response to the evidences of creation (in this case the inerrant 
Scriptures). 
 
There is little need for the testimony of the Spirit within the doctrine of inerrancy because the 
evidences of Scripture are enough to establish belief in its claims.  The tendency then is to 
see the Spirit as a relief player who only comes in when the evidence of Scripture is not 
sustaining conviction.  When this happens the Spirit comes in and provides assurance to the 
believer that the evidence is correct and that the Bible is authoritative.   
 
Does this mean that anyone who believes in the past work of Spirit’s production of the 
Biblical text must adopt a doctrine of inerrancy?  No.  John Webster is one of a number of 
theologians who accept the past inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the production of the texts of 
Scripture but who do not find the doctrine of inerrancy vital to their understanding of 
Scripture.  He talks about the inspiration of Scripture as “the sanctifying work of the Spirit so 
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that they [the texts] may become fitting vessels of the treasure of the Gospel.” 592  He even 
uses the language of concursus when talking about the inspiration of Scripture and yet he 
does not see the doctrine of inerrancy as a necessary component to the doctrine of Scripture 
he provides. 
 
What does not seem to be the case is the ability to affirm the doctrine of inerrancy apart from 
the past act of the Spirit. The act of producing an inerrant revelation is strictly reliant upon 
the action of God.  So to talk about inerrancy without the past inspiration of the Holy Spirit 
upon the writers of the Scriptures would seem to be impossible.  However, by accepting the 
doctrine of inerrancy one finds little need of the contemporary work of the Holy Spirit to 
establish biblical authority.   
If the authority of scripture is dependent upon the contemporary work of the Holy Spirit then 
does this necessarily mean that we have to completely do away with the doctrine of inerrancy 
altogether?  No.  The doctrine of inerrancy still may play a vital role as being one of many 
indicia which help to support the faith of those who know Jesus as their Lord and Saviour.  
But when it is taken out of the realm of proving scripture’s authority then it no longer is the 
foundation of faith.  Therefore, one’s faith does not have to be stumbled by an apparent 
problem with the text, and also, one does not have to prove that there are not any problems 
with the text before one believes.  The Spirit gives both faith in Christ and faith in the 
authority of Scripture. 
 
This means that scripture is not some kind of scientific textbook which we are at liberty to 
‘put to the test’   which many both within and without the church have wanted to do for 
nearly three hundred years.  We can affirm the mysteriousness of the text and not need to 
                                                
592 Webster, John.  Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch.  Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003, p. 38. 
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examine it under a fine-tooth comb.  The Bible is not that kind of text, but when the 
inerrancy of the text is the foundation for its authority then the temptation is to treat it as 
such.  If there is no guarantee ‘from below’ that when one reads the Bible she will be 
enlightened of the mysteries of God, like one would be about the reproduction of a butterfly 
after reading an entomology textbook, then one ought to approach the Bible differently than 
one would a scientific textbook.  When the church reads its scripture it hopes that it will meet 
with her risen Lord and so come to know and love God more.  That meeting is the work of 
the Father through the Son by the Spirit.  If there is a guarantee that this meeting will happen 
it is from God alone.   We hope but cannot expect this to happen, so we ought to approach 
the text of scripture humbly with reverence hoping that we might love God more as he meets 
us in our reading of the text.593   
 
In this understanding the role of the Holy Spirit is key.  We saw that the work of the Holy 
Spirit is important for the doctrine of inerrancy but that that work is restricted to his past act 
of inspiration.  For both Calvin and Kuyper restricting the authority of Scripture to the past 
act of the Spirit is inadequate.  But if one wants to see scripture as a scientific textbook that 
acts as the foundation for the church’s faith then one has to restrict the role of the Spirit to the 
past act of inspiration.  What we are suggesting here is that one recognizes the necessity of 
the Spirit’s contemporary work in making scripture authoritative to mankind and so not treat 
it as a text with which one can do anything one likes.  If we reduce the Spirit’s role in 
scriptural authority to the past act of plenary inspiration then not only are we prone to treat 
the text we have as a scientific textbook that is the foundation of our faith, but also we are in 
                                                
593 My argument here is similar to the Reformation debates over the efficacy of the Sacraments.  Is there 
something in the sacrament that is itself powerful, or is the power of the sacrament only the promise of God?  
Similarly, is there something in the text of Scripture that is itself powerful, or is the power of Scripture reliant 
on the promise of God, i.e., God’s faithfulness?   
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danger of deism- the Holy Spirit acted once before in the past but we no longer need him to 
continue to act for us to believe.   
 
Is this an exclusive picture that I am painting?  Do only those who are part of the club 
recognize the authority of Scripture?  I don’t think so.  There does not seem to be any 
necessary reason why one would need to equate recognition of the authority of scripture and 
being in the community of believers called the church.  It is possible to imagine that the 
Spirit would convict someone of scripture’s authority and for whatever reason they do not 
find themselves part of the believing community.  The point I am stressing is that whenever 
belief in the authority of Scripture happens it is a direct result of the current work of the Holy 
Spirit.  It is not because the Holy Spirit once acted a long time ago and so now we have all 
these proofs so that anyone of normal cognitive abilities ought to be able to recognize and 
believe in scripture’s authority.   
 
This thesis started with a quote from Harold Lindsell.  In his remark we are told that it would 
be a sinful not to come to grips with the doctrine of inerrancy, a doctrine which he believed 
would be the watershed issue for American evangelicals in the twentieth century.  Six 
chapters later we have come to a point where some conclusions are necessary.  This thesis 
has never been about disproving the doctrine of inerrancy.  Rather, it has sought to question 
its status as a foundational doctrine for the church.  Furthermore, the doctrine of inerrancy 
may have a role to play amongst the other doctrines of the church, but this thesis concludes 
that it ought not play the primary role upon which all other doctrines rely.  The two main 
reasons were established in each of the two main sections of this thesis.  Fundamentally, the 
doctrine of inerrancy assumes an inadequate account of truth and authority and so cannot be 
the definitive statement on these subjects. 
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The doctrine of inerrancy is primarily rooted in an eighteenth century understanding of truth 
which regarded truth as propositional in nature.  It depends on the presupposition that these 
propositions correspond to an objective reality independent of themselves and that these 
propositions are founded upon specific epistemological certainties accessible universally to 
rational beings.   
 
This particular view of truth is not theologically adequate.  A more appropriate understanding 
of truth would consider the implications, as well as, define itself according to the theological 
claim of Jesus Christ to be the truth.  The claim of Scripture is that truth is not properly to be 
understood as a proposition but that it has theological significance, and this theological 
significance cannot be completely appropriated by the definition of truth presupposed by the 
doctrine of inerrancy. 
 
This ‘Christological’ definition of truth is a lager category than the propositional definition 
given by inerrantists and so logically may include an understanding of truth where sometimes 
truth is conveyed by propositions.  However, if one presupposes a definition of truth, which 
is, formed by the philosophical assumptions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then 
one cannot affirm the theological definition of truth required in the scriptural witness.  The 
doctrine of inerrancy does this and therefore does not provide an adequate understanding of 
truth. 
 
But it is not only its definition of truth where the doctrine of inerrancy struggles.  Its account 
of biblical authority is also inadequate for many of same reasons.  Because of their 
philosophical presuppositions, both Warfield and Henry base scriptural authority on the past 
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act of the Holy Spirit in inspiring the text.  This pneumatology is an inadequate 
representation of the Spirit’s function within the church and is not consistent with the 
Calvin’s doctrine of biblical authority, whom both Warfield and Henry see as a guiding light 
for their theology.  
 
Both Warfield and Henry’s particular pneumatologies and their doctrines of Scripture do not 
adequately represent the area of the Reformed tradition of which they were a part. Calvin 
required a very contemporary role for the Spirit in order for his doctrine of biblical authority 
to succeed.  Without the contemporary internal witness of the Spirit, Holy Scripture would 
not have authority for those who read it.  However, both Warfield and Henry place so much 
emphasis on the past act of the Spirit that His contemporary witness is of little or no value.  
This is one of the reasons why inerrancy is so valuable.   
 
Inerrantist insist with the utmost decisiveness that all authority is lost if the one does not 
belief that the Scriptures in their original autographs are without error.  But if the Dutch 
Reformed position of Abraham Kuyper is then the current work of the Holy Spirit relied on 
to establish the authority of Scripture.  Furthermore, the model constructed by Barth has such 
a strong Christological aspect to it that the authority of Scripture is grounded in this 
(however, the role of the Spirit cannot be seen as separate here).  Furthermore, both of these 
models provide different ways of understanding Biblical authority without presupposing 
some of the necessary things of the doctrine of inerrancy.   
 
Abraham Kuyper, the Dutch Reformed theologian mentioned above, provides a way of 
understanding biblical authority that seemed very similar to Calvin’s Reformed position.  He 
also would probably have accepted prima facie the doctrine of inerrancy, or at the very least 
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the idea that Scripture did not lie in what it revealed.  And yet nowhere, does he connect his 
understanding of biblical authority with his beliefs about whether or not Scripture erred.   If 
there is a way forward for the doctrine of inerrancy then I would suggest that it should root 
itself in Kuyper’s theological commitments.  Kuyper seems to offer an account of biblical 
authority that is pneumatologically robust and consistent with his Reformed predecessors. 
 
But what do we mean when we say that Scripture has no authority without the contemporary 
and internal work of the Holy Spirit.  It seems that people who come to the text of Scripture 
without the work of the Spirit can read much of it and know what it says.  However, this does 
not mean that they understand what it says.  The first thing that comes with the Spirit’s work 
upon the reader of the text is understanding.   When the Bible presents the claim that Jesus is 
Lord to the person reading it, it is authoritative when the person understands what that claim 
means.  So when it is said that the authority of Scripture is reliant upon the Spirit’s 
testimony, it is meant that a person is given understanding of the text by the Spirit.   
 
But authority does not just imply understanding.  If a person reads the Bible and is presented 
with the claim that ‘Jesus is Lord’ they will believe and be convicted that this is the case only 
by the inner work of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:3).  Therefore, in some sense the term 
authority implies conviction.  The Bible has authority means that the  Bible’s claims about 
reality bring conviction to those who have been internally witnessed to by the Holy Spirit.   
 
Both understanding and conviction are results of the Bible’s authority for those who have 
been give the gift of faith.  The reader is not able to produce these things on his own.  When 
these things do not exist the Bible is not authoritative to the person reading it.  This is reason 
why it is so important to hold the Bible’s authority and the contemporary work of the Holy 
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Spirit together.  However, this does not mean that we have to deny that authority is a 
property of the text.  It is possible to affirm that the text has authority but that this authority is 
unrecognizable to those who have not first been given ‘eyes to see.’  Because inerrantists 
often equate authority with the text of Scripture and assume that anyone of a normal rational 
capacity could understand what it says and recognize it’s authority, they do not need the 
contemporary work of the Spirit.   
 
But could there be a doctrine of inerrancy that looked different to the one that is rejected by 
post-modern theologians and that we have been examining in this thesis? I would suggest 
that a ‘post-conservative’ doctrine of inerrancy, one that does not presuppose the 
philosophical foundations discussed throughout this thesis, and one that allows for the 
current work of the Holy Spirit in establishing the authority of the Bible but does not neglect 
His past work of inspiration might be modelled after Abraham Kuyper’s thought.   
 
What would this doctrine look like?  An entire thesis could be devoted to answering this 
question.  I can only give some suggestions of how one might conceive of this ‘new’ type of 
inerrancy.  First, because it would not be rooted in the philosophical shifts of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, it would not play a primary role amongst other church doctrines.  
Rather, it would be more like one of Calvin’s indicia, providing assurance for the faith of the 
believer who has already received the witness of the Holy Spirit in their lives.   
 
Furthermore, it would have no apologetic value.  It could not be the bridge that spans the gap 
between the church and the world.  Scripture would then truly become the church’s book and 
only once one is given faith by the Spirit would one be able to recognize it as the Word of 
God and value it as inerrant.  Thinking about inerrancy this way would require the church to 
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re-examine its understanding of pneumatology. It would have to rely more heavily upon 
God’s current action in building His church and less upon trying to prove that He acted in the 
past to inspire a specific set of writings known as the Bible upon which people should place 
their trust.   
 
Of course, the whole notion of error might be reconsidered in light of the Christological 
foundation upon which all derivative truth is founded.  If Jesus Christ really is the Truth then 
all error would be misrepresentations of who He is.  In a post-conservative account of 
inerrancy the error would not be true propositions representing objective reality versus false 
propositions misrepresenting objective reality, but rather, Christ versus anti-Christ.  So to say 
that the Bible errs may indicate that it is against Christ in some way.  There are other ways of 
thinking about this but the point is that a doctrine of inerrancy that presupposes truth as 
Christological will not be asking the sort of questions that the ‘classical’ understanding of 
inerrancy asks.  
No longer will questions about the correspondence between truth claims in scripture and 
what we know of the reality of the world take centre stage.  
 
Classical inerrancy assumes that we have a grasp of what the reality of the world is.  In this 
respect it is classically modern.  Thus it assumes what it means to err.  In other words, its 
understanding of error is dependent upon the presupposition that it knows the what the reality 
of the world is.  But what if the reality of the world is Jesus Christ (Colossians 1:16; 1 
Corinthians 8:6)?   In fact, this seems to be the picture the Bible paints of Jesus’ relation to 
the world.  The reality of the world is Jesus Christ.  This reality is what he made it to be and 
what it is being made to be through his life, death and resurrection.   
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If this is the case then asking what it would meant to err seems to be a relevant question.  
What is error?  It would seem that one way to understand error would be this way: Error is 
any misconstrued picture of the person and work of Jesus Christ.  This would not be just 
theological error, it is error of any kind, i.e., historical or scientific, philosophical or 
theological because all of these fields of knowledge deal with a universe what was made by 
and through Jesus Christ.  For instance, scientific knowledge is a particular type of 
knowledge which examines an aspect of the world that was created through Christ and at 
which Christ is the center.  To make a claim like ‘the earth is the center of the universe’ is a 
scientific error, yes, but the primary reason it is an error would be different than normally 
espoused.  On a Christo-centric model that claim is false because at root is a miscontrual of 
how this universe finally relates to Jesus Christ.   
 
Because the world was made by him and through him and because all things are subjected to 
him any account truth and falsity must be founded upon him.  The result of this 
understanding of error is not that we fully change the idea of what error is, but rather we 
change what the principle cause of error is and therefore change how we evaluate the 
importance of particular errors.   
 
What might this mean for the church?  It seems that one significant implication has to do 
with the Spirit.  How is it that one can know and understand truth of any kind?  Well, it 
seems right to appeal to the Spirit who promises to lead men and women into the truth.  
Relying on the Spirit to be the giver of truth means that man does not have to rely on himself.  
Therefore, man does not have to make himself into an idol. 
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Does this mean that only truth is given to believers or the churched?  I do not think this has to 
be implied.  The Spirit provides truth to whom he wills, church and unchurched alike.  The 
difference is that for some he enables them to recognize him as the giver of that gift and 
Christ as the foundation upon which the derivative ‘truths’ that the Spirit provides are 
founded.  This model recognized the very active role the Spirit plays in the contemporary 
world.  It is opposite to the classically modern picture of man in control of everything.  It 
means that the economy of God is central to both our knowing and understanding the truth 
that he both is and has created.     
 
On this model the need to define truth and falsity according to the standard “correspondence 
vs. coherence” debate is seen to be inadequate.  There is a sense in which all truth 
corresponds to the reality of Jesus Christ, but Jesus Christ is not an object to whom we can 
take under our control and scientifically verify.  Therefore, the strict correspondence view 
simply does not work.  Furthermore, there is also a sense in which Jesus Christ might be seen 
to be he who causes the coherence of truth and so it might seem that the coherence model fits 
better with this picture.  However, because Christ transcends the world, as the truth, he does 
not fit the strict coherence view either.  There are aspects of each of these views on truth that 
seem to fit with the model I am suggesting but neither fully realize philosophically the 
picture I am attempting to paint.    
 
Any theory of truth that does not start with the originator of truth will be inadequate.  A 
theory of truth which revolves around a Christological center, much like the earth revolves 
around the sun, and is drawn to that center by the Spirit, much like the gravitational pull the 
sun has on the earth, will begin to portray an adequate notion of truth.  It would take another 
entire project to develop these things fully.  What I have sought to do is a way forward for a 
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doctrine of inerrancy that assumes a Christological view of truth and in doing that to show 
where the main inadequacies are in the classical doctrine of inerrancy.  I only offer these 
specific thoughts toward the end of the thesis in order to give a glimpse of what a neo-
inerrancy might look like.    
 
Harold Lindsell may have been right about the doctrine of inerrancy being the watershed 
issue for evangelicals of the twentieth century but that is only because of the specific 
philosophical and theological commitments it makes, ones that we have drawn out in this 
thesis.  However, in order for it not to continue to be the watershed issue of the twenty-first 
century, it must be taken off of its pedestal as the foundational Christian doctrine upon which 
all others depend.  Although, there is no reason for it to be disregarded entirely because it 
conveys an important theological claim, i.e., that God is not a deceiver, when He speaks he 
does not lie.  The thought of Abraham Kuyper and those theologians influenced by him may 
be able to help create a doctrine of inerrancy uninfluenced by philosophical concerns of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.    
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